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Matter can receive a form, and within this form-matter 
relation lies the ontogenesis.
– Gilbert Simondon
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Introduction
What May I Hope For?
In academia, revolutionary and radical ideas are actualized through 
an engagement with scholars and scholarly traditions of the canonized 
past. Contemporary generations read, or more often reread older texts, 
resulting in “new” readings that do not fit the dominant reception of 
these texts. Also, academics tend to draw in scholars from an unforeseen 
past, those who come from a different academic canon or who have been 
somewhat forgotten. It is in the resonances between old and new readings 
and re-readings that a “new metaphysics” might announce itself. A new 
metaphysics is not restricted to a here and now, nor does it merely project an 
image of the future for us. It announces what we may call a “new tradition,” 
which simultaneously gives us a past, a present, and a future. Thus, a new 
metaphysics does not add something to thought (a series of ideas that wasn’t 
there, that was left out by others). It rather traverses and thereby rewrites 
thinking as a whole, leaving nothing untouched, redirecting every possible 
idea according to its new sense of orientation.
“New materialism” or “neo-materialism” is such a new metaphysics. 
A plethora of contemporary scholars from heterogeneous backgrounds 
has, since the late 1990s up until now, been producing (re-)readings that 
together work towards its actualization. This book is written on the new 
materialism simultaneously with its fleshing out of the new materialist 
ambition. The negotiations concerning the new tradition are carried out 
in the first part of this book. This part consists of four interviews with the 
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most prominent new materialist scholars of today: Rosi Braidotti, Manuel 
DeLanda, Karen Barad, and Quentin Meillassoux. The second part is made 
up of four chapters that situate this new tradition in contemporary scholarly 
thought. The problematics shared by the interviewed scholars are the subject 
matter of the chapters in Part Two, but it is new materialism that is active 
everywhere and always throughout. New materialism is the metaphysics that 
breathes through the entire book, infusing all of its chapters, every statement 
and argument. New materialism is thus not “built up” in this book: its 
chapters are not dependent upon one another for understanding their 
argument. The different chapters of the book can be read independently, 
although there are many different transversal relations between them.
The interviews in Part One are intra-actions rather than interactions. The 
former term was introduced by Barad and is central to her new materialism. 
Qualitatively shifting any atomist metaphysics, intra-action conceptualizes 
that it is the action between (and not in-between) that matters. In other 
words, it is not the interviewers or the interviewee or even the oeuvre of 
the interviewee that deserves our special attention, but it is the sense of 
orientation that the interview gave rise to (the action itself) that should 
engender us. For it is in the action itself that new materialism announces 
itself. We have emphasized this by making strong connections between the 
individual questions and answers in Part One and the individual chapters of 
Part Two. This allows the reader to go back and forth between the two parts, 
in order to gain a deeper understanding of the new materialist tradition.
The interview with Rosi Braidotti revolves, firstly, around the issue of the 
genealogy of new materialism, and around new materialism as genealogical. 
The latter can be read either as an instance of Jean-François Lyotard’s 
“rewriting” or of Gilles Deleuze’s “creation of concepts.” The genealogical 
element of Braidotti’s take on new (feminist) materialism, Braidotti herself 
being an (un)dutiful daughter of great Continental materialists such as 
Georges Canguilhem, Michel Foucault and Deleuze (van der Tuin 2009), 
most certainly pervades the remainder of the book. Braidotti makes clear 
how it is important to draw situated cartographies of (new) materialisms, 
and to traverse these maps at the same time in order to produce visionary 
alternatives, that is, creative alternatives to critique. When it comes to 
Braidotti’s precise take on the matter of materialism, we encounter a 
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Deleuzean “univocity” or “single matter,” while we simultaneously find 
Braidotti acknowledging difference as a force of sexual differing on the one 
hand, and a sexual difference that needs to be traversed in order to come 
up with post-human, post-anthropocentric, and post-secular visions of 
sustainability and (intergenerational) justice on the other.
The next interview, with Manuel DeLanda, demonstrates how new 
materialism is indeed filled with a visionary force, and how an attentive 
study of a material world asks us to look again at notions such as the mind 
or subjectivity from which this material world is independent. Braidotti’s 
genealogy comes back in DeLanda’s formulation of the new materialism, 
but initially in the form of dynamic morphogenesis as a historical process 
that is constitutive of the material world. It is only in a secondary instance 
that DeLanda is interested in the way in which for instance postmodernism 
or linguisticist idealism has led us away from theorizing scholarly processes 
as material processes, and as having dynamic, morphogenetic capacities of 
their own. DeLanda’s univocal methodology is at work from the word go, 
so it could also be argued that the “new” subjectivity or mind, including 
significant, not signifying, power differences, is always already implied 
instead of a priori established.
In the subsequent interview with Karen Barad, this discussion that 
cuts across the epistemological and the ontological is continued. For the 
visionary aspect of a new materialism that she calls “agential realism,” 
Barad brings in a “diffractive” methodology, which is a methodology that 
allows one to establish the genealogical aspect of Braidotti and the univocity 
of DeLanda in their entanglement (not interaction). This entanglement 
comes first, Barad demonstrates via feminist theory and Bohrian quantum 
physics. She explains how the so-called subject, the so-called instrument, 
and the so-called object of research are always already entangled, and how 
measurements are the entanglement of matter and meaning. Barad also 
singles out the ways in which what she calls “onto-epistemology” is always 
already ethical, that is, how possibilities for post-human agency are part of 
what Braidotti would call (sexual) differing, and what DeLanda would call 
morphogenesis. All of this opens up for a notion of matter that, as Barad 
says in the interview, affirms that matter “feels, converses, suffers, desires, 
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yearns, and remembers” because “feeling, desiring and experiencing are not 
singular characteristics or capacities of human consciousness.”
The final interview with Quentin Meillassoux seems to go back 
to the new materialism proposed by DeLanda. Whereas Barad and 
Braidotti work towards a new materialism that is immediately ontological, 
epistemological, and ethical, DeLanda and Meillassoux seem to be more 
interested in the ontological, either at the expense of an immediate or 
simultaneous interest in epistemology and ethics (DeLanda) or by leading 
up to epistemological questions of the classificatory kind (Meillassoux). 
This reading, however, would itself be classificatory, and would divide the 
terrain to an extent that may overstate differences and overlook similarities. 
Meillassoux produces a new materialism (a “speculative materialism”) 
that radicalizes the relation between epistemology and ontology, thus 
producing a new materialism that can access the in-itself. Similar to the 
projects of the three other interviewees, it is especially a subjectivism 
(also known as a social constructivism, a linguistic idealism, or an identity 
politics) that is qualitatively shifted in the anti-anthropocentric work of 
Meillassoux. Here, a “realism” is brought forward that intends to do justice 
to matter and the contingency of nature most radically, while stressing the 
limitlessness of thought.
In terms of academic attention, new materialism is in many ways a wave 
approaching its crest. The amount of publications on this topic is growing, 
especially in cultural and feminist theory (see e.g. Alaimo and Hekman eds. 
2008; Coole and Frost eds. 2010; Bolt and Barrett eds. forthcoming). As 
the authors of this book we have engaged actively in the constitution and 
application of new materialism (e.g. Dolphijn 2004; van der Tuin 2008; 
Dolphijn 2011; van der Tuin 2011). With this book, which is the result of an 
intense cooperation over several years, we have aimed at producing an open 
cartography of new materialism that radically explores this new tradition in 
thought, and that aims at including all that it can virtually do.
I
Interviews

Chapter 1
“The notion of the univocity of Being or single matter positions 
difference as a verb or process of becoming at the heart 
of the matter”
Interview with Rosi Braidotti
Q1: In your contribution to Ian Buchanan and Claire Colebrook’s Deleuze 
and Feminist Theory you coined the term “neo-materialism” and provided a 
genealogy of it. Focusing on theories of the subject, one of the red threads running 
through your work, your genealogy “Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, 
Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favorite fantasy” (Braidotti 
2000, 159) is followed by a definition of the subject, the “I think” as the body of 
which it is an idea, which we see as the emblem of the new materialism:
A piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by 
the unfolding of genetic encoding. Neither a sacralised inner sanctum, 
nor a pure socially shaped entity, the enfleshed Deleuzian subject 
is rather an ‘in-between’: it is a folding-in of external influences 
and a simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, 
an enfleshed sort of memory that repeats and is capable of lasting 
through sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to 
itself. The Deleuzian body is ultimately an embodied memory (ibid.).
In this text you stay close to the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze when 
developing the new materialism. The term, however, can already be found in 
Patterns of Dissonance, where you state that “a general direction of thought 
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is emerging in feminist theory that situates the embodied nature of the subject, 
and consequently the question of alternatively sexual difference or gender, at the 
heart of matter. […] This leads to a radical re-reading of materialism, away 
from its strictly Marxist definition. […] The neo-materialism of Foucault, the 
new materiality proposed by Deleuze are […] a point of no return for feminist 
theory” (Braidotti 1991, 263–6), and in Nomadic Subjects where it is stated 
that “What emerges in poststructuralist feminist reaffirmations of difference is 
[…] a new materialist theory of the text and of textual practice” (Braidotti 1994, 
154). How is “genealogy” important for you, and how is it that the full-fledged 
conceptualization of the new materialism came about in a text that focused on the 
philosophy of Deleuze?
Rosi Braidotti: You’re right in pointing out the progressive development 
of and identification with the label “neo-materialism” within the corpus 
of my nomadic thought. Patterns of Dissonance announces my general 
project outline in theoretical terms, which are expressed in the mainstream 
language that is typical of book versions of former PhD dissertations. Then 
there follows a trilogy, composed by Nomadic Subjects, Metamorphoses and 
Transpositions. Nomadic Subjects—which incidentally has just been re-
issued by Columbia University Press in a totally revised second edition 
seventeen years after its original publication (Braidotti 2011b)—already 
has a more controversial message and a more upbeat style. Metamorphoses 
and Transpositions pursue the experiment in a conceptual structure that has 
grown more complex and rhizomatic and a style that attempts to do justice 
to this complexity, while not losing touch with the readers altogether.
More theoretically, I would argue that, throughout the 1980’s, a text 
such as Althusser’s “Pour un materialisme aléatoire” had established a 
consensus across the whole spectrum of his students—Foucault, Deleuze, 
Balibar. It was clear that contemporary materialism had to be redefined 
in the light of recent scientific insights, notably psychoanalysis, but also in 
terms of the critical enquiry into the mutations of advanced capitalism. It 
was understood that the post-‘68 thinkers had to be simultaneously loyal to 
the Marxist legacy, but also critical and creative in adapting it to the fast-
changing conditions of their historicity. That theoretico-political consensus 
made the term “materialist” both a necessity and a banality for some 
poststructuralists. Leading figures in the linguistic turn, such as Barthes 
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and Lacan, wrote extensively and frequently about “the materiality of the 
sign.” In a way there was no real need to add the prefix “neo-” to the new 
materialist consensus at that point in time. That, however, will change.
What is clear is that by the mid-1990’s the differences among the 
various strands and branches of the post-structuralist project were 
becoming more explicit. The hegemonic position acquired by the linguistic 
branch—developed via psychoanalysis and semiotics into a fully-fledged 
deconstructive project that simply conquered intellectually the United 
States—intensified the need for clearer terms of demarcation and of 
theoretical definition. Thus “neo-materialism” emerges as a method, 
a conceptual frame and a political stand, which refuses the linguistic 
paradigm, stressing instead the concrete yet complex materiality of bodies 
immersed in social relations of power.
At that point, it became clear to me that the genealogical line that 
connected me to Canguilhem, Foucault and Deleuze also marked a 
distinctive tradition of thought on issues of embodiment and political 
subjectivity. The terminological differences between this branch and the 
deconstructive one also became sharper, as did the political priorities. 
Accordingly, “nomadic subjects” is neither about representation nor about 
recognition but rather about expression and actualization of practical 
alternatives. Gilles Deleuze—from his (smoky) seminar room at Vincennes—
provided lucid and illuminating guidance to those involved in the project 
of redefining what exactly is the “matter” that neo-materialism is made of. 
Things get more conceptually rigorous from that moment on.
Feminism, of course, did more than its share. Feminist philosophy builds 
on the embodied and embedded brand of materialism that was pioneered 
in the last century by Simone de Beauvoir. It combines, in a complex and 
groundbreaking manner, phenomenological theory of embodiment with 
Marxist—and later on poststructuralist—re-elaborations of the complex 
intersection between bodies and power. This rich legacy has two long-
lasting theoretical consequences. The first is that feminist philosophy goes 
even further than mainstream continental philosophy in rejecting dualistic 
partitions of minds from bodies or nature from culture. Whereas the chasm 
between the binary oppositions is bridged by Anglo-American gender 
theorists through dynamic schemes of social constructivism (Butler and 
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Scott eds. 1992), continental feminist perspectives move towards either 
theories of sexual difference or a monistic political ontology that makes the 
sex/gender distinction redundant.
The second consequence of this specific brand of materialism is that 
oppositional consciousness combines critique with creativity, in a “double-
edged vision” (Kelly 1979) that does not stop at critical deconstruction 
but moves on to the active production of alternatives. Thus, feminist 
philosophers have introduced a new brand of materialism, of the embodied 
and embedded kind. The cornerstone of this theoretical innovation is a 
specific brand of situated epistemology (Haraway 1988), which evolves from 
the practice of “the politics of location” (Rich 1985) and infuses standpoint 
feminist theory and the debates with postmodernist feminism (Harding 
1991) throughout the 1990s.
As a meta-methodological innovation, the embodied and embedded 
brand of feminist materialist philosophy of the subject introduces a break 
from both universalism and dualism. As for the former, universalist claims to 
a subject position that allegedly transcends spatio-temporal and geo-political 
specificities are criticised for being dis-embodied and dis-embedded, 
i.e., abstract. Universalism, best exemplified in the notion of “abstract 
masculinity” (Hartsock 1987) and triumphant whiteness (Ware 1992), is 
objectionable not only on epistemological, but also on ethical grounds. 
Situated perspectives lay the pre-conditions for ethical accountability 
for one’s own implications with the very structures one is analyzing 
and opposing politically. The key concept in feminist materialism is the 
sexualized nature and the radical immanence of power relations and their 
effects upon the world. In this Foucauldian perspective, power is not only 
negative or confining (potestas), but also affirmative (potentia) or productive 
of alternative subject positions and social relations.
Feminist anti-humanism, also known as postmodern feminism, 
expanded on the basic critique of one-sided universalism, while pointing 
out the dangers implicit in a flat application of equal opportunities policies. 
Contrary to “standpoint theory” (Harding 1986), post-humanist feminist 
philosophers do not unquestionably rely on the notion of “difference,” as 
the dialectical motor of social change. They rather add more complexity 
to this debate by analyzing the ways in which “otherness” and “sameness” 
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interact in an asymmetrical set of power relations. This is analogous to 
Deleuze’s theories of Otherness; his emphasis on processes, dynamic 
interaction and fluid boundaries is a materialist, high-tech brand of vitalism, 
which makes Deleuze’s thought highly relevant to the analysis of the late 
industrialist patriarchal culture we inhabit. Furthermore, Deleuze’s work 
is of high relevance for feminism: not only does he display a great empathy 
with issues of difference, sexuality and transformation, but he also invests 
the site of the feminine with positive force. Conveyed by figurations such as 
the non-Oedipal Alice: the little girl about to be dispossessed of her body 
by the Oedipal Law, or by the more affirmative figure of the philosopher’s 
fiancée Ariadne, the feminine face of philosophy is one of the sources of the 
transmutation of values from negative into affirmative. This metamorphosis 
allows Deleuze to overcome the boundaries that separate mere critique 
from active empowerment. Last but not least, Deleuze’s emphasis on the 
“becoming woman” of philosophy marks a new kind of masculine style of 
philosophy: it is a philosophical sensibility which has learned to undo the 
straitjacket of phallocentrism and to take a few risks. In Deleuze’s thought, 
the “other” is not the emblematic and invariably vampirized mark of alterity, 
as in classical philosophy. Nor is it a fetishized and necessarily othered 
“other,” as in deconstruction. It is a moving horizon of exchanges and 
becoming, towards which the non-unitary subjects of postmodernity move, 
are by which they are moved in return.
This double genealogy makes my own relationship to materialism into a 
lifelong engagement with complexities and inner contradictions.
Q2: In the same chapter in Deleuze and Feminist Theory the new materialism 
is also called “anti-maternalist” (Braidotti 2000, 172). Maternal feminism surely 
is, along with feminist standpoint theory, a feminist materialism. So, on the menu 
we find “the naturalistic paradigm” and its “definitive loss” (ibid., 158), feminist 
materialisms, “social constructivism” (ibid.), and, finally, “a more radical sense 
of materialism” (ibid., 161), that is, an “anti-essentialism” (ibid., 158), “a form 
of neo-materialism and a blend of vitalism that is attuned to the technological 
era” (ibid., 160). In Metamorphoses you propose a cartographical method for 
contemporary philosophical dialogue according to which “we think of power-
relations simultaneously as the most ‘external’, collective, social phenomenon and 
also as the most intimate or ‘internal’ one” (Braidotti 2002a, 6). Looking back 
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at your chapter in Deleuze and Feminist Theory, how would you employ this 
method to draw a contemporary map of the new feminist materialist dialogue? Or, 
from a slightly different angle, your chapter from Patterns of Dissonance on the 
radical philosophies of sexual difference (a branch of feminist theory that does not 
necessarily overlap with the trademarked “French feminism” and which is very 
much a materialism) closes with the provocative question: “have they been heard?” 
(Braidotti 1991, 273). How would you answer your 1991 question nowadays, 
amidst the theorizations of new feminist materialisms?
RB: The issue of the relationship between the material and the maternal 
was crucial for my generation. Part of it was contextual: we were the first 
ones in fact to enjoy the privilege of having strong, feminist teachers 
and supervisors in our academic work. In my case, I had as teachers and 
role models women of the caliber of Genevieve Lloyd and Luce Irigaray, 
Michelle Perrot and Joan Scott—to mention just the major ones. Talk 
about the anxiety of influence! This sort of lineage made the issue of the 
oedipalization of the pedagogical relationship into a crucial and complicated 
matter. Another reason for it was of course theoretical: if you look back at 
the scholarship of the 1980s, you will find a plethora of texts and treatises 
on pedagogics and mother-daughter relationships. Psychoanalysis alone 
blew this issue out of all proportions, and with the privilege of hindsight you 
may say that the entire post-1968 generation has a big negative relation to 
their mothers and fathers. I guess all members of a revolutionary generation 
are marked by the violence of a break, an inevitable rupture from the 
previous generation.
Personally, I fast grew allergic to the whole oedipal theme, also because I 
witnessed the many violent and sharp conflicts it engendered in the feminist 
community—the clash between Cixous and de Beauvoir being a legendary 
one. In some ways I was scared of the negative passions that the “maternal” 
mobilized in a highly politicized context. I consequently took shelter in the 
first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, aptly called Anti-Oedipus, and 
made sure to apply it to the question of how to develop an independent 
yet loyal system of thought in relation to the development of feminist 
philosophy. This choice coincided with my decision to bring feminism into 
the institutions, which I took as a process of democratic accountability. 
Central to it, of course, is the project of inter-generational justice.
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All of my cartographies are as inclusive as I’m capable of making them 
and I’ve carefully avoided sectarianism, while taking a firm theoretical and 
political stand (Braidotti 2010). This standpoint was also for me a way of 
staying sane through the multiple “theory wars” and “culture wars” we 
witnessed through the 1990’s, as the right wing took over the agenda in the 
USA and the post-1989 global consensus tends to dismiss the key traditions 
of thought I consider as fundamental for my work: Marxist and post-
structuralist theories of materialism.
Right now there is a need for a systematic meta-discursive approach to 
the interdisciplinary methods of feminist philosophy. This is among the top 
priorities for philosophy today (Alcoff 2000) as well as women’s, gender 
and feminist studies as an established discipline (Wiegman 2002). If it is 
the case that what was once subversive is now mainstream, it follows that 
the challenge for feminist philosophers today is how to hold their position, 
while striving to achieve more conceptual creativity (Deleuze and Guattari 
[1991] 1994).
In a globally connected and technologically mediated world that 
is marked by rapid changes, structural inequalities and increased 
militarization, feminist scholarship has intensified theoretical and 
methodological efforts to come to grips with the complexities of the 
present, while resisting the moral and cognitive panic that marks so much of 
contemporary social theories of globalization (Fukuyama 2002, Habermas 
2003). With the demise of postmodernism, which has gone down in history 
as a form of radical scepticism and moral and cognitive relativism, feminist 
philosophers tend to move beyond the linguistic mediation paradigm 
of deconstructive theory and to work instead towards the production of 
robust alternatives. Issues of embodiment and accountability, positionality 
and location have become both more relevant and more diverse. My main 
argument is that feminist philosophy is currently finding a new course 
between post-humanism on the one hand and post-anthropocentric theories 
on the other. The convergence between these two approaches, multiplied 
across the many inter-disciplinary lines that structure feminist theory, ends 
up radicalizing the very premises of feminist philosophy. It results especially 
in a reconsideration of the priority of sexuality and the relevance of the sex/
gender distinction.
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It is more difficult to answer the question of whether the radical 
philosophies of sexual difference, as a form of neo-materialism that 
doesn’t necessarily overlap with French feminism (a misnomer on many 
accounts) had actually been heard. The paradigmatic status of the sex/
gender distinction in American feminist theory and the global reach of 
this paradigm, for instance across the former Eastern Europe after 1989, 
has made it difficult for situated European perspectives to keep alive, let 
alone move forth.
Most notably, this sex/gender distinction has become the core of the 
so-called “Trans-Atlantic dis-connection.” If I were to attempt to translate 
this into the language of feminist theory, I would say that “the body” in U.S. 
feminism cannot be positively associated with sexuality in either the critical 
or the public discourse. Sexuality, which is the fundamental paradigm in the 
critical discourses of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, simply has no 
place to be in American political discourse: it got strangled. What chance, 
then, did “French feminism” have? The sex/gender dichotomy swung 
towards the pole of gender with a vengeance, disembodying it under the 
joint cover of liberal individual “rights” and social constructivist “change.” 
It was left to the gay and lesbian and queer campaigners to try to reverse 
this trend, rewriting sexuality into the feminist agenda. For instance, Teresa 
de Lauretis (1994) returns to issues of psychoanalytic desire in order to 
provide a foundational theory of lesbian identity. Judith Butler reverses the 
order of priorities in the sex/gender dichotomy in favor of the former and 
manages to combine Foucault with Wittig. By now, observers begin to speak 
of American post-structuralism as a movement of its own, with its own 
specific features and conceptual aims. The fact that most leading French 
poststructuralists take up regular teaching positions in the USA favors 
this second life of post-structuralism, which in the meantime dies away in 
Europe and disappears especially from the French intellectual scene. By 
the start of the third millennium, “French” theory belongs to the world in a 
diasporic, not a universalist mode. The Frenchness of post-structuralism is 
lost in translation indeed, just as it undergoes a conceptual mutation in the 
Trans-Atlantic transition.
One practical action I took in order to make sure that other, more 
European approaches were heard is to set up EU-wide networks of women’s 
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gender and feminist studies, of which ATHENA (the Advanced Thematic 
Network of Women’s Studies in Europe) is the best example. Theoretically, 
my function as ATHENA founding director resulted in friendly but firm 
criticism of American hegemony in feminist theory and an attempt to 
develop other perspectives, drawn from historical and situated European 
traditions. I think we’ve been heard, insofar as counter-memories and 
alternative genealogies can ever be heard. The sheer tone and structure of 
this interview with you—a younger generation of critical thinkers—gives me 
great reason to rejoice and feel a renewed hope.
Q3: Your philosophy has always been a philosophy of difference. In the chapter 
“Sexual Difference as a Nomadic Political Project” from Nomadic Subjects 
(1994) you explain why, and follow Luce Irigaray doing so. First, you claim to 
attempt to shift difference-as-a-dialectics, which underpins Western, Eurocentric 
thought. Here, “in this history,” you claim, “difference” has been predicated on 
relations of domination and exclusion, to be “different-from” came to mean to 
be “less than,” to be worth less than” (Braidotti 1994, 147; original emphasis). 
Second, you try to break through the canon of Western feminism, which has 
dismissed sexual difference “in the name of a polemical form of “antiessentialism,” 
or of a utopian longing for a position “beyond gender,” (ibid., 149). Developing 
your own approach, you have consistently focused on “sexual difference as a 
project,” as a “nomadic political project” (ibid.). Doing so, you have relied on so-
called “French feminism” and “French theory.”
Having discussed “French feminism” and its place in contemporary academia 
in question 2, what is your take on French theory at large in contemporary 
academia? Apart from its canonical version, which has been created in an Anglo-
U.S. context just like “French feminism,” do you see minor traditions in academia 
that are equally “French”? And if so, how do they look and how are they related to 
the new materialism?
RB: It is clear by now that we need to deterritorialize French theory in 
order to rescue it from the debacle it suffered in North America. This is a 
double challenge, considering how right-wing the European intellectual 
context has become in the last decade. A further factor that delays the 
development of situated European perspectives is the perennial hostility 
between French and German philosophical traditions. There are however 
three main points worth stressing: first, a tendency to move beyond the 
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analytic versus Continental divide in philosophy, as indicated by John 
Mullarkey (2006) in his work on “post-continental” philosophy. German 
philosopher Dieter Thomä makes a similar case in the volume I edited 
for the History of Continental Philosophy (Braidotti ed. 2010). These are 
encouraging developments that allow us to activate new theoretical and 
methodological resources within the previously antagonistic traditions.
Second, the productive contribution of radical epistemologies to the 
reception of French philosophy also needs to be stressed. Nowadays, there 
can be no reading of Canguilhem without taking into account Haraway’s 
work; no Derrida without Butler or Spivak; no Foucault without Stuart Hall 
and no Deleuze without materialist feminists. This is a point of no return.
Third, to address more directly your question I think French philosophy 
is rich in minor traditions, which we would do well to revisit. They range 
from the less globally recognized, but nonetheless quintessentially French 
tradition of philosophy of science and epistemology to the emphasis on 
sexuality of the libertine tradition. My personal favorite is the enchanted 
materialism of Diderot and an established tradition that links rationalism 
directly to the imagination. They are a multiplicity of mountain streams that 
converge upon mainstream materialism.
Q4: Do you agree that difference is quintessential to the new materialism? And if 
so, how would you define its take on difference?
RB: Absolutely—especially if one follows Deleuze on this point and 
posits monism as the fundamental ontology. The notion of the univocity of 
Being or single matter positions difference as a verb or process of becoming 
at the heart of that matter. There are only variations or modulations of space 
and time within a common block so it’s all about patterns of repetition and 
difference. Within such a system of thought, moreover, sexual difference 
plays a crucial role.
Sexual difference in particular poses the question of the conditions of 
possibility for thought as a self-originating system of representation of itself 
as the ultimate presence. Thus, sexual difference produces subjectivity 
in general. The conceptual tool by which Irigaray had already shown this 
peculiar logic is the notion of “the sensible transcendental.” By showing 
that what is erased in the process of erection of the transcendental subject 
are the maternal grounds of origin, Irigaray simultaneously demystifies the 
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vertical transcendence of the subject and calls for an alternative metaphysics. 
Irigaray’s transcendental is sensible and grounded in the very particular fact 
that all human life is, for the time being, still “of woman born” (Rich 1976). 
There are resonances between the early Irigaray and Deleuze’s work.
As I have often argued, Deleuze’s emphasis on the productive and 
positive force of difference is troublesome for feminist theory in so far as it 
challenges the foundational value of sexual difference. For Irigaray, on the 
other hand, the metaphysical question of sexual difference is the horizon 
of feminist theory; for Grosz ([1993] 1994) it is even its precondition. 
For Butler (1993) difference is a problem to overcome, as a limit of the 
discourse of embodiment; for me however sexual difference is the situated 
corporeal location that one starts from—it is a negotiable, transversal, 
affective space. The advantage of a Deleuzian as well as Irigarayan approach 
is that the emphasis shifts from the metaphysics to the ethics of sexual 
difference. Deleuze’s brand of philosophical pragmatism questions whether 
sexual difference demands metaphysics at all. The distinctive traits of 
nomadic sexual difference theory is that difference is not taken as a problem 
to solve, or an obstacle to overcome, but rather as a fact and a factor of our 
situated, corporeal location. And it is not a prerogative only of humans, 
either. This has important methodological consequences.
Following Deleuze’s empiricism, Colebrook for instance wants to 
shift the grounds of the debate away from metaphysical foundations to a 
philosophy of immanence that stresses the need to create new concepts. 
This creative gesture is a way of responding to the given, to experience, and 
is thus linked to the notion of the event. The creation of concepts is itself 
experience or experimentation. There is a double implication here: firstly 
that philosophy need not be seen as the master discourse or the unavoidable 
horizon of thought: artistic and scientific practices have their role to play 
as well. Secondly, given that ethical questions do not require metaphysics, 
the feminist engagement with concepts need not be critical but can be 
inventive and creative. In other words, experimenting with thinking is what 
we all need to learn. That implies the de-territorialization of the very sexual 
difference we started off from.
Q5: In your recent work you focus on “post-humanism” and “post-secularism.” In 
two articles in Theory, Culture and Society you elaborate on both terms. In fact, 
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you immediately complexify the post-human by weaving a post-anthropocentrism 
through it, which is an intervention ascribed to feminist theory: “The feminist 
post-anthropocentric approach […] also challenges the androcentrism of the post-
structuralists’ corporeal materialism” (Braidotti 2006, 198). In addition, you 
claim that for instance Donna Haraway’s post-anthropocentric post-humanism 
is not an anti-foundationalism; it is a “process ontology” instead (ibid., 199). 
Apart from the fact that you capitalize on Haraway’s Whiteheadian moment here 
(“Beings do not pre-exist their relatings” (Haraway 2003, 6)), you also ascribe a 
specific theory of time to feminist post-humanism, a theory that seems Bergsonian:
To be in process or transition does not place the thinking subject 
outside history or time […]. A location is an embedded and embodied 
memory: it is a set of counter-memories, which are activated by the 
resisting thinker against the grain of the dominant representations 
of subjectivity. A location is a materialist temporal and spatial site 
of co-production of the subject, and thus anything but an instance of 
relativism (Braidotti 2006, 199).
Process ontology, along with neo-vitalism, also provides the key to your 
conceptualization of the post-secular, albeit that sticking to the psychoanalytic 
frame remains of importance to you (Braidotti 2008, 12–13). In your work, post-
secularism is conceptualized as follows:
The post secular position on the affirmative force of oppositional 
consciousness inevitably raises the question of faith in possible futures, 
which is one of the aspects of […] residual spirituality […]. Faith 
in progress itself is a vote of confidence in the future. Ultimately, it 
is a belief in the perfectibility of Wo/Man, albeit it in a much more 
grounded, accountable mode that privileges partial perspectives, as 
Haraway (1988) put it. It is a post secular position in that it is an 
immanent, not transcendental theory, which posits generous bonds 
of cosmopolitanism, solidarity and community across locations and 
generations. It also expresses sizeable doses of residual spirituality in 
its yearning for social justice and sustainability (ibid., 18).
In your view, the post-secular is thus intrinsic to contemporary feminist theories 
of difference, perceived as structured by a politics of affirmation rather than 
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negation or dialectics (ibid., 13). And once more, theory’s non-linear temporality, 
in its Whiteheadian as well as Bergsonian mode, appears to be key.
In your theorization of the post-secular, however, the strong anti-androcentric 
approach of feminist theory seems to disappear somewhat, albeit that process 
ontology and neo-vitalism are explicited. How is post-secular feminism an anti-
androcentrism? How, for instance, should we conceptualize this faith in “the 
perfectibility of Wo/Man”?
RB: My starting assumption is that the post-secular turn challenges 
European political theory in general and feminism in particular because it 
makes manifest the notion that agency, or political subjectivity, can actually 
be conveyed through and supported by religious piety and may even 
involve significant amounts of spirituality. This statement has an important 
corollary—namely, that political agency need not be critical in the negative 
sense of oppositional and thus may not be aimed solely or primarily at the 
production of counter-subjectivities. Subjectivity is rather a process ontology 
of auto-poiesis or self-styling, which involves complex and continuous 
negotiations with dominant norms and values and hence also multiple 
forms of accountability. This position is defended within feminism by a 
variety of different thinkers ranging from Harding and Narayan (2000) to 
Mahmood (2005).
The corollary of this axiom is the belief that women’s emancipation is 
directly indexed upon sexual freedom, in keeping with the European liberal 
tradition of individual rights and self-autonomy. As Joan Scott (2007) 
recently argued, this historically specific model cannot be universalized and 
it is the basic fault of contemporary European politicians that they enforced 
this model and insist on its homogeneity in spite of rising evidence of its 
contingent and hence partial applicability. This is a crucial point, which 
again stresses the importance of sexuality as the major axis of subject-
formation in European culture and in its philosophies of subjectivity. It 
is precisely because of the historical importance of sexuality that sexual 
difference is such a central axis in the formation of identity and of 
social relations.
Thus the post-secular predicament forces, if not a complete revision, 
at least a relativization of the dominant European paradigm that equates 
emancipation with sexual liberation. Moreover, the post-secular position 
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on the affirmative force of oppositional consciousness inevitably raises the 
question of the desire for and faith in possible futures, which is one of the 
aspects of the residual spirituality I mentioned above. The system of feminist 
civic values rests on a social constructivist notion of faith as the hope for 
the construction of alternative social horizons, new norms and values. 
Faith in progress itself is a vote of confidence in the future. Ultimately, 
it is a belief in the perfectibility of Wo/Man, albeit it in a much more 
grounded, accountable mode that privileges partial perspectives, as Haraway 
(1988) put it.
Desire is never a given. Rather, like a long shadow projected from the 
past, it is a forward-moving horizon that lies ahead and towards which 
one moves. Between the “no longer” and the “not yet,” desire traces the 
possible patterns of becoming. These intersect with and mobilize sexuality, 
but only to deterritorialize the parameters of a gender system that today 
more than ever combines redemptive emancipatory benevolence with 
violent militarized coercion into the Western neo-imperial project. Against 
the platitudes of sex as conspicuous consumption and the arrogance of 
nationalist projects of enforced liberation of non-Westerners, critical 
thinkers today may want to re-think sexuality beyond genders, as the 
ontological drive to pure becoming. Desire sketches the conditions for 
intersubjective encounters between the no longer and the not yet, through 
the unavoidable accident of an insight, a flush of sudden acceleration that 
marks a point of non-return. Accepting the challenge of de-territorialized 
nomadic sexuality may rescue contemporary sexual politics from the 
paradoxical mix of commercialized banalities and perennial counter-identity 
claims on the one hand, and belligerent and racist forms of neo-colonial 
civilizationism on the other.
Q6: As a final experiment, let us try to move feminism beyond ideas about the 
social and cultural embeddedness of embodied femininity by discussing the way 
in which you work with the notion of the nomad. In Difference and Repetition 
Deleuze ([1968] 1994, 36) already contrasted the nomad to nomos, and it seems 
that throughout your work you delve into this particular opposition more and more. 
In other words, it seems to be interested increasingly not so much in a feminism 
that is about a rethinking of the relation between the female and the male, or the 
relation between the female and the world, what is at stake in your feminism is 
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thinking about “woman” in all of its morphogenetic and topological virtualities. 
From the “other materialism” which you already propose in the final chapter of 
your first book (Patterns of Dissonance) in 1991 to claims like “Language 
is a virus” (in Nomadic Subjects), you have already pushed feminism way 
beyond the idea that the female should be thought as “the Other” and even beyond 
Deleuze and Guattari’s “becoming-woman” which in some way comes close to a 
nomadology but still implies the social and cultural relationality which the nomad 
does not need. Could we conclude (with Arnold Toynbee) that the nomad is she 
who “does not move” but is merely interested in the experimenting and experiencing 
femininity in all its material realizations? Or better, has the concept of the nomad 
allowed you to set in motion a return to a radical Spinozism that studies not so 
much the social and cultural aspects of feminism, but simply poses the question 
what a woman can do?
RB: What a great question! I wish we could run a six-week seminar on 
it! The starting point for most feminist redefinitions of subjectivity is a new 
form of materialism that develops the notion of corporeal materiality by 
emphasizing the embodied and therefore sexually differentiated structure 
of the speaking subject. Consequently, rethinking the bodily roots of 
subjectivity is the starting point for the epistemological project of nomadism. 
The body or the embodiment of the subject is to be understood as neither 
a biological nor a sociological category, but rather as a point of overlap 
between the physical, the symbolic, and the sociological. I stress the issue 
of embodiment so as to make a plea for different ways of thinking about 
the body. The body refers to the materialist but also vitalist groundings 
of human subjectivity and to the specifically human capacity to be both 
grounded and to flow and thus to transcend the very variables—class, 
race, sex, gender, age, disability—which structure us. It rests on a post-
identitarian view of what constitutes a subject.
A nomadic vision of the body defines it as multi-functional and complex, 
as a transformer of flows and energies, affects, desires and imaginings. From 
psychoanalysis I have learned to appreciate the advantages of the non-
unitary structure of the subject and the joyful implication of the unconscious 
foundations of the subject. Complexity is the key term for understanding 
the multiple affective layers, the complex temporal variables and the 
internally contradictory time- and memory-lines that frame our embodied 
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existence. In contrast with the oppositions created by dualistic modes of 
social constructivism, a nomadic body is a threshold of transformations. It is 
the complex interplay of the highly constructed social and symbolic forces. 
The body is a surface of intensities and an affective field in interaction with 
others. In other words, feminist emphasis on embodiment goes hand-in-
hand with a radical rejection of essentialism. In feminist theory one speaks as 
a woman, although the subject “woman” is not a monolithic essence defined 
once and for all, but rather the site of multiple, complex, and potentially 
contradictory sets of experiences, defined by overlapping variables, such 
as class, race, age, life-style, sexual preference and others. One speaks as a 
woman in order to empower women, to activate socio-symbolic changes in 
their condition; this is a radically anti-essentialist position.
The nomad expresses my own figuration of a situated, postmodern, 
culturally differentiated understanding of the subject in general and of 
the feminist subject in particular. This subject can also be described as 
postmodern/postindustrial/postcolonial, depending on one’s location. In so 
far as axes of differentiation like class, race, ethnicity, gender, age and others 
intersect and interact with each other in the constitution of subjectivity, the 
notion of nomad refers to the simultaneous occurrence of many of these 
at once. Speaking as a feminist entails that priority is granted to issues of 
gender (or rather, of sexual difference) in connection with the recognition 
of differences among women. This figuration translates therefore my 
desire to explore and legitimate political agency, while taking as historical 
evidence the decline of metaphysically fixed, steady identities. One of 
the issues at stake here is how to reconcile partiality and discontinuity 
with the construction of new forms of inter-relatedness and collective 
political projects.
The political strategy doubles up as a methodology; transformative 
projects involve a radical repositioning on the part of the knowing 
subject, which is neither self-evident nor free from pain. No process 
of consciousness-raising ever is. In post-structuralist feminism, the 
“alternative science project” (Harding 1986) has also been implemented 
methodologically through the practice of dis-identification from familiar and 
hence comforting values and identities (De Lauretis 1986, Braidotti 1994).
Interview with Rosi Braidotti 35
Dis-identification involves the loss of cherished habits of thought and 
representation, a move that can also produce fear and a sense of insecurity 
and nostalgia. Change is certainly a painful process, but this does not equate 
it with suffering, nor does it warrant the politically conservative position that 
chastises all change as dangerous. The point in stressing the difficulties and 
pain involved in the quest for transformative processes is rather to raise an 
awareness of both the complexities involved, the paradoxes that lie in store 
and to develop a nomadic “ethics of compassion” (Connolly 1999).
Changes that affect one’s sense of identity are especially delicate. Given 
that identifications constitute an inner scaffolding that supports one’s sense 
of identity, shifting our imaginary identifications is not as simple as casting 
away a used garment. Psychoanalysis taught us that imaginary re-locations 
are complex, and as time-consuming as shedding an old skin. Moreover, 
changes of this qualitative kind happen more easily at the molecular or 
subjective level, and their translation into a public discourse and shared 
social experiences is a complex and risk-ridden affair. In a more positive 
vein, Spinozist feminist political thinkers like Moira Gatens and Genevieve 
Lloyd (1999) argue that such socially embedded and historically grounded 
changes are the result of “collective imaginings”—a shared desire for 
certain transformations to be actualised as a collaborative effort. They are 
transversal assemblages aimed at the production of affirmative politics and 
ethical relations.
De-familiarization is a sobering process by which the knowing 
subject evolves from the normative vision of the self he or she had 
become accustomed to. The frame of reference becomes the open-ended, 
interrelational, multi-sexed, and trans-species flows of becoming by 
interaction with multiple others. A subject thus constituted explodes the 
boundaries of humanism at skin level.
However, as Irigaray teaches us, changing the boundaries of what a 
woman can do entails the shift of fundamental parameters. Ontologically, 
in terms of the spatio-temporal frame of becoming; symbolically, through 
liturgies of actualization and the formalization of adequate modes of 
expression; and socially, in practical forms of collaborative morality and 
transitional politics that may lead to a more radical form of democracy. 
As I argued earlier, the conditions for renewed political and ethical agency 
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cannot be drawn from the immediate context or the current state of the 
terrain. They have to be generated affirmatively and creatively by efforts 
geared to creating possible futures, by mobilizing resources and visions 
that have been left untapped and by actualizing them in daily practices of 
interconnection with others.
This project requires more visionary power or prophetic energy, qualities 
which are neither especially in fashion in academic circles, nor highly valued 
scientifically in these times of commercial globalization. Yet, the call for 
more vision is emerging from many quarters in critical theory. Feminists 
have a long and rich genealogy in terms of pleading for increased visionary 
insight. From the very early days, Joan Kelly (1979) typified feminist theory 
as a double-edged vision, with a strong critical and an equally strong creative 
function. Faith in the creative powers of the imagination is an integral part 
of feminists’ appraisal of lived embodied experience and the bodily roots 
of subjectivity, which would express the complex singularities that feminist 
women have become. Donna Haraway’s work (1997, 2003) provides the 
best example of this kind of respect for a dimension where creativity is 
unimaginable without some visionary fuel.
Prophetic or visionary minds are thinkers of the future. The future as 
an active object of desire propels us forth and motivates us to be active 
in the here and now of a continuous present that calls for resistance. The 
yearning for sustainable futures can construct a liveable present. This is not 
a leap of faith, but an active transposition, a transformation at the in-depth 
level (Braidotti 2006). A prophetic or visionary dimension is necessary in 
order to secure an affirmative hold over the present, as the launching pad 
for sustainable becoming or qualitative transformations. The future is the 
virtual unfolding of the affirmative aspect of the present, which honours our 
obligations to the generations to come.
The pursuit of practices of hope, rooted in the ordinary micro-
practices of everyday life, is a simple strategy to hold, sustain and map out 
sustainable transformations. The motivation for the social construction of 
hope is grounded in a profound sense of responsibility and accountability. 
A fundamental gratuitousness and a profound sense of hope is part of 
it. Hope is a way of dreaming up possible futures, an anticipatory virtue 
that permeates our lives and activates them. It is a powerful motivating 
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force grounded not only in projects that aim at reconstructing the social 
imaginary, but also in the political economy of desires, affects and creativity. 
Contemporary nomadic practices of subjectivity—both in pedagogy and 
other areas of thought—work towards a more affirmative approach to 
critical theory.
Chapter 2
“Any materialist philosophy must take as its point of departure the 
existence of a material world that is independent of our minds”
Interview with Manuel DeLanda
Q1: In your short text “The Geology of Morals, A Neo-Materialist Interpretation” 
from 1996 you introduce the term “neo-materialism” rewriting the way in which 
Deleuze and Guattari, in their A Thousand Plateaus ([1980] 1987), use 
Hjelmslev’s linguistic model (which according to Deleuze and Guattari thus goes 
far beyond the reach of language) of form, content, substance and expression in 
order to conceptualize geological movements. In your reading of it, you make no use 
of Hjelmslev but instead favor other concepts like strata, deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization in order to map the morphogenetic changes of the real. There 
is no reason why neo-materialism should make use of particular concepts (like 
the ones mentioned) or even of particular authors like Hjelmslev. Yet what seems 
to be crucial for it would be to revitalize an interest in an affirmative reading of 
the dynamics among processes of materialization, as it offers us a thinking which 
starts with “bodily motions alone,” as Spinoza would put it ([1677] 2001, E2P49 
Schol.) and how this allows us to rethink very different branches of academia such 
as geology, mathematics, cultural theory, (neo-classical) economics and sociology.
In your book Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy from 2002 you give 
a beautiful definition of what ‘a history’ is, which made us rethink the way in 
which new materialism could be situated in academic thought. You write,
The well-defined nature of the possible histories is not to be 
approached by a mere mention of laws expressed as differential 
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equations, but by an understanding of how such equations in fact 
individuate trajectories (DeLanda 2002, 36).
Can we conclude that the books you wrote and the way in which your new 
materialist arguments rewrite the various branches of academia, are all about the 
creation of such “individuated trajectories” that invent a neo-materialism? In other 
words, could we even say that your neo-materialism, though inspired by Deleuze 
and Braudel, cannot even be said to have these authors as its point of departure?
Manuel DeLanda: Any materialist philosophy must take as its point 
of departure the existence of a material world that is independent of our 
minds. But then it confronts the problem of the origin of the enduring 
identity of the inhabitants of that world: if the mind is not what gives 
identity to mountains and rivers, plants and animals, then what does? An 
old answer is “essences,” the answer given by Aristotle. But if one rejects 
essentialism then there is no choice but to answer the question like this: all 
objective entities are products of a historical process, that is, their identity 
is synthesized or produced as part of cosmological, geological, biological, 
or social history. This need for a concept of “synthesis” or of “production” 
is what attracted Marx to Hegelian dialectics since it provided him with a 
model of synthesis: a conflict of opposites or the negation of the negation. 
Deleuze and Guattari, on the other hand, replace that model of synthesis 
with what they call a “double articulation”: first, the raw materials that will 
make up a new entity must be selected and pre-processed; second, they 
must be consolidated into a whole with properties of its own. A rock like 
limestone or sandstone, for example, is first articulated though a process 
of sedimentation (the slow gathering and sorting of the pebbles that are 
the component parts of the rock). Then it is articulated a second time as 
the accumulated sediment is glued together by a process of cementation. 
They use Hjemslev’s terms “content” and “expression” as the names for 
the two articulations, but this is not meant to suggest that the articulations 
are in any way linguistic in origin. On the contrary: the sounds, words, 
and grammatical patterns of a language are materials that accumulate or 
sediment historically, then they are consolidated by another process, like the 
standardization of a dialect by a Royal Academy and its official dictionaries, 
grammars, and rules of pronunciation.
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The question of the “individuation of trajectories” is about mathematical 
models (which to me are the secret of the success of science) but you are 
correct that it goes beyond that. All entities synthesized historically are 
individual entities: individual plants and animals; individual species and 
ecosystems; individual mountains, planets, solar systems, et cetera. Here 
“individual” means simply “singular or unique,” that is, not a particular 
member of a general category, but a unique entity that may compose larger 
individual entities through a relation of part-to-whole, like individual 
pebbles composing a larger individual rock. A materialist ontology of 
individual entities is implicit in Deleuze & Guattari and Braudel, so we must 
give them credit for that, then move on and invent the rest.
Q2: Neo-materialism is in a way rewriting academia as a whole, which includes 
the disciplinary boundaries that organize it today. In your work you definitely 
practice this by reading a geology into sociology for instance. Yet it would be 
very interesting to make this more explicit. Thus, how would new materialism 
propose a rethinking of the disciplinary boundaries (without using labels such as 
interdisciplinarity, postdisciplinarity or transdisciplinarity which eventually are all 
new disciplining exercises)?
MD: Academic fields are also historical individuals with contingent 
boundaries, many of which are settled as part of turf wars. Why would 
anyone feel the need to respect those boundaries? We need to draw on 
the conceptual and empirical resources developed by all fields to enrich 
materialism and prevent it from becoming a priori. What label we use to 
designate this maneuver is entirely irrelevant.
Q3: Despite your emphasis on individuated trajectories, you responded very 
positively to our request for an interview about a new materialism. You said 
that the time has come indeed for a renewed interest in materialist perspectives. 
In addition to its potential disciplining effects (“new materialism” becoming a 
theoretical yet anti-methodological school), we all know that materialism, in 
European thought, has a strong Marxist history. In several of your writings and 
interviews, however, you mentioned various problems with Marx’s thinking. 
You consider yourself to be left-wing, but you do not share many of the dogmas, 
institutional preferences and economic solutions offered by the Left, premised 
on Marxism. In terms of economics your interest seems to be much more in 
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institutional or evolutionary economics (think of the writings of Donald now 
Deirdre McCloskey and Phil Mirowski) and the way in which they now re-
read Adam Smith (especially his Theory of Moral Sentiments from 1759). 
Nevertheless, what you do take from Marx is his interest in the oppressed, that is, 
his anti-Aristotelianism that allows us to conceptualize the self-organizing power of 
“matter” without the “meaning” that should overcode it.
Combining your rejection of Marx and your appraisal of materialism, could 
we then label your new materialist thinking as a non-humanist and even non-
anthropocentric materialism?
MD: The political economy of Marx is entirely a priori. Although he 
was sincerely interested in historical data (and hence, in creating an a 
posteriori theory) the actual amount of information available to him was 
extremely limited. Today we have the opposite situation thanks to the work 
of Fernand Braudel and his school. In addition, the old institutional school 
of economics (perhaps best represented by the work of John Kenneth 
Galbraith) as well as the neo-institutionalist school, offer new models that 
go beyond classical economics. (The two authors you mention, though, are 
mostly useless, being meta-economists and non-materialist.) It is our duty as 
Leftists to cut the umbilical cord chaining us to Marx and reinvent political 
economy. Deleuze and Guattari failed miserably in this regard.
Marx’s theory of value was indeed anthropocentric: only human labor 
was a source of value, not steam engines, coal, industrial organization, et 
cetera. So in that sense the answer is yes, we need to move beyond that and 
reconceptualize industrial production. In addition, Marx did not see trade 
or credit as sources of wealth, but Braudel presents indisputable historical 
evidence that they are.
Q4: It would be interesting, in reply to Marxism, to see this stance formulated 
into a political program. Above all, the current ecological drama might be a nice 
starting point for a neo-materialist political program. But could it be led by an 
invisible hand?
MD: Ecologists (not only activists but scientists) are well placed to 
help in this regard, because as they study food webs they must consider all 
sources of “value”: the sun, the photosynthetic process that transforms solar 
energy into chemical energy, the micro-organisms that decompose dead 
bodies and re-inject nutrients into the soil, et cetera. Combining ecology 
42 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin
and economics is a good idea, so that a barrel of oil is not valued only in 
terms of its market price but as a non-renewable source of value due to 
the energy it contains. We may keep the idea of an “invisible hand” (that is, 
that prices self-organize as part of a dynamic between supply and demand) 
but only when dealing with large numbers of small firms without market 
power. When dealing with oligopolies there is no anonymous competition 
but rivalry and deliberate planning. Large corporations, as Galbraith argued 
long ago, are a “planning system” operating through a very visible hand. 
Braudel referred to oligopolies as an “anti-market” to stress this point.
Q5: In your work on “assemblage theory” (in A New Philosophy of Society from 
2006) you once again show us that it is “the movement that in reality generates all 
these emergent wholes” that we should focus on when we want to “get a sense of the 
irreducible social complexity characterizing the contemporary world” (DeLanda 
2006, 6). You argue strongly against the dualisms that have been transmitted to 
us in the history of philosophy (matter vs. meaning, micro vs. macro, inorganic vs. 
organic vs. social, realism vs. social constructivism, etcetera.) and argue in favor 
of a new ontology according to which “mechanisms are largely causal, but they 
do not necessarily involve linear causality” (ibid., 19; original emphasis). In an 
interesting book from 2007 called Built by Animals, Mike Hansell describes to us 
the following construction:
It is a sphere composed of a few hundred stones cemented together, 
with a large circular hole at the bottom. The top of its dome bears 
seven or eight study spikes, each a cairn of stones, larger ones 
at the base, the smallest at the tip creating a sharp point. The 
most distinctive architectural detail, the one that gives the name 
to the species that builds it, is the collar to the circular aperture. 
It is a pleated coronet constructed from particles too small to be 
distinguishable from the cement that binds them. The diameter of this 
whole dwelling, for that is what it is, is about 150 thousandths of a 
millimeter (i.e. micrometres, written µm). Smaller than the full stop 
at the end of this sentence, it is the portable home of the Difflugia 
coronata, a species of amoeba (Hansell 2007, 58).      
The Difflugia coronata is not an animal. It is a single-cell creature that feeds 
and reproduces, but has no nervous system (thus no brain). Major academics 
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interested in animal architecture, like the quoted Hansell, have difficulty explaining 
how such a simple creature is capable of creating such a complex form, their biggest 
problem being that the Difflugia coronata lacks a brain. For some reason they 
fail to see how their question already embodies several presumptions that make 
any answer impossible. They accept the Cartesian difference between the mind 
and the body. They accept the difference between the animal (subject) and its 
house (object).
New materialism, implicitly and explicitly, wards off these modernist 
oppositions, and might very well be considered capable of explaining how this 
simple creature could create such complex forms. Not only in your geological history 
of the organic world, but also in your assemblage theory you show us how organic 
and inorganic matter, in their entanglement, create the new. Do you think the 
Difflugia coronata created its house similarly to the way in which the human 
being created not only its cities but also the social group equally “[…] freeing 
them from the constraints and literally setting them into motion to conquer every 
available niche in the air, in water and on land” as you wrote in A Thousand 
Years of Nonlinear History (2000, 26–7)?
MD: It is absurd to think that complex self-organizing structures need 
a “brain” to generate them. The coupled system atmosphere-hydrosphere 
is continuously generating structures (thunderstorms, hurricanes, coherent 
wind currents) not only without a brain but without any organs whatsoever. 
The ancient chemistry of the prebiotic soup also generated such coherent 
structures (auto-catalytic loops) without which the genetic code could 
not have emerged. And bacteria in the first two billion years of the history 
of the biosphere discovered all major means to tap into energy sources 
(fermentation, photosynthesis, respiration). To think that a “brain” is 
needed goes beyond Cartesian dualism and fades into Creationism: matter 
is an inert receptacle for forms that come from the outside imposed by an 
exterior psychic agency: “Let there be light!”
So yes, neo-materialism is based on the idea that matter has 
morphogenetic capacities of its own and does not need to be commanded 
into generating form. But we should not attempt to build such a philosophy 
by “rejecting dualisms” or following any other meta-recipe. The idea that 
we know already how all past discourses have been generated, that we have 
the secret of all past conceptual systems, and that we can therefore engage 
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in meta-theorizing based on that knowledge is deeply mistaken. And this 
mistake is at the source of all the idealisms that have been generated by 
postmodernism.
Q6: Could you elaborate some more on this idea of not “rejecting dualisms,” 
since this comes very close to an important argument in our own reading of new 
materialism. For when we say that new materialism, implicitly and explicitly, 
wards off modernist oppositions and thus qualitatively shifts the acceptance of the 
Cartesian difference between the mind and the body, the subject and the object, et 
cetera, we are referring to Bergson ([1869] 2004, 297) who has argued that: “The 
difficulties of ordinary dualism come, not from the distinction of the two terms, 
but from the impossibility of seeing how the one is grafted upon the other.” Thus, 
we argue, the time has come to make a formal difference between this ordinary 
dualism as Bergson analyzes it, and the radical rewriting of modernist dualisms, as 
proposed for instance by Lyotard and Deleuze. The latter have set themselves to a 
rewriting exercise that involves a movement in thought that practices what Bergson 
termed “pushing dualism to an extreme,” rephrased by Deleuze’s statement that 
“difference is pushed to the limit.” Would you agree with us that this is actually a 
crucial element of new materialism’s affirmative stance?
MD: I am not convinced that avoiding dualities is the key to a new 
way of thinking (particularly if one simply adds new ones: modernism-
postmodernism, rhizome-tree, power-resistance). What matters is 
what categories are used dualistically. For example, in my book A New 
Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity (DeLanda 
2006) I criticize the use of the concepts “The Market” and “The State.” 
Not because they are a duality, but because both are reified generalities 
that do not really exist. Adding a third term, like “The People,” would 
not help. What we need is to replace the reified generalities with concrete 
assemblages: many bazaars, many regional trading areas, many national 
markets... each with a date of birth and (potentially) a date of death. 
The best way to deal with this problem is always to think statistically, 
dealing always with populations and with how variation is distributed in a 
population. Thus, the duality “male-female” can easily be eliminated if we 
take a large population and check how secondary sexual characteristics are 
distributed: all of them, except for the capacity to bear children, form two 
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overlapping statistical distributions. The duality emerges when one ignores 
the zone of overlap and reifies the averages.
Q7: Could we say that this stance exemplifies your ontological take on ‘topology’ 
as explained in Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy, which involves 
a qualitative shifting of Euclidean geometry (2002, 24) through “view[ing] 
this genesis not as an abstract mathematical process but as a concrete physical 
process in which an undifferentiated intensive space (that is, a space defined by 
continuous intensive properties) progressively differentiates, eventually giving rise 
to extensive structures (discontinuous structures with definite metric properties)” 
(ibid., 25; original emphasis)?
MD: Topology enters neo-materialism as part of the rejection of 
Aristotle. We need to replace both his “genus” and his “species.” The latter 
is replaced by the concept of a species as a contingent historical individual, 
born through a process of speciation (reproductive isolation) and capable 
of dying through extinction. The former is replaced by the “topological 
animal,” that is, a body-plan common to entire phyla (such as that of 
vertebrates) that is a structured space of possible body designs. Such a space 
cannot be metric because each vertebrate species varies in length, area, 
volume, et cetera, so only topological properties like connectivity can be 
used to specify it.
Q8: In After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux critiques idealists and what he calls 
“correlationists,” for their shared representationalism (something you also argue 
against) and also for continuing the anthropocentrism that saturates the history of 
Western thought. For although the human mind is no longer the point of departure 
for philosophy, correlationalism still needs it in order for the world to exist. 
Meillassoux ([2006] 2008, 37) ascribes a Kantianism to “the Leibnizian monad; 
Schelling’s nature, or the objective subject-object; Hegelian Mind; Schopenhauer’s 
Will; the Will (or Wills) to Power in Nietzsche; perception loaded with memory in 
Bergson; Deleuze’s Life, etc.”
According to our reading of your work, you seem to aim at providing a non-
anthropocentric mapping of the morphogenetic changes of the real. Does it follow 
from this summary of your project that you agree with Meillassoux?
MD: To be honest, I never read Meillassoux. But I surely reject the idea 
that morphogenesis needs any “mind” to operate. I also reject the neo-
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Kantian thesis of the linguisticality of experience. To assume that human 
experience is structured conceptually is to dehistoricize the human species: 
we spent hundreds of thousands of years as a social species, with a division 
of labor (hunters, gatherers) and sophisticated stone tool technology. 
Language is a relatively recent acquisition. Are we to assume that those 
ancient hunter gatherers lived in an amorphous world waiting for language 
to give it form? That’s Creationism again, you know: “And the word 
became flesh.”
So yes, to the extent that Meillassoux rejects all forms of idealism I 
surely agree with him. I would need to see what he offers beyond a critique 
in order to assess the actual degree of agreement. Critique is never enough. 
Marxism is not going to go away simply by making a critique of it, we need 
to offer a viable alternative.
Q9: If so, an alliance can also be struck between your work and the work of 
Alain Badiou, who is Meillassoux’s teacher and also claiming a new materialism. 
This time it comes to the fore when we take into account your shared interest in 
mathematics, and, more in particular, topology, diagram or model. For a new 
materialism to be valuable for scholarly and activist projects such as feminism 
and post-colonialism, however, a theory of the subject seems to be necessary. In 
new feminist materialism, for instance, alliances are sought with process ontologies, 
which make the non-anthropocentric stance not non-foundationalist (cf. the 
work of Rosi Braidotti). A question then would be whether you see this necessity 
for a new theory of the subject, and how this (dis-)connects with the work of 
Meillassoux and Badiou?
MD: Badiou left me with a bad feeling after reading his book on Deleuze 
which is incredibly incompetent. He uses the word “the One” on just about 
every page when Deleuze never used it (other than when making remarks 
about the scholastic notion of the “univocity of being”). He is also a fanatic 
about set theory, whereas I tend towards the differential calculus as my 
mathematical base. (The idea that the latter was reduced to the former is yet 
another mistake we inherited from the nineteenth century).
I agree that a theory of the subject is absolutely necessary but it must 
be based on Hume, not on Kant: subjective experience not as organized 
conceptually by categories but as literally composed of intensities (of color, 
sound, aroma, flavor, texture) that are given structure by habitual action. 
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Recent developments in artificial intelligence will help with this: while 
the old symbolic school is deeply Kantian, the new connectionist school 
(based on neural nets that are not programmed but trained) points to a 
way out. Current neural net designs are at the level of insect intelligence 
but they already suggest how an insect protosubjectivity can emerge from a 
dynamic of perceived intensities. We need to extend this to the subjectivity 
of mammals and birds, and work our way up to human subjectivity. 
The political implication of this can be phrased as follows: rejecting the 
linguisticality of experience (according to which every culture lives in 
its own world) leads to a conception of a shared human experience in 
which the variation comes not from differences in signification (which is a 
linguistic notion), but of significance (which is a pragmatic one). Different 
cultures do attribute different importance, relevance, or significance to 
different things because their practices (not their minds) are different. When 
it comes to gender, the paradox is this: idealism was created by males who 
were in an academic environment in which their material practices were 
reduced to a minimum, and who had wives who did all the material work. 
And yet the moment feminism became academic it became deeply idealist. 
Hence I welcome any return to materialism by feminists, even if based on 
entirely different ideas.
Chapter 3
“Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns and remembers”
Interview with Karen Barad
Q1: “New materialism” as a term was coined by Manuel DeLanda and Rosi 
Braidotti in the second half of the 1990’s1. New materialism shows how the 
mind is always already material (the mind is an idea of the body), how matter 
is necessarily something of the mind (the mind has the body as its object), and 
how nature and culture are always already “naturecultures” (Donna Haraway’s 
term). New materialism opposes the transcendental and humanist (dualist) 
traditions that are haunting cultural theory, standing on the brink of both the 
modern and the post-postmodern era. The transcendental and humanist traditions, 
which are manifold yet consistently predicated on dualist structures, continue to 
stir debates that are being opened up by new materialists (think of the feminist 
polemic concerning the failed materialism in the work of Judith Butler, and of the 
Saussurian/Lacanian linguistic heritage in media and cultural studies). What can 
be labelled “new materialism” shifts these dualist structures by allowing for the 
conceptualization of the travelling of the fluxes of nature and culture, matter and 
mind, and opening up active theory formation.
In your emphasis on quantum physics, you seem to be proposing a very 
similar route. The idea behind “agential realism,” in print since 1996 following 
the Bohrian approach to epistemology that you have published about since the 
mid-1980s, seems to ward off the dualisms that have haunted the humanities and 
the sciences as well. Particularly in the case of measurement, this agential realism 
allows you to re-read Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics and to critique the 
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fact that so many theorists refuse to come to terms with the material-discursive and 
performative nature of intra-actions.
Is this immanent enfolding of matter and meaning, which you refer to as 
“agential realism,” and which we name a “new materialism,” the quintessence of 
your critique of both the sciences and the humanities?
Karen Barad: The core of your question I have to say is spot on, but 
since you state what I am doing in terms of critique I wanted to start by 
saying something about critique. I am not interested in critique. In my 
opinion, critique is over-rated, over-emphasized, and over-utilized, to the 
detriment of feminism. As Bruno Latour signals in an article entitled “Why 
has critique run out of steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern” 
(2004), critique is a tool that keeps getting used out of habit perhaps, but it 
is no longer the tool needed for the kinds of situations we now face. Critique 
has been the tool of choice for so long, and our students find themselves 
so well-trained in critique that they can spit out a critique with the push 
of a button. Critique is too easy, especially when a commitment to reading 
with care no longer seems to be a fundamental element of critique. So as 
I explain to my students, reading and writing are ethical practices, and 
critique misses the mark. Now, I understand that there is a different valence 
to the notion of critique in Europe than there is in the United States; 
nonetheless, I think this point is important. Critique is all too often not a 
deconstructive practice, that is, a practice of reading for the constitutive 
exclusions of those ideas we can not do without, but a destructive practice 
meant to dismiss, to turn aside, to put someone or something down—
another scholar, another feminist, a discipline, an approach, et cetera. So 
this is a practice of negativity that I think is about subtraction, distancing 
and othering. Latour suggests that we might turn to Alan Turing’s notion of 
the critical instead of critique (Turing 1950), where going critical refers to 
the notion of critical mass—that is, when a single neutron enters a critical 
sample of nuclear material which produces a branching chain reaction 
that explodes with ideas. As a physicist I find this metaphor chilling and 
ominous. Instead, building on a suggestion of Donna Haraway, what I 
propose is the practice of diffraction, of reading diffractively for patterns of 
differences that make a difference. And I mean that not as an additive notion 
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opposed to subtraction, as I will explain in a little bit. Rather, I mean that in 
the sense of it being suggestive, creative and visionary.
In chapter 2 of Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the 
Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Barad 2007) I discussed in detail what 
I call a diffractive methodology, a method of diffractively reading insights 
through one another, building new insights, and attentively and carefully 
reading for differences that matter in their fine details, together with the 
recognition that there intrinsic to this analysis is an ethics that is not 
predicated on externality but rather entanglement. Diffractive readings bring 
inventive provocations; they are good to think with. They are respectful, 
detailed, ethical engagements. I want to come back to the crux of your 
question now that I have said something about critique. I do not mean to 
pick on that, but I think it is important to say something about the notion of 
critique and to move it to thinking instead about these kinds of provocations 
and other kinds of engagements that we might practice.
So, coming back to the crux of your question, the entanglement of 
matter and meaning calls into question this set of dualisms that places 
nature on one side and culture on the other. And which separates off 
matters of fact from matters of concern (Bruno Latour) and matters of care 
(Maria Puig de la Bellacasa), and shifts them off to be dealt with by what 
we aptly call here in the States “separate academic divisions,” whereby the 
division of labor is such that the natural sciences are assigned matters of 
fact and the humanities matters of concern, for example. It is difficult to see 
the diffraction patterns—the patterns of difference that make a difference—
when the cordoning off of concerns into separate domains elides the 
resonances and dissonances that make up diffraction patterns that make the 
entanglements visible.
I would like to offer two examples to think with in engaging your 
question. I recently gave a keynote at a conference at the Stevens Institute 
of Technology,2 which is in New Jersey. They are starting a very innovative 
revamping of their Humanities program. They are interested in taking 
insights from science studies, and running them back into the Humanities. 
This is the way they talk about it. What they propose is the reverse of how 
some would think of the potential impact of science studies: not to use the 
Humanities to think about the Sciences but to use the Sciences to rethink 
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the Humanities. This is their project and it was a very interesting conference. 
But there was something about the way in which it was being framed overall 
that I wanted to see if I could get into conversation with them about. First 
of all, there was the notion that what is needed is a synthesis; a synthesis 
or a joining of the Humanities and the Sciences as if they were always 
already separate rather than always already entangled. So that there would 
be Science with matters of fact, and nature, and so on, on one side, and 
Humanities, meaning, values, and culture, on the other, and somehow that 
there would be a joining of the two. So, we talked about the ways in which 
there are entanglements that already exist between the Humanities and the 
Sciences; they have not grown up separately from one another. I was just 
pointing out to them some of the limitations of thinking analogically as in 
looking for mirror images between the Sciences on the one hand and the 
Humanities on the other. And I was telling them about this wonderful story 
that Sharon Traweek tells about when she was doing fieldwork on the high 
energy physics community at the Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC). She 
is standing in a hall at SLAC, and notices a physicist staring at pictures of 
fractal images on the wall. She gazes upon the images and asks him: “Can 
you tell me what is so beautiful about those images?” The physicist turns 
to her with this puzzled look on his face and says: “I am not really sure 
why you asked the question. It’s self-evident! Everywhere you look it is the 
same.” And of course feminists are not trained to look or take pleasure in 
everything being the same, but to think about differences.
Of course the mirror image of that is that Science mirrors Culture, so 
we have a kind of scientific realism versus social constructivism, which 
are of course both about mirroring. Instead, what I propose is the notion 
of diffraction, drawing on the work of my colleague and friend Donna 
Haraway. As Donna says, “diffraction patterns record the history of 
interaction, interference, reinforcement, difference. Diffraction is about 
heterogeneous history, not about originals. Unlike reflections, diffractions 
do not displace the same elsewhere, in more or less distorted form, thereby 
giving rise to industries of [story-making about origins and truths]. Rather, 
diffraction can be a metaphor for another kind of critical consciousness.” 
What I was pointing out is the difference in the shift from geometrical 
optics, from questions of mirroring and sameness, reflexivity, where to see 
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your image in the mirror there necessarily has to be a distance between 
you and the mirror. So there is a separation of subject and object, and 
objectivity is about mirror images of the world. And instead, the shift 
towards diffraction, towards differences that matter, is really a matter of 
what physicists call physical optics as compared to geometrical optics. 
Geometrical optics does not pay any attention to the nature of light. 
Actually, it is an approximation that gets used to study the optics of different 
lenses, or mirrors. And you just treat light as if it were a ray (an abstract 
notion). In other words, it is completely agnostic about whether light is a 
particle or a wave or anything else. It is just an approximation scheme for 
studying various apparatuses. By contrast, diffraction allows you to study 
both the nature of the apparatus and also the object. That is, both the nature 
of light and also the nature of the apparatus itself. I talk a lot about this in 
chapter 2 of Meeting. But what I wanted to bring out is the fact that we learn 
so much more about diffraction using quantum physics.
There is a difference between understanding diffraction as a classical 
physics phenomenon and understanding it quantum-mechanically. I have 
taken this wonderful metaphor that Donna has given us and I have run 
with it by adding important non-classical insights from quantum physics. 
Diffraction, understood using quantum physics, is not just a matter of 
interference, but of entanglement, an ethico-onto-epistemological matter. 
This difference is very important. It underlines the fact that knowing is a 
direct material engagement, a cutting together-apart, where cuts do violence 
but also open up and rework the agential conditions of possibility. There 
is not this knowing from a distance. Instead of there being a separation of 
subject and object, there is an entanglement of subject and object, which 
is called the “phenomenon.” Objectivity, instead of being about offering 
an undistorted mirror image of the world, is about accountability to marks 
on bodies, and responsibility to the entanglements of which we are a part. 
That is the kind of shift that we get, if we move diffraction into the realm of 
quantum physics. All of this is to say that we come up with a different way 
of thinking about what insights the Sciences, the Humanities, the Arts, the 
Social Sciences, and let’s not forget insights derived outside of academia, 
can bring to one another by diffractively reading them through one another 
for their various entanglements, and by being attentive to what gets excluded 
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as well as what comes to matter. So that we wind up with a very different 
way of engaging the relationship between the Sciences and the Humanities, 
which I think is the original question that you asked me.
And then, just really briefly my second example and I promise you I will 
not go on this long about every question, but just to set up some things in 
the beginning… I taught a lecture course this quarter called “Feminism in 
Science,” which had Science students in the class as well as students from 
the Humanities, the Social Sciences, and the Arts, and we were talking 
about the notion of scientific literacy and how scientific literacy has grown 
up to be the sole responsibility of the Sciences. But what is scientific 
literacy? We spent millions of dollars on it in the United States and we are 
not really sure what it means at all, as a matter of fact. And after spending 
millions of dollars by whatever measure is provided for scientific literacy, 
we still have the same percentages of scientific literacy as before. According 
to these measures, scientific literacy is between three and six percent. And 
that is actually the same number of scientists and engineers that we have. 
That tells you something about the way in which scientific literacy is being 
understood, and how it is being measured, and how it is being thought 
about, and who needs to take responsibility for it, and so on. And so we 
talked about the fact that a different kind of literacy is actually required for 
doing science. That consideration of the ethical, social and legal implications 
of various new sciences and technologies after the fact is not robust enough. 
For example, we considered the new field of bioethics in which ethics is 
taken to be solely a matter of considering the imagined consequences of 
scientific projects that are already given. But the notion of consequences is 
based on the wrong temporality: asking after potential consequences is too 
little, too late, because ethics of course, is being done right at the lab bench. 
And so, as for what it takes to be scientifically literate, the question is what 
does it take in order to identify the various apparatuses of bodily production 
that are at stake here. And so in order to identify those we need a much 
broader sense of literacy and we need all kinds of people around the lab 
bench, so that scientific literacy should no longer be seen as being solely the 
responsibility of the Sciences. I think that is one of the ways in which we get 
ourselves in a lot of trouble in terms of education.
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Q2: Could you explain to us a bit more what, how, or who the agent in agential 
realism “is”?
KB: First, I want to say that I try to stay away from using the term 
“agent,” or even “actant,” because these terms work against the relational 
ontology I am proposing. Also the notion that there are agents who have 
agency, or who grant agency, say, to non-humans (the granting of agency 
is an ironic notion, no?), pulls us back into the same old humanist orbits 
over and over again. And it is not easy to resist the gravitational force of 
humanism, especially when it comes to the question of “agency.” But agency 
for me is not something that someone or something has to varying degrees, 
since I am trying to displace the very notion of independently existing 
individuals. This is not, however, to deny agency in its importance, but on 
the contrary, to rework the notion of agency in ways that are appropriate 
to relational ontologies. Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons 
or things; rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for 
reconfiguring entanglements. So agency is not about choice in any liberal 
humanist sense; rather, it is about the possibilities and accountability 
entailed in reconfiguring material-discursive apparatuses of bodily 
production, including the boundary articulations and exclusions that are 
marked by those practices. One of the items that you asked about is the 
how of agency, and in a sense, the how is precisely in the specificity of the 
particular practices, so I cannot give a general answer to that, but perhaps I 
can say something helpful about the space of possibilities for agency.
Agency, on an agential realist account, does not require a clash of 
apparatuses, (as Butler once suggested) such as the contradictory norms 
of femininity, so that we are never successful in completely embodying 
femininity, because there are contradictory requirements. Agential realism 
does not require that kind of clash of apparatuses, because intra-actions to 
begin with are never determining, even when apparatuses are reinforcing. 
Intra-actions entail exclusions, and exclusions foreclose determinism. 
However, once determinism is foreclosed this does not leave us with the 
option of free will. I think we tend to think about causality and questions 
of agency in terms of either determinism on the one hand, or free will on 
the other. Cause and effect are supposed to follow one upon the other like 
billiard balls, and so we got into the habit of saying that we do not really 
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mean this in a causal sense. And I think to some degree, causality has 
become a dirty word, as realism is/was. And so I am trying to get people to 
talk about causality again, because I think that it is very, very important. 
If we have a group of people where we find that there is a lot of cancer in 
a certain community, I want to know something about the nature of that 
community and about causal relationships, because if I am at Love Canal in 
the United States, a populated area where a bunch of toxins were dumped 
and the people were getting cancers, then I might want to evacuate people. 
On the other hand, if I am at the Mayo Clinic, where they are treating 
cancer patients and there are a lot of people with cancer, it is not the 
thing to do. I really want us to specify more carefully the different kinds of 
causalities, and how to think causality again. And that is partly what I mean 
by the notion of “intra-action” as proposing a new way of thinking causality. 
It is not just a kind of neologism, which gets us to shift from interaction, 
where we start with separate entities and they interact, to intra-action, where 
there are interactions through which subject and object emerge, but actually 
as a new understanding of causality itself.
First of all, agency is about response-ability, about the possibilities of 
mutual response, which is not to deny, but to attend to power imbalances. 
Agency is about possibilities for worldly re-configurings. So agency is not 
something possessed by humans, or non-humans for that matter. It is an 
enactment. And it enlists, if you will, “non-humans” as well as “humans.” 
At the same time, I want to be clear that what I am not talking about here 
is democratically distributing agency across an assemblage of humans and 
non-humans. Even though there are no agents per se, the notion of agency I 
am suggesting does not go against the crucial point of power imbalances. On 
the contrary. The specificity of intra-actions speaks to the particularities of 
the power imbalances of the complexity of a field of forces. I know that some 
people are very nervous about not having agency localized in the human 
subject, but I think that is the first step—recognizing that there is not this 
kind of localization or particular characterization of the human subject is the 
first step in taking account of power imbalances, not an undoing of it.
As a brief example, there is an article I just came across on the Internet 
by Chris Wilbert called “Profit, Plague and Poultry: The Intra-active 
Worlds of Highly Pathogenic Avian Flu” (Wilbert 2006), on the bio-geo-
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politics of potential flu pandemics. Chris’s analysis of the avian flu (H5N1) 
as a naturalcultural phenomenon highlights the importance of taking 
account of the agential entanglements of intra-acting human and non-
human practices. Chris points out that while world health organizations 
and governments are placing migratory birds and small farm chicken 
producers under surveillance, the empirical data does not support these 
causal linkages. Rather, the disease follows the geographical diffraction 
patterns of large-scale factory farmed production of poultry. The latter gives 
rise to unprecedented densities of birds, making first-class lodgings for 
thriving and mutating zoonoses. Industrially produced meats, international 
veterinary practices, biosecurity practices, international trade agreements, 
transport networks, increased density of human populations, and more 
are among the various agential apparatuses at work. Causality is not 
interactional, but rather intra-actional. Making policy based on additive 
approaches to multiple causes, misses key factors in avoiding epidemics 
such as providing inexpensive forms of safe food for the poorest populations 
and the elimination of industrial forms of the mass killing of animals. So in 
addition to nicely illustrating the importance of paying attention to “human” 
and “non-human” forms of agency, as it were, there is a way in which 
Chris acknowledges what gets left out of practices of accounting when 
agency is attributed to human or non-human entities and left at that. What 
gets left out, you see, is a whole array of very complex material practices 
that contribute to a kind of epidemic that is not attributable either to the 
organisms themselves or to the kinds of things that people do. I do not 
know Chris. I bring it to your attention, because I think that he gives us an 
interesting case to think with.
Another example that may be helpful here is an example that Haraway 
(2008) talks about. It is an example that is raised by Barbara Smuts, who is 
an American bioanthropologist who went to Tanzania to investigate baboons 
in the wild for her doctoral research. She is told as a scientific investigator 
of non-human primates to keep her distance, so that her presence would 
not influence the behavior of the research subjects that she was studying. 
Distance is the condition of objectivity. Smuts talks about the fact that 
this advice was a complete disaster for her research, that she found herself 
unable to do any observations since the baboons were constantly attentive 
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to what she was doing. She finally realized that this was because Smuts was 
behaving so strangely to them, they just could not get over her. She was 
being a bad social subject in their circles. The only way to carry on and to do 
research objectively was to be responsible; that is, that objectivity, a theme 
that feminist science studies has been emphasizing all along, is the fact that 
objectivity is a matter of responsibility and not a matter of distancing at all. 
What ultimately did work was that she learned to be completely responsive 
to the non-human primates, and in that way she became a good baboon 
citizen. They could understand, at least intelligibly to the non-human 
primates, and as a result they left her alone and went about their business, 
making it possible for her to conduct her research.
Q3: In Meeting the Universe Halfway and in several journal articles, you 
follow Haraway in proposing “diffraction,” the relational nature of difference, as 
a methodology for treating theories and texts not as preexisting entities, but as 
intra-action, as forces from which other texts come into existence. On the other 
hand, you focus strongly on the work of Niels Bohr throughout your work. Your re-
writing of the philosophy that is active in all of his texts seems to be neither dutiful 
nor undutiful to his ideas. And yet your work can be read as one of the strongest 
commentaries on the work of Bohr now available to academics. Perhaps the first 
one that succeeds in reading him into the Humanities. Next to Bohr, of course, 
you read many other scientists and scholars like Einstein, Schrödinger, but also 
Merleau-Ponty, Haraway of course, Deleuze, and Latour. Especially as concerns 
the philosophers and those scholars traditionally not read within the Sciences, you 
seem to read them very affirmatively, albeit in passing.
How would you evaluate this conceptualization of the way in which you 
treat theories, taking into account your proposal for a diffractive methodology? In 
other words, is there a sense in which your work is not a meditation that agrees or 
disagrees with the work of Bohr, but one that is intra-active with it, creating both 
the work of Bohr and agential realism? And what are the generational implications 
of diffraction more generally? Feminists are usually wary of thought as governed 
by oedipality; feminists such as Rosi Braidotti have argued for a methodology that 
does not repeat the all-too-common Oedipal relation with Masters, affirming their 
status by negating the work, and this comes very close to your critique of critique 
actually. Does diffraction allow for a relation between texts and scholars that is 
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neither undutiful (affirming the Master by negating the work) nor dutiful (placing 
the “new” work in the Master’s house)?
KB: Given what I already said about diffractive readings, I think it is 
clear that your question really beautifully states my relationship with the 
materials that I engaged with in doing diffractive readings. In the spirit of 
diffractive readings, I just want to say that I am really very grateful and 
indebted to you for your careful reading of my work. Thank you for that. 
I wholeheartedly agree with what you have said there in terms of the fact 
that I am neither looking to Bohr’s work as scripture nor to somehow be 
the “undutiful daughter” to Bohr. But to read various insights through one 
another and to produce something new, new patterns of thinking-being, 
while at the same time being very attentive to what it is that Bohr is trying to 
say to us, and I think that you have done that with my work so I wanted to 
thank you for that.
Q4: Although “gender” is the term that seems to be the unquestionable foundation 
of the field of gender studies, its conceptual legacy has been specified as Anglo-
American and linguistic. Feminist scholars working with gender usually set up an 
argument against a biological determinism or biological essentialism, and ascribe 
a fixed sexual ontology to major traditions in (scholarly) thought as well as to 
Continental feminist philosophy (e.g. the work of Luce Irigaray). Félix Guattari 
once summarized his take on these issues in an interview, stating:
If Gilles Deleuze and I have adopted the position of practically not 
speaking of sexuality, and instead speaking of desire, it’s because we 
consider that the problems of life and creation are never reducible to 
physiological functions, reproductive functions, to some particular 
dimension of the body. They always involve elements that are either 
beyond the individual in the social or political field, or else before the 
individual level (Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411).
This non-representationalist take on “sexual difference” seems to come close to 
your reading of this concept. Your proposal for an onto-epistemology shows us how 
matter (among others bodily matter) and meaning are always already immanently 
enfolded and transitional. Yet instead of taking a term from psychoanalysis (like 
desire), you bring in physics (Bohr’s conceptual apparatus). How then is quantum 
physics helping you in articulating your feminism?
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KB: A decade ago I would often get the following question: “Since 
your work is not about women or gender, what does it have to do with 
feminism?” My answer, of course, was: “Everything.” Happily, the question 
you have asked is light years beyond the kind of thinking that motivates 
that question. And I am assuming then that the level of conversation has 
shifted since that time, and that I can jump right in. Eros, desire, life 
forces run through everything, not only specific body parts or specific kind 
of engagements among body parts. Matter itself is not a substrate or a 
medium for the flow of desire. Materiality itself is always already a desiring 
dynamism, a reiterative reconfiguring, energized and energizing, enlivened 
and enlivening. I have been particularly interested in how matter comes to 
matter. How matter makes itself felt. This is a feminist project whether or 
not there are any women or people or any other macroscopic beings in sight. 
Along with other new materialist feminists—Vicki Kirby is notable in this 
regard—feeling, desiring and experiencing are not singular characteristics 
or capacities of human consciousness. Matter feels, converses, suffers, 
desires, yearns and remembers. You could also see Noela Davis’ paper 
on new materialism on this topic (Davis 2009). I tried to make this point 
more vivid in chapter 7 of my book, which has received a lot of interest and 
attention, but less specifically feminist engagement. And I think there is a 
lot of important food for thought in this chapter, at least in my mind. So I 
want to go over this, because it is a chapter that gets deeply into the physics 
of things, and as a result many humanities and social sciences scholars 
assume it is irrelevant to what they are thinking about. I always teach physics 
in my feminist classes, in part precisely because it calls into question the 
exceptionally narrow framing of scientific concerns and scientific literacy 
in the way that I was just talking about. Who is responsible for engaging 
with science? I’d like to walk you through some of what’s going on in that 
chapter, because I think it holds some really important ways for rethinking 
some key feminist issues about matter and space and time and so on.
I will give you a super-fast lesson of what you need to know about 
quantum physics and then come to what is in Chapter 7 to show you some 
of the results and what I think the implications are in terms of thinking 
about questions of social justice, which I think are key here. So here is my 
crash course on quantum physics.
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According to classical physics, there are only two kinds of entities in the 
world; there are particles and there are waves. Particles are very different 
from waves. Particles are localized entities that occupy a particular place 
in space and in time, and you cannot have two particles in the same place 
at the same time. On the other hand, there are waves, and waves are not 
entities at all. Waves are disturbances in fields. If you think about ocean 
waves, you see that waves often overlap with one another. They can occupy 
the same place at the same time; that is part of what they are famous 
for doing. So on the one hand, we have something localized, and, on the 
other, we have something very non-localized. Very distinct kinds of entities, 
ontologically speaking. In physics, there is a very simple machine that can be 
used to find out whether it is a particle or a wave, and it is called a two-slit 
apparatus. When you take a bunch of balls and shoot them randomly at two 
slits, what you find is that most of the particles wind up directly across from 
the two slits. You get something called a “scatter pattern.” You can think 
about the fact that if I am wildly throwing tennis balls in this room at the 
doorway, most of them are going to wind up right across from the doorway 
and a few of them will scatter to the sides. In contrast to that, think of a 
wave machine, making a disturbance in the water. And when the disturbance 
hits this kind of “breakwater” with two holes in it, what happens is that the 
disturbance bulges out on both sides and you get these kinds of concentric, 
overlapping circles that get forced through, just like when I drop two rocks 
in a pond simultaneously, I get an overlapping of concentric circles. That 
is a diffraction pattern and what you see is that there is a reinforcing of 
waves. When two waves meet, crest to crest, they make a higher wave. But 
sometimes you get a crest meeting a trough, and they cancel out. That 
makes for a very different kind of pattern.
Now, what happens if we test electrons with a two-slit apparatus? You 
might think, since we used to think of electrons as little tiny particles, that 
they would give me a particle pattern. But the result that we actually get is 
that electrons exhibit a diffraction or wave pattern. But as we saw, diffraction 
patterns are created by overlapping waves. But how can electrons overlap? 
They are particles. They cannot overlap with one another. You might think 
that the electrons are overlapping, but you can test that by sending one 
electron through at a time. If you send just one electron through at a time, 
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you built up this diffraction pattern. It seems like we cannot explain this 
diffraction pattern; it seems like a mystery how this particle seems to be 
acting like a wave. Einstein in particular was very upset about this and 
suggested that we do an experiment where we actually watch the electron 
go through the slits. I want to talk about this which-slit detector experiment, 
because this is what I am building up to. In this experiment, what I have 
done is replace the top slit with a slit on a spring. And if the particle goes 
through the top slit, it imparts some of its momentum to the top slit and it 
moves a little bit, then I will know “Oh, it went through the top slit.” So, this 
is a way to measure which slit the electron is going through on its way to the 
screen. And Einstein said if we do this experiment we will catch the electron 
in the act of being both a particle, by going through one slit or the other, 
and a wave by showing this interference pattern and then it will show that 
quantum mechanics is self-contradictory and that we will have to find some 
other way of thinking about it. And Bohr said: “No, not so fast.” If you do 
this experiment, you have now revised the apparatus. And what we observe 
in any experiment is a phenomenon or entanglement or the inseparability of 
the apparatus and the observed object. Bohr said that if Einstein were to 
make the adjustment to the two-slit apparatus he suggested, he is going to 
get a particle pattern, not a diffraction pattern. Now, one should lose sleep 
over this. Because what this is saying is that the ontology of the electron is 
changing depending upon how I measure it. Let me just finish the quantum 
physics lesson really quickly. Bohr has an explanation for this, which is 
to say, again, that the properties that we measure are not attributable to 
independent objects. Independent objects are abstract notions. This is the 
wrong objective referent. The actual objective referent is the phenomenon—
the intra-action of what we call the electron and the apparatus. And so 
the fact that its ontology changes when we change the apparatus is not a 
surprise, because we are investigating an entirely different phenomenon.
I will now move into what is in Chapter 7 because I think, again, that 
there are important feminist “lessons” here. And of course when I say 
“feminist lessons,” that is a distorting shorthand I need to qualify. Because, 
of course, what I am presenting with agential realism already has feminist 
lessons built in to it, and that is part of the beauty of Chapter 7. At least for 
me it is the incredible satisfaction of taking insights from feminist theory, 
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on the one hand, and insights from physics, on the other, and reading them 
through one another in building agential realism. And from there going 
back and seeing if agential realism can solve certain kinds of fundamental 
problems in quantum physics. And the fact that it is robust enough to do 
that, and that feminist theory has important things to say to physics is 
amazing, absolutely amazing, and key to the point I want to make as well. 
And in fact, when I was able to actually show that you could do science 
with agential realism and bring these important interests, the question came 
to me of whether or not I should publish this result in a physics journal or 
leave it for the book, so that physicists would have to go to a feminist book 
in order to find out some of the physics. I chose the latter, but in retrospect I 
think it was a mistake, because it took a very long time for the book to come 
out (more than three years) and because it seems that some physicists are 
engaging with my ideas without acknowledging it. Practices of publishing 
are always political.
Coming back to the issue at hand, Bohr and Heisenberg were totally 
at odds. Not only Bohr and Einstein, but also Bohr and Heisenberg. 
Heisenberg thought that the reason why it changes from a wave pattern 
to a particle pattern when you change the apparatus is because you are 
disturbing the particle. And this places a limit on what we can know, 
because each measurement disturbs what you are measuring. And he 
called that the “(Heisenberg) Uncertainty Principle,” which I have found 
is more familiar to European audiences than American audiences. But 
Bohr argues with Heisenberg and says that he makes a fundamental error 
in proposing uncertainty, and what is at issue is not uncertainty at all, 
but rather indeterminacy. That is, when we make a measurement, what 
happens is that it is not a matter of disturbing something and our knowledge 
is uncertain as a result, but rather there are not inherent properties and 
there are not inherent boundaries of things that we want to call entities 
before the measurement intra-action. That is, Bohr is saying that things are 
indeterminate; there are no things before the measurement, and that the 
very act of measurement produces determinate boundaries and properties of 
things. So, his is an ontological principle rather than an epistemological one. 
In other words, for Bohr particles do not have a position independently of 
my measuring something called position.
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Now, it seems that there is no scientific way to discern who is right, 
because what we are talking about is showing an empirical result about 
what happens before you do any measurement. So it seems like there is no 
way to ever resolve that. But actually we can. This is amazing! We can do 
experimental metaphysics now, which of course is just an indicator of the 
fact that there has never been a sharp boundary between physics, on the one 
hand, and metaphysics or philosophy, on the other. So there is an amazing 
and really astonishing experiment that physicists have only been able to 
do in the past decade or so since previously it was not technologically 
possible. And these famous Gedanken- or thought experiments of Bohr and 
Heisenberg could now be done for the first time, actually be performed 
in a laboratory. They never thought about them actually being done; they 
were not meant to be experiments that got actualized. They were meant 
to be experiments to think with, just tools to think with. But now it is 
technologically possible to actually do this experiment—to show what 
happens when I measure which-slit. Was Einstein right and do I catch the 
electron being both a particle and a wave showing that quantum theory 
is self-contradictory? Or is Bohr right that once I actually go ahead and 
measure which-slit, now I get a particle pattern and the interference pattern 
is gone? But even more beautifully than that, what the physicists have done 
in this case is to design an experiment where Heisenberg’s explanation of 
disturbing something that already exists, cannot be part of the explanation. 
So Heisenberg is designed out of this experiment. If it happens, it is 
happening for some reason other than a disturbance.
What is happening is that there is a beam of atoms coming along; in fact, 
they are rubidium atoms, and before the rubidium atoms reach the double 
slit, what happens is that there is a laser beam which gives the rubidium 
atoms some energy. And what happens when the atom gets energy, the 
electron that is in the inner orbital of rubidium gets kicked up to a high 
energy level from the energy it got from the laser beam. Now it is in, what is 
called, an “excited state.” See, there is already talk of desire in physics! And 
then it goes across and it goes to these cavities, these micromaser cavities. 
That is the which-slit detector. You do not have to know anything about 
micromaser cavities at all except this: when the rubidium atom in an excited 
state goes into one micromaser cavity or the other, the electron necessarily 
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drops back down to its ground state and in doing so it emits a photon and 
it leaves this trace photon in either the upper cavity or the lower cavity and 
then goes on its way through the two slits. So the rubidium atom goes on its 
way through the two slits and it hits the screen. And that is our experiment. 
Now, the reason why Heisenberg is not a part of this, is because you can 
show that by getting the rubidium atom into an excited state and having it 
come back down, it does nothing to affect the atom’s forward momentum. 
It is not disturbed. Here physicists have very cleverly made a which-slit 
detector that does not disturb the rubidium atoms’ forward momentum. So 
it is going to leave a telltale trace in detector one or detector two of which 
slit it went through without disturbing it. Now if you do this without the 
which-slit detector, just send rubidium atoms through double slits, you get a 
diffraction pattern. But if you put the laser there and the micromaser cavities 
and find out which slit it goes through, then it shifts to a scatter pattern or 
a particle pattern. But that second one definitely is a scatter pattern (rather 
than the alternating intensity pattern of waves). I just told you that there is 
no disturbance going on here so that is amazing already. It is amazing that 
you can now show that Bohr is right and not Einstein.
But now here is where we as feminists really need to pay attention, 
because now something really amazing is coming forward in this, which is 
that since I have not made a disturbance in actually measuring which slit the 
atom goes through, you might ask the question if, after it goes through and 
leaves a telltale trace (a photon) in one slit or the other, what happens if I 
erase that information? Will I get the diffraction pattern again? It would be 
very hard, if there was a disturbance, to completely “un-disturb” it just so. 
But there is no disturbance here, remember? So we can ask the question, if 
I erase the which-slit information, can I actually get the diffraction pattern? 
The eraser part here is that I am going to erase the which-slit information 
and here is how I do it. I have these two different cavities and I take the 
wall out between the two of them, the two micromaser cavities, and I put a 
photo-absorbing plate right in between them. Remember that the rubidium 
atoms are left in there and they have gone through and they hit the screen. 
But they leave a photon, a quantum of light, in either cavity one or in cavity 
two. If I put a photon absorbing plate in between, then if the photon gets 
absorbed, I have erased the information of which side it came from. So that 
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is how I am going to erase the information. And what I am going to do is I 
am going to put a set of shutters (like the shutters you have for blinds on the 
windows, and you can make it either shut so that the windows completely 
shut out the light or you can open them so the light comes through). So if 
we put shutters there, if the shutters are closed, I have the situation I had 
before where I know the which-slit information. But if I open the shutters, I 
give it the possibility of being erased.
And what happens here actually is that, if I do this experiment now and 
open the shutters, I can show that I actually get a diffraction pattern! Now 
this gets even stranger. So I have these rubidium atoms, they are heading 
toward the two-slit detector. They leave a telltale photon in one place or the 
other. They go through the two slits and I am going to let them already hit, 
completely hit the screen. Now afterwards I am going to decide whether or 
not to open the shutters and erase the information about which slit it goes 
through. That is called “delayed choice” mode. And if I trace the ones whose 
which-slit information is erased, I get a diffraction pattern. In other words, 
after the rubidium atom has already hit, I am able to determine whether 
or not it had behaved like a particle or a wave. In other words, whether or 
not it had gone through a single slit at a time, like a particle will, or gone 
through both slits at the same time like a wave will. In other words, after it has 
already hit the screen and gone through the apparatus, I am able to determine its 
ontology, afterwards.
So the point here is: how do physicists interpret this? The way physicists 
interpret this is by saying that we have the ability to change the past. 
Because I am changing how it went through the slit after it has already 
gone through the slits. So there is a talk about erasing what already was, 
restoring the diffraction pattern, and basically moving the clock backwards 
or changing how the particle went through after it has already gone through: 
the ability to change the past. Now I want to suggest, though, that that is a 
very convenient kind of nostalgic fantasy. I cannot blame physicists for 
engaging in this. I think this is a very seductive fantasy. Perhaps at one time 
or another all of us wish that we could change the past and the marks left on 
bodies, and change the ways in which we materialized the world, especially 
when we are not being careful, that we would like to undo what has been 
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done, that we would like to go back and do it differently. But is this really 
what this experiment is telling us about what is possible?
It turns out that if we look at this experiment more carefully—it is all 
explained in Chapter 7—the original diffraction pattern is not being restored 
whatsoever and there is no complete erasure going on here at all. What is 
happening here is that the experiment is not about engaging a past that 
already was. See, we assume that time is a given externality, just a parameter 
that marches forward, and that the past already happened and the present, 
that moment “now” just slipped away into the past, and that the future is 
yet to come. But if we examine this carefully, again using the insights from 
feminist theory, from post-structuralist theory, and things that Cultural 
Studies has been telling us, and so on, and bring them into the physics here, 
what we can see is that what is going on actually is the making of temporality. 
There are questions of temporality that are coming to the fore here. What 
we are seeing here is that time is not given, it is not universally given, but 
rather that time is articulated and re-synchronized through various material 
practices. In other words, just like position, momentum, wave and particle, 
time itself only makes sense in the context of particular phenomena. So what 
is going on here is that physicists are actually making time in marking time, 
and that there is a certain way in which what we take to be the “past” and 
what we take to be the “present” and the “future” are entangled with one 
another. What we have learned from this experiment is that what exists 
are intra-active entanglements. That is the only reason we get a diffraction 
pattern again, by the way.
And importantly, the original diffraction pattern doesn’t return, a new 
one is created, one in which the diffraction (that is, entanglement effects) 
is a bit challenging to trace. So, the issue is not one of erasure and return. 
What is at issue is an entanglement, intra-activity. The “past” was never 
simply there to begin with, and the “future” is not what will unfold, but 
“past” and “future” are iteratively reconfigured and enfolded through 
the world’s ongoing intra-activity. There is no inherently determinate 
relationship between past, present, and future. In rethinking causality as 
intra-activity and not as this kind of billiard-ball causality—cause followed 
by an effect—the fantasy of erasure is not possible, but possibilities for 
reparation exist. That “changing the past” in the sense of undoing certain 
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discrete moments in time is an illusion. The past, like the future though, is 
not closed. But “erasure” is not what is at issue. In an important sense, the 
“past” is open to change. It can be redeemed, productively reconfigured 
in an iterative unfolding of spacetimematter. But its sedimenting effects, 
its trace, can not be erased. The memory of its materializing effects is 
written into the world. So changing the past is never without costs, or 
responsibility. A recent Ph.D. student of mine, Astrid Schrader (whose work 
is really remarkable, well worth looking out for) has an amazing paper in 
Social Studies of Science entitled “Responding to Pfiesteria piscicida (the Fish 
Killer): Phantomatic Ontologies, Indeterminacy, and Responsibility in Toxic 
Microbiology” (2010), showing how previously incompatible experiments 
on a tiny aquatic organism with large environmental policy stakes can be 
reconciled by tracing how time is differently made/synchronized through 
different laboratory practices. She argues that memory is not a matter of the 
past, but recreates the past each time it is invoked.
What I am trying to make clear is—all of this is an answer to your 
question, believe it or not—a sample of what I have learned from engaging 
with quantum physics that helps me further my understanding of feminist 
issues and practices. My passion for my work is utterly and completely 
grounded, and hopefully always with its feet attached to the ground, in 
questions of justice and ethics. This is what totally drives me. So I think 
there is a way in which the physics here actually helps me to bring an 
important materialist sense to Derridean notions of justice-to-come. That 
is not justice which we presume we know what it is in advance and which 
is forever fixed. So just to end this short answer with a couple of quotes 
from Derrida:
[The concern is] not with horizons of modified—past or 
future—presents, but with a “past” that has never been present, 
and which never will be, whose future to come will never be a 
production or a reproduction in the form of presence (Derrida 
[1968] 1982, 21; original emphasis).
And furthermore that:
No justice […] seems possible or thinkable without the principle 
of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that 
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which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who 
are not yet born or who are already dead […]. Without this 
non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present […] without 
this responsibility and this respect for justice concerning those 
who are not there, of those who are no longer or who are not yet 
present and living, what sense would there be to ask the question 
“where?” “where tomorrow?” “whither?” (Derrida [1993] 2006, 
xviii; original emphasis).
So this is an example of what I learned from my diffractive engagements 
with physics: what responsibility entails in our active engagement of 
sedimenting out the world in certain kinds of ways and not others. Being 
attentive to ways in which we are re-doing, with each intra-action materially 
re-doing the material configurings of spacetimemattering. The past and the 
present and the future are always being reworked. And so that says that the 
phenomena are diffracted and temporally and spatially distributed across 
multiple times and spaces, and that our responsibility to questions of social 
justice have to be thought about in terms of a different kind of causality. 
It seems very important to me to be bringing physics to feminism as well 
as feminism to physics. (To understand my response as something learned 
from physics and applied to feminism is to have misunderstood something 
fundamental about what I am trying to say.)
Q5: A lot of scholars within the Humanities have great difficulties with 
posthumanist theories especially because they seem to lack an ethics, and you 
already talked about ethics. Especially when you bring in physics, this critique 
will no doubt be even stronger. At several moments in your work, however, one gets 
the impression that the ethics implicit in your approach is of great importance to 
you, as you already mentioned. Obviously when one wants to be part of feminist 
debates, it is impossible not to articulate onto-epistemology as an ethico-onto-
epistemology. In your “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding 
of How Matter Comes to Matter” (Barad 2003) your emphasis on the material-
discursive seems to critique the idea of the “medium.” This idea seems to claim 
that there are cases in which meaning can be non-material, idealistically traveling 
through space while not being affected by matter, actually remaining ultimately 
Interview with Karen Barad 69
“the same,” or unaltered. Your texts show that this idea of the medium is in conflict 
with the argument that matter and meaning are necessarily entangled.
Our question then would be how to understand this relational ontology that 
rejects the metaphysics of what used to be called “relata,” of words and things. How 
is an ethics at work in how matter comes to matter?
KB: I think that you can already probably see from what I have been 
saying that I believe that questions of ethics and of justice are always already 
threaded through the very fabric of the world. They are not an additional 
concern that gets added on or placed in our field of vision now and again 
by particular kinds of concern. Being is threaded through with mattering. 
Epistemology, ontology, and ethics are inseparable. Matters of fact, matters 
of concern, and matters of care are shot through with one another. Or to 
put it in yet another way: matter and meaning cannot be severed. In my 
agential realist account, matter is a dynamic expression/articulation of the 
world in its intra-active becoming. All bodies, including but not limited to 
human bodies, come to matter through the world’s iterative intra-activity, 
its performativity. Boundaries, properties, and meanings are differentially 
enacted through the intra-activity of mattering. Differentiating is not about 
radical exteriorities (we saw that in the experiments I just talked about) but 
rather what I call agential separability. That is, differentiating is not about 
Othering, separating, but on the contrary, about making connections and 
commitments. So the very nature of materiality itself is an entanglement. 
Hence, what is on the other side of the agential cut is never separate from 
us. Agential separability is not individuation. Ethics is therefore not about 
right responses to a radically exteriorized other, but about responsibility 
and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming, of which we 
are a part. Ethics is about mattering, about taking account of the entangled 
materializations of which we are part, including new configurations, new 
subjectivities, new possibilities. Even the smallest cuts matter. Responsibility, 
then, is a matter of the ability to respond. Listening for the response 
of the other and an obligation to be responsive to the other, who is not 
entirely separate from what we call the self. This way of thinking ontology, 
epistemology, and ethics together makes for a world that is always already an 
ethical matter.
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Q6: Finally, if you then propose a materialist ethics through physics, similar to the 
way people like Badiou (2007) and Meillassoux ([2006] 2008) re-absolutize the 
scope of mathematics, you indeed stir up post-Kantian academia. This has to have 
consequences for how you value various disciplines. Not falling into the traps of 
disciplinarity, multi-disciplinarity, inter-disciplinarity, or post-disciplinarity, how 
would you then qualify your manifesto for academic research?
KB: Well, manifesto is a thing that my friend and colleague Donna 
Haraway can get into, but I cannot claim that term. [Laughs.] Of course, 
she means it ironically. Agential realism is not a manifesto, it does not take 
for granted that all is or will or can be made manifest. On the contrary, it is 
a call, a plea, a provocation, a cry, a passionate yearning for an appreciation 
of, attention to the tissue of ethicality that runs through the world. Ethics 
and justice are at the core of my concerns or rather, it runs through “my” 
very being, all being. Again, for me, ethics is not a concern we add to the 
questions of matter, but rather is the very nature of what it means to matter.
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Chapter 4
“There is contingent being independent of us, and this contingent 
being has no reason to be of a subjective nature”
Interview with Quentin Meillassoux
Q1: Your debut book After Finitude ([2006] 2008) is considered by many to 
be one of the fiercest attacks on the history of modern thought, critiquing its 
humanism, its immanent metaphysics, its anti-materialism.1 You rigorously develop 
what you refer to as speculative materialism by means of rewriting this history, 
or as you refer to it, by rewriting correlationalism. This term is conceptualized 
throughout the book and has certainly triggered many scholars—sometimes 
referred to as the speculative realists (see Bryant et al, eds. 2011)—to develop 
a new philosophy of science and a new view on how move away from Kant. 
Correlationism, which you refer to as “the idea according to which we only ever 
have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term 
considered apart from the other” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 5) is severely critiqued 
by others who use this term. For you, however, the correlationist standpoint deserves 
great respect, which you do not just critique, but rather “radicalize from within: as 
an ‘inside job,’” as Harman (2011a, 25) puts it.
In this book, which is mapping what we refer to as a new materialism, we felt 
no need to include or exclude particular scholars, and thus we also see no reason 
to count you in (or out). What we do notice is that we outline a similar trajectory 
to your own, albeit that these trajectories are developed in very different ways. 
Can you give us a rough sketch of the path you have been taking, giving much 
attention to this most complex idea of “correlationism”?
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Quentin Meillassoux: In my book I frontally oppose two positions: a) 
“strong correlationism” which, in my opinion, is the most rigorous form of 
anti-absolutism, and therefore of contemporary anti-metaphysics, and b) 
a metaphysics I call “subjective,” which, conversely, is nowadays the most 
widespread philosophy of the absolute, one which consists in posing this or 
that feature of the subject as essentially necessary—that is, its status as part 
of a correlate.
Let us specify this distinction. In chapter 1 of After Finitude, I define 
correlationism in general as an anti-absolutist thesis: one uses the correlate 
“subject-object” (broadly defined) as an instrument of refutation of all 
metaphysics to enforce that we would have access to a modality of the in-
itself. Instead, for correlationism, we cannot access any form of the in-itself, 
because we are irremediably confined in our relation-to-the-world, without 
any means to verify whether the reality that is given to us corresponds 
to reality taken in itself, independently of our subjective link to it. For 
me, there are two main forms of correlationism: weak and strong (see 
chapter 2, p. 42 for the announcement of this difference and p. 48 ff. for its 
explanation). Weak correlationism is identified with Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy: it is “weak” in that it still grants too much to the speculative 
pretension (e.g. absolutory) of thought. Indeed, Kant claims that we know 
something exists in itself, and that it is thinkable (non-contradictory). 
“Strong” correlationism does not even admit that we can know that there is 
an “in-itself” and that it can be thought: for this we are radically confined 
in our thought, without the possibility of knowing the in-itself, not even its 
taking place and logicity.
I then define correlationism’s most rigorous contemporary opponent: 
the subjectivist metaphysician. The one who believes, unlike the strong 
correlationist (let’s call him simply “the correlationist” from now on), that 
we can actually access an absolute: that of the correlate. Instead of saying, 
like the correlationist, that we can not access the in-itself because we are 
confined to the correlate, the subjectivist metaphysician (let’s call him the 
“subjectivist” alone) asserts that the in-itself is the correlate itself.
Thus the “subjectivist’s” thesis, according to its various instances, 
absolutizes various features of subjectivity. We have seen this from 
Hegel’s speculative idealism, which absolutizes Reason, to the various 
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actual variations of vitalism (along the dominant Nietzsche/Deleuze axis) 
that absolutize will, perception, affect, et cetera. For me, Deleuze is a 
metaphysical subjectivist who has absolutized a set of features of subjectivity, 
hypostatized as Life (or “a Life”), and has posed them as radically 
independent of our human and individual relationship to the world.
This distinction between strong correlationism and subjectivist 
metaphysics constitutes the very core of the book. Chapter 3, in fact, lays 
the foundation of my enterprise. Chapter 3 is entirely based on the clash 
between correlationism and subjectivism, and it is that confrontation that 
allows me to establish the absolute necessity of facticity—a point of view 
from which you must read all my subsequent positions.
Q2: In your view Deleuze, who has made important contributions to what we 
refer to as “new materialism,” is not materialist because the absolute primacy of 
the unseparated (“nothing can be unless it is some form of relation to the world”) 
in his metaphysics does not allow for the Epicurean atom “which has neither 
intelligence, nor will, nor life” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 37) to be possible. 
Though it should be added that the Deleuze (with and without Guattari) is 
important to your thinking and still demands more thinking (Meillassoux 2010). 
You emphasize that science and mathematics have posed questions to philosophy 
(questions concerning the ancestral) that demand a speculative materialism freed 
from the primacy of the unseparated. Yet how can you simultaneously claim to 
break with a transcendental statement such as: what is asubjective cannot be—and 
yet marry a similar approach to that of Kant concerning science or mathematics?
QM: Let’s be precise again. The statement: “what is asubjective cannot 
be” is the only “common point” of both anti-metaphysical correlationism 
and subjectivist metaphysics. But we must understand in what way and to 
what extent. For the correlationist, it means that I can never think the object 
by doing the economy of my subjective point of view. For the correlationist, 
the statement therefore means: the a-subjective is unthinkable for us 
(“it cannot be” means: “it cannot be thinkable”). For the subjectivist the 
statement conversely means that the a-subjective is absolutely impossible: 
“it cannot be” = “it cannot be in itself.” Metaphysics of Life or of Spirit, 
transcendental philosophy, or strong correlationism: all converge in the 
denunciation of “naïve realism” proper to an Epicurean type of materialism 
asserting that some non-subjective exists (atoms and void) and that we can 
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know it. I really break with this anti-realist consensus, notably with any form 
of transcendental, and yet without going back to Epicureanism, which in 
its genre still remained a metaphysics (not subjective but realist) because it 
supported the real need for atoms and void.
But this certainly does not prevent me from maintaining the demand 
for an elucidation of science’s conditions of thinkability. Such a demand, 
in fact, has nothing transcendental in itself: it is proper to any philosophy 
which seeks to know what it is speaking of when using the term “science.” 
My thesis is that we still do not understand what this word means, since 
we failed to resolve the aporia of the arche-fossil: that the mathematized 
sciences of nature are only thinkable under the conditions of granting an 
absolute scope to its statements, an absolute scope that all anti-metaphysical 
philosophies of the era have challenged. Subjectivist metaphysics could 
rightly assert that they have maintained the absolute scope of thought and 
that they therefore do not fall under the problem of arche-fossil: however, I 
show that these metaphysics are effectively refuted by strong correlationism, 
and that consequently they are also ultimately unable to resolve this aporia.
Q3: Perhaps we should talk about why we should rewrite the history of thought. 
Many authors interested in developing a materialist or realist philosophy today 
are keen on rejecting humanism because of its (implicit) representationalist 
or linguisticist theorizations, claiming that in this emphasis on the copy or 
on language a lethal reductivism has entered thought (in philosophy and the 
humanities more generally, but in the sciences just as well). You, on the other 
hand, intend to break open correlationist thinking in order to reach out for the 
Absolute again. Many will agree with you that the Absolute has been excluded 
from thinking more and more since the coming of modernity (since the rise of 
Kant-inspired correlationism, to use your terms). In fact, whereas Nietzsche 
famously claimed at the end of the 19th century (in Also Sprach Zarathustra 
([1883–1885] 1967)) that critical thinking had killed God, you claim the exact 
opposite: because of correlationism the Absolute has become unthinkable. Critiquing 
Kant through Descartes and Hume especially when it comes down to causality, 
you intend to push correlationism to the extreme, revealing what you refer to as 
the Principle of Facticity: a radically different conceptualization of nature (nature 
as contingent) and its relation to thinking. Radicalizing (weak) correlationism 
shows us that, as you put it “every world is without reason, and is thereby capable 
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of actually becoming otherwise without reason” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 53; 
original emphasis).
QM: Let me explain this point again in a few words. The subjectivist 
asserts that the correlationist discovered, in spite of him, the true absolute: 
not a reality outside of the correlate, but the correlate as such. Indeed, 
the correlationist has demonstrated that we could not claim to think of a 
reality independent of the correlation without immediately contradicting 
ourselves: to think the in-itself is to think it, thus making it a correlate of our 
subjective activity of thought instead of making it an absolute independent 
of us. But this, according to the subjectivist, demonstrates that this absolute 
is nothing other than the correlation itself. Because, by the correlationist’s 
own confession, I cannot conceive the correlate’s disappearance or being-
other without immediately reconducting it in its own structures, which 
means that in reality I cannot think the correlation otherwise than as 
necessary. This conclusion contradicts the correlationist’s anti-absolutist 
thesis. However the subjectivist nevertheless extracts it from the argument 
of the correlationist, thus turning correlationism against itself: the correlate, 
instrument of de-absolutization of realist metaphysics, is turned back into an 
anti-realist absolute. But the strong correlationist has not yet spoken his last 
word: in Chapter 3, I show that in his most contemporary forms (Heidegger 
or Wittgenstein) he manages to refute the subjective response by opposing 
the irreducible facticity to the absolutization of the correlation. I shall let you 
re-read how I describe this answer: the conclusion I draw upon is that strong 
correlationism cannot be refuted by the absolutization of the correlation 
as believed by the subjectivist, but rather by the absolutization of facticity 
(wherein resides the meaning of the principle of factuality).
Q4: Though you mention several times that speculative materialism is in search 
of a diachronic approach, your use of concepts does point us to a time (and place) 
long gone (the arche-fossil for instance). Also when you state that “[…] there is 
a deeper level of temporality, with which what came before the relation-to-the-
world is itself but a modality of that relation-to-the-world” (ibid., 123), this depth, 
which comes back several times in the final chapter, should be searched for “before” 
thought. This reminds us once again of a Heideggerian approach which intends to 
take us “back” to the things themselves. Now as we’ve seen before, you are in fact 
quite critical of Heidegger (not only in your answer above but also for instance 
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on ibid., 41–2, where you accuse him (together with Wittgenstein) of setting up 
a strong correlationism that dominated twentieth century philosophy). Though 
you quote mainly his later work, your critique of Heidegger focuses primarily on 
questions of being that were more central to his earlier work. In his Die Frage 
nach Technik (1954) and also in Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1960) 
we can easily read a materialism that comes close to yours as he too questions 
relationality and is in search of a more complete and deeper meaning of things 
(and times) that can be found only before this relationality came into being.
Speculatively taking away the idealist and sometimes humanist dimension 
of Heidegger’s thinking, could we say that the phenomenological notion of going 
back to the things themselves, and also their interest in rewriting, as Lyotard 
([1988] 1991) would put it, ancient Greek thinking (think as well of your last 
chapter entitled “Ptolemy’s Revenge”) is also your interest? Or would you at least 
share his idea not so much of rewriting a pre-human, but rather a pre-modern or 
classical philosophy?
QM: In relation to Heidegger, I take care to show that he has in fact 
never escaped correlationism, neither in his later nor in his earlier period. 
That is why I quote his Identity and Difference (chapter 1, p. 41–2), which 
brings back Ereignis—a central notion from after the “turn” in Heidegger’s 
work—to a clearly correlational structure. The “return to things themselves,” 
which was the slogan of Husserl’s phenomenology before that of the 
early Heidegger, in no way corresponds to my idea of philosophy: as 
it only consists, by this call, in returning to the things as correlates of 
consciousness, Dasein, phenomenon, being, or Being. If the given were the 
thing in itself, then the thing would intrinsically be something given-to, but 
according to me, this is not the case. There is therefore no return to “things 
in themselves,” but rather to the in-itself seen as indifferent to what is given 
to us, because indifferent to our opening-the-world.
I am not involved in a return to or a rewriting of the Greeks—such an 
enterprise offers no determinate meaning to my approach.
Q5: Michel Foucault was the first to announce the End of Man or the second 
Copernican turn in The Order of Things ([1966] 1970). His new way of 
writing history might not have excluded the human mind, but certainly it at least 
claims not to start with it. His idea of discourse for instance did not start with 
language, but with material forms (for instance the prison-form) which came along 
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with expressive forms like delinquency (which is not a signifier, but part of a set of 
statements reciprocally presupposing the material form of the prison). To push this 
a bit further, it seems not too difficult to rephrase this argument without the human 
mind playing even a minor role in it. Think for instance of how sedimentary 
processes work, where pebbles are picked up by water streams (expressed through 
them) and are sorted in uniform layers creating the new entity of the sedimentary 
rock (new substances), a non-linear and ongoing process also in movement because 
of tectonic movements, weather conditions and much more (complicated) processes 
of change that in the end create movements very similar to how Foucault saw them 
taking place in respect to nineteenth century processes of delinquency.
In what way then is your approach different from Foucault’s? Or, where is the 
arche-fossil different and less dependent upon the human mind than the pebbles in 
the example above?
QM: Concerning Foucault I will simply answer as follows. His 
investigation focuses on past dispositives of knowledge-power, and 
eventually on dispositives that are contemporary to him. He can bring 
us nothing in regards to the disqualification of strong correlationism, 
because the disqualification is situated at a level that his research does not 
address, but rather presupposes. Indeed, I examine how correlationism, 
from its point of departure in the Cogito, has come to dominate all of 
modern thought, including the most resolutely anti-Cartesian: the “great 
confinement” was not that of the fools in the asylum, but that of the 
philosophers in the Correlate—and this also applies to Foucault. Indeed, 
Foucault does not say anything that would embarrass a correlationist, as 
all his comments can easily be considered as a discourse-correlated-to-the-
point-of-view-of-our-time, and rigorously dependent on it. This is a typical 
thesis of some correlationist relativism: we are trapped in our time, not in 
Hegelian terms, but rather in a Heideggerian fashion—that is to say in the 
modality of knowledge-power that always already dominates us. His thesis 
on the “disappearance of man” is about man understood as an object of 
“human sciences,” not about the correlate as I conceive it.
I am not at all hostile to Foucault’s thesis, even though in my view 
he thinks within a historicist ontology that remains unthought in its 
deep nature—even in his magnificent course entitled “Society Must be 
Defended” (Foucault 2003).
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Q6: The central question of your book was: How is thought able to think what there 
can be when there is no thought? (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 36) A lot of scholars 
in the humanities, though sympathetic to your re-reading of Kant and Hume, 
might not see the urgency of this question. Feminism for instance might be interested 
in thinking beyond the male-female dichotomy and contemporary feminist theory 
would also definitely not start its analysis from the human (female) mind, but 
the urgency of thinking a place without thought would probably be considered the 
pointless question par excellence, as you already phrased it (ibid., 121). How would 
you suggest convincing them?
QM: That the question of what there is when there is no thought is 
considered by many—and not only by feminists—as devoid of meaning 
or interest is indeed likely. As you recall, I specifically say: the problem is 
to understand how the most urgent question has come to be regarded as 
the most idle one. The question is not about convincing anyone to think 
otherwise, because it is a very strong feature of our era that we cannot fight 
in a few sentences.
If I had to say something to shake actual certainties, I would formulate 
it in a provocative fashion, but basically this is what I think: I assert that 
anyone who refuses to deal with this question simply does not know what 
he is saying when he utters the words “science,” “mathematics,” “absolute,” 
“metaphysics,” “non-metaphysics,” and other words of equal significance. 
What I say in my book and in the lines above suffice to explain what allows 
me to say that.
That is why the question of sexual difference cannot be foreign to this 
interrogation. For instance, Lacan’s entire work is crossed by the question 
of the scientificity or non-scientificity of psychoanalysis, and finds one of 
its points of culmination in the notion of the “matheme.” Well, I argue for 
any Lacanian discourse—which is admittedly related to the question of the 
difference between “man/woman” or “male/female”—to be unable to grasp 
the meaning of its most crucial concepts until it will not have treated as its 
necessary prerequisite the question of the non-correlational in science. The 
same also applies to any feminist theory that incorporates in its discourse 
one of the terms quoted above.
Q7: You shift strong correlationism by revolutionizing Kant and Hume, thus 
by demonstrating how a radical anti-anthropocentrism fulfills the Copernican 
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revolution. Central to this radical anti-anthropocentrism by which you re-
absolutize thought is mathematics (ibid., 101, 103, 113, 126): “what is 
mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought” (ibid., 117). This 
entails a definite move away from thinking science philosophically, because this is 
what has obfuscated “science’s non-correlational mode of knowing, in other words, 
its eminently speculative character” (ibid., 119; original emphasis). What you 
state is that of the statement “thought can think that event X can actually have 
occurred prior to all thought, and indifferently to it,” “no variety of correlationism 
[…] can admit that that statement’s literal meaning is also its deepest meaning” 
(ibid., 122; original emphasis). In line with the argument it makes sense to link 
this eternal truth that we find in mathematics to a “realism” (albeit speculative), 
but how could we call it a materialism? Is the morphogenetic dynamics of 
mathematics equal to matter?
QM: I intend to demonstrate–note here that this is still not done in 
After Finitude—that what is mathematizable is absolutizable. You ask me if 
this is a materialist thesis rather than a merely “realist” one. It is difficult 
to discuss the relevance of my thesis if we omit the whole discussion of the 
problem of the arche-fossil found in Chapter 1. I will nevertheless answer 
as follows: for me, materialism holds in two key statements: 1. Being is 
separate and independent of thought (understood in the broad sense of 
subjectivity), 2. Thought can think Being. Thesis number 1 is opposed to 
any anthropomorphism which seeks to extend subjective attributes to Being: 
materialism is not a form of animism, spiritualism, vitalism, etcetera. It 
asserts that non-thinking actually precedes, or at least may in right precede 
thought, and exists outside of it, following the example of Epicurean 
atoms, devoid of any subjectivity, and independent of our relationship 
to the world. Thesis number 2 affirms that materialism is rationalism 
(again broadly defined as there are different definitions of reason) in that 
it is always an enterprise that, through skepticism, opposes an activity of 
knowledge and criticism to religious appeal, to mystery, or to the limitation 
of our knowledge.
Skepticism and faith converge in the thesis of our finitude, making us 
available to any belief: conversely, materialism grants the human being the 
capacity to think by his own means the truth of both his environment and 
condition. Under the enemy of reason, he always knows how to detect the 
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priest. He also knows that no one has more desire to be right—without 
allowing one to argue against him—than the opponent of reason.
I follow these two theses because I argue and demonstrate—strictly 
through argumentation—that there is contingent being independent of 
us, and furthermore, that this contingent being has no reason to be of a 
subjective nature. I also try to found a scientific rationalism based on the 
use of mathematics to describe non-human and inorganic reality. This is 
not to “Pythagorize,” or to assert that Being is inherently mathematical: it is 
rather to explain how it is that a formal language manages to capture, from 
contingent-Being, properties that a vernacular language fails at restituting. 
My thesis on mathematics is a thesis on the scope of formal languages, not a 
thesis on Being. I do not posit it by whim or “scientist” tropism, but because 
I showed with the problem of arche-fossil that there one had no choice: if 
the sciences have meaning, then mathematics has an absolute scope. Yet 
sciences have meaning, and hence sciences rest via their mathematized 
formulations on a reality that is radically independent of our humanity. This 
contrasts with the ‘qualitative’ judgments of ordinary perception, which 
can safely be thought for their part as correlated to the sensible relation 
we have with the world, and as having no existence outside of this relation. 
The absolute scope of mathematics must therefore be established, and our 
only way to do this is, I think, is to pass through the derivative scope of 
the principle of factuality. This is the problem left out in After Finitude: a 
problem that simultaneously traces the program of a consequent speculative 
materialism.
Q8: In your conceptualization of potentiality vs. virtuality you note that 
potentiality comes with a determined world, conforming to the laws of nature. 
Superchaos, on the other hand, comes with virtuality. How is thinking the virtual 
linked to speculation, and what role is there for matter (and nature)? We ask 
the latter sub-question, because we noticed that whereas on page 11 you speak 
of matter, life, thought and justice, on page 14 you only speak of the latter three. 
We introduced the concept of nature in reference to your apparent affinity with 
Spinoza’s physics (not with his metaphysics).
Finally, then, the vectorial subject to be developed in speculative materialism 
does not emancipate but rather anticipates the unforeseen, though in keeping 
with the law of non-contradiction. Doing away with idealism, it would be most 
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interesting to see how this emancipation “does not yet exist,” especially in relation to 
how it then affirms or critiques the great French feminists like Cixous and even de 
Beauvoir, when they emphasize not so much a final emancipation but rather the 
willingness to write or think femininity.
QM: For me, matter is not identifiable with “nature.” Nature is a 
world order determined by specific constants, and that determines within 
itself this set of possibles that I call “potentialities.” In return, matter is a 
primordial ontological order: it is the fact that there must be something and 
not nothing—contingent beings as such. One can imagine an infinity and 
more of material worlds governed by different laws: they would be different 
“natures,” although equally material. Matter’s second characteristic is 
negative: it designates contingent non-living and non-thinking beings. In our 
world, life and thought are constituted on a background of inorganic matter 
to which they return. One could perhaps imagine a nature entirely alive or 
spiritual in which case “matter” would be pushed out—but it would remain 
an essential and eternal possibility of Superchaos because every nature can 
be destroyed by it, but not the contingent being in a state of pure-material.
Concerning the theory of the materialist subject, I am indeed interested 
in challenging the identification of action with its pure present deployment, 
while simultaneously repeating the criticism of the former revolutionary 
model of future emancipation. However, I think that the present is 
intimately constituted by the “projection” of the subject to this not-yet-
present. Here I am not saying anything original: Heidegger as well as Sartre 
has insisted on this constitutive dimension of the future in the constitution 
of the subjective present. However, I add a very different dimension to this 
projection: a dimension which is not only devoid of religious transcendence, 
but also inaccessible to the subject’s action—an articulation that I believe 
effective of radical egalitarian justice (of the living and of the dead) and 
the eternal return as proof of return (a resurrection intensely deceptive). 
What interests me is the feedback effect of this expectation on the present of 
action and on the concrete transformation of the subject.
Notes
1. Translation (from the French) by Marie-Pier Boucher.

II
Cartographies

Introduction
A “New Tradition” in Thought
Chapter 5 (“The Transversality of New Materialism”) focuses on three 
ways in which new materialism can be called “transversal.” So far we have 
seen that new materialism is a cultural theory that does not privilege matter 
over meaning or culture over nature. It explores a monist perspective, devoid 
of the dualisms that have dominated the humanities (and sciences) until 
today, by giving special attention to matter, which has been so neglected by 
dualist thought. Cartesian dualism, after all, has favored mind. As concerns 
feminist literary theory in the deconstructive paradigm, for instance, it has 
been noted that:
Men have aligned the opposition male/female with rational/
emotional, serious/frivolous, or reflective/spontaneous, 
[whereas] feminist criticism […] works to prove itself more 
rational, serious, and reflective than male readings that omit and 
distort (Culler [1982] 2008, 58).
It is this kind of scholarship, according to Jonathan Culler, but also 
according to DeLanda (as seen in the interview above) that attempts to 
provoke a shift in thought, but which continues the dominant scholarly 
mode of thinking. And whereas this act of reclaiming thought has been 
important for feminism, it has not spurred a revolution in thought (as 
we will explain in Chapters 5 and 7). New materialism wants to set such 
a revolution in motion, and for this reason it has a renewed interest in 
philosophical monism or in the philosophy of immanence. New materialism, 
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as a transversally new intellectual orientation, works through the 
transcendental and humanist (dualist) traditions that haunt cultural theory, 
and finds itself transversally on the brink of both the modern and the post-
postmodern eras. The transcendental and humanist traditions, despite being 
manifold, are consistently predicated on dualist structures. New materialists 
open up the paradoxes inherent in those traditions by creating concepts that 
traverse the fluxes of matter and mind, body and soul, nature and culture, 
and opens up active theory formation. The three transversalities discussed 
in Chapter 5 concern disciplinarity, paradigms, and the spatiotemporality of 
theory—that is, the cartographical methodology introduced in the interview 
with Braidotti.
Chapter 6 (“Pushing Dualism to an Extreme”) discusses the way in 
which new materialism constitutes a philosophy of difference or immanence 
by working through or “traversing” the dualisms that form the backbone of 
modernist thought. This chapter dives immediately into the epistemological 
or even methodological dimension of new materialism itself as displayed by 
the interviewees in Part One. Continuing the transversal ideas of Lyotard, 
Deleuze, and Bruno Latour about the temporality of theory formation, new 
materialists have set themselves to a rewriting of all possible and impossible 
forms of emancipation. This rewriting exercise involves a movement in 
thought that, in the words of Henri Bergson ([1896] 2004, 236), can be 
termed “push[ing] dualism to an extreme.” By this movement, Deleuze 
([1968] 1994, 45) has stated that “difference is pushed to the limit,” that 
is to say, “difference” is “shown differing” (ibid., 68; emphasis in original). 
The chapter addresses the new materialist ways in which modernity’s 
dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms) are traversed, 
and how a new conceptualization of difference (structured by an affirmative 
relation) comes to be constituted along the way. This conceptualization of 
difference leaves behind all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern 
dualist thinking, since a difference structured by affirmation does not 
work with predetermined relations (e.g. between mind and body) nor 
does it involve a counter-hierarchy between terms. The chapter makes 
explicit the methodology of the current-day rise of non-dualist thought, 
both in terms of its non-classificatory mode of (Deleuzian) thinking, and 
in terms of the theory of the time of thought thus effectuated (Lyotard’s 
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notion of “rewriting modernity” is not a postmodernism). We conclude 
by demonstrating how this new materialism traverses the sexual dualisms 
that structure modernist feminist thinking, anticipating the next chapter 
that includes a re-reading of Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex 
([1949] 2010), mainly through the work of Elizabeth Grosz. This short 
demonstration forms the bridge to Chapter 7.
The seventh chapter (“Sexual Differing”) envisions a new way of 
mapping the relations between the sexes by moving beyond sex, sexual 
difference, and gender. Instead of the epistemological groundwork for 
a new conceptualization of difference, this chapter is interested in new 
materialism’s ontology of difference itself. In the dominant reception of the 
work of de Beauvoir, finding its apotheosis in the work of Butler, feminists 
overthrow sex and sexual difference in favor of gender. What we propose in a 
new materialist spirit is that gender, with which a revolution in thought was 
intended, did not produce the desired effect. Theorists of gender position 
themselves in dualistic opposition to theorists of sexual difference, and end 
up re-affirming sexual difference in its narrowest definition (the biological 
essentialism of sex). All forms of identity politics, as shown in the interviews 
summarized by the Culler citation above, involve dualism, and need to 
be opened up and set in motion. Counter-intuitively, a true revolution in 
thought does not consist of the dualistic overthrow of a seemingly outdated 
framework. Similar to Deleuze’s rejection of Otherness that runs through 
a great deal of the new materialist work, we show how a revolution in 
thought entails the affirmation of the thinking process—that is, a practical 
philosophy. This chapter in line with the preceding chapter, proposes the 
setting up of a new materialist theory of sexual difference as a practical 
philosophy in which concept and creation are considered as intertwined. Re-
reading de Beauvoir affirmatively, a sexual differing can be made apparent 
that has an eye for the material (“sex”) and the discursive (“gender”) in 
their mutual entanglement, thus shifting identity politics and biological 
essentialism in favor of a performative ontology, as well as the dominant 
conceptualization of a “revolution in thought.” In the practical philosophical 
process, then, the present comes about as creating the past and the future: 
de Beauvoir (the past) is being re-read (the present), while working 
towards the future of feminist thought. Through our so-called case study 
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on sex, gender, and sexual difference, we show how the new materialism 
is a practical philosophy that makes way for thinking metamorphoses 
regarding—along with sex—“race,” class, and the other so-called axes of 
social difference.
Finally, in the eighth chapter (“The End of (Wo)Man”), we engage most 
directly with new materialism’s new metaphysics by discussing its post-
humanism or a-humanism. We start from the work of Foucault, on whose 
work all interviewees took a position. When Foucault in The Order of Things 
([1966/1970] 1994) announced that man was only a recent invention, he 
added a permanent question mark to the humanist and modernist traditions 
that had dominated European thought for over two centuries. In his recently 
published accompanying dissertation Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology 
(2008, submitted in 1961) he gives us an even more thorough perspective 
on how anthropocentrism has shaped our (dualist) thinking, and how it has 
actually distorted our strategies of studying the real. His views can definitely 
be considered the opening statements of new materialism, especially because 
Foucault in his later work has shown in so many ways how bodies (think of 
prisons, for instance) and the words within which they are enveloped (think 
of “delinquency”) act only in entanglement with one another, and that the 
human being acts within the actualization and realization of these discursive 
forces. Recently, Meillassoux’s After Finitude ([2006] 2008) proposed 
another re-reading of Kant that suggests that Foucault has not pushed 
things far enough (as Meillassoux explained in his interview).
Not even referring to Foucault in his book, Meillassoux’s interests in 
ancestrality proposes us to think the real without it first being represented 
in the human mind, which, according to Meillassoux, is still the common 
practice in what is called post–critical theory (which probably includes 
Foucault). Meillassoux, continuing themes found in the early writings of 
Alain Badiou, together with other speculative thinkers such as Ray Brassier 
and Graham Harman, thus intends to fulfill Kant’s Copernican revolution 
of the mind by proposing a radical anti-anthropocentrism, which refuses to 
see truth only in how it can possibly appear to the human mind. Instead, 
he proposes an understanding of truth (or nature) through mathematics. 
We will show how Meillassoux’s speculative materialism differs from the 
positions of other prominent contemporary materialists such as Barad and 
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DeLanda. These authors, though also inspired by the natural sciences, 
emphasize that phenomena reveal themselves from their relations. However, 
we will also demonstrate how a coherence can be created between these new 
materialists that, after having worked through humanism and the different 
differences it gave rise to, asks how much (wo)man we need at all. Without 
intending to come to a fixed conclusion, we can see that the different 
developments in new materialist thinking leave us with many questions in 
both the sciences and the humanities on the role of the human being in 
the morphogenesis of the real. This book, together with the new materialist 
scholars it interviews and discusses, wishes to provide a methodological 
opening for these ontological questions.
The “new” in new materialism is not a term that accepts or continues a 
classificatory historiography of (academic) thinking that necessarily comes 
with a hierarchy or any kind of a priori logic. New materialism affirms that 
such hierachized specialization creates “minds in a groove” whereas “there 
is no groove of abstractions which is adequate for the comprehension of 
human life” (Whitehead [1925] 1997, 197). New materialism does not 
intend to add yet another specialized epistemology to the tree of academic 
knowledge production (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 5). As such, it is 
thus not necessarily opposed to the crude or Historical/Marxist materialist 
tradition. It is not necessarily different from any other materialist, pragmatic 
or monist tradition either, since it carefully “works through” all these 
traditions in order to avoid, along with the trap of antagonism, the trap of 
anachronism (Lyotard [1988] 1991, 26–7) or of “a retrograde movement” 
(Bergson [1934] 2007, 11). New materialism says “yes, and” to all of these 
intellectual traditions, traversing them all, creating strings of thought that, 
in turn, create a remarkably powerful and fresh “rhythm” in academia today 
(Simondon [1958] 1980).
New materialism’s metaphysics follows from an interdisciplinary 
development in thought, whose backbone is a strong interest in Continental 
philosophy. Yet it seems to have no difficulty in opening up these thoughts 
to Anglo-American thought, and actually makes their intermingling 
productive. Yet this is nothing “new.” There are many examples in which 
Continental and Anglo-American thought have been moving in similar 
directions, as scholars were consciously or unconsciously inspired by a 
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radical thought they felt to be present beneath what was known. After all, 
just like Alfred North Whitehead’s plea for “wandering” through and beyond 
grooves (Whitehead [1925] 1997, 207), Lyotard’s “working through” is “a 
working attached to a thought of what is constitutively hidden from us in the 
event and in the meaning of the event” (Lyotard [1988] 1991, 26). Or in the 
words of Bergson, “As though the thing and the idea of the thing, its reality 
and its possibility, were not created at one stroke when a truly new form, 
invented by art or nature is concerned!” (Bergson [1934] 2007, 11). Good 
ideas are never bothered by space or time. From Bergson to Whitehead 
and Lyotard, from Louis Hjelmslev to Benedict Spinoza, from Foucault 
to British Cultural Studies, and from quantum physics to contemporary 
feminist theory—time and again, new thoughts travel easily and have always 
already announced themselves when the conditions are right (De Boever 
et al. 2009).
One could even claim that the break between Continental and Anglo-
American thought, or the divide between the sciences and the humanities 
as C.P. Snow ([1959] 1965) expressed it in his famous 1950 essay “The 
Two Cultures,” were not so much states that were noticed, but were actually 
prompted by philosophers of science themselves. Snow’s taxonomy created 
and eventually overcoded this radical distinction he claimed to have merely 
observed (cf. Kirby 2008a). Such major Historiographies, to speak again 
with Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, are not so much critiqued by new 
materialism. Instead, they are being read in their relations to the minor 
historiographies which often result in the appearance of alternative new 
trajectories. It is in this sense that the “materialism” of new materialism 
is also not exclusive. It is not embraced in opposition to transcendental 
thinking, but instead re-reads metaphysics as a whole from a “natureculture” 
perspective, as science studies would call it (Latour [1991] 1993, Haraway 
2003). The new materialist practice of reading as re-reading, together 
with the readings proposed by new materialist scholars, perform its new 
metaphysics.
New materialism wants to do justice to the “material-semiotic,” or 
“material-discursive” character of all events, as Donna Haraway (1988, 595) 
and Karen Barad (2003, 810) would call it. It is interested in actualizing a 
metaphysics that fully affirms the active role played by matter in “receiving” 
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a form (cf. Simondon 2009, 4). Working through Cartesian or modernist 
dualisms, new materialism has set itself to practice the Spinozist dictum that 
the mind is always already an idea of the body, while the body is the object 
of the mind (Spinoza [1677] 2001, E2P21, Schol.). In terms of artworks, 
for instance, a new materialist perspective would be interested in finding 
out how the form of content (the material condition of the artwork) and the 
form of expression (the sensations as they come about) are being produced 
in one another, how series of statements are actualized, and how pleats of 
matter are realized in the real (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 89; cf. 
Bolt and Barrett eds. forthcoming). In this way, new materialism is different 
from most post-Kantian studies of art, since in these studies, the material 
and discursive dimensions are treated separately. After a short description 
of the materials used following a “crude materialism,” the contemporary 
scholar influenced by the so-called “linguistic turn” proceeds to deconstruct 
its messages. New materialism allows for the study of the two dimensions in 
their entanglement: the experience of a piece of art is made up of matter and 
meaning. The material dimension creates and gives form to the discursive, 
and vice versa. Similar to what happens with the artwork, new materialism 
sets itself to rewriting events that are usually only of interest to natural 
scientists. Here it becomes apparent that a new materialist take on “nature” 
will be shown to be transposable to the study of “culture” and vice versa, 
notwithstanding the fact that these transpositions are not unilinear. After all, 
“transposition” is at work in music as well as genetics (Braidotti 2006, 5).
Thinking in such a way reveals to us a “[…] new form of materialist 
philosophy in which raw matter-energy through a variety of self-organizing 
processes and an intense power of morphogenesis, generates all the 
structures that surround us” (DeLanda 1996, n.p.). Studying these 
metamorphoses as they happen through the formation of content and 
expression, that is, through the entanglement of materiality and meaning 
in the widest sense of the word, new materialist thinking allows us to write 
such a metamorphosis not by excluding parts of it beforehand, but by 
at least being open to the process in its full manifestation. We need this 
new materialism because, whether it concerns earthquakes, art, social 
revolutions, or simply thinking, the material and the discursive are only 
taken apart in the authoritative gesture of the scholar or by the common-
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sensical thinker; while in the event, in life itself, the two seeming layers 
are by all means indiscernible. New materialism wants to move away 
from the authoritative scholarly attitude and from everyday utilitarian 
common sense, and wants to engross itself in what is “ontologically prior” 
(Massumi 2002, 66).
As an important but poorly defined force in contemporary academia, 
new materialism stands in need of conceptualization, and this second part 
of the book provides it. We bring together important scholars and texts that 
have contributed to the new materialism, and by showing the coherence in 
their (implicit) dialogue, by demonstrating their joint movements, we allow 
for a natureculture metaphysics of the ontologically prior to be actualized. 
But we do not map this new tradition from a distance. In this book, we 
add to new materialism as much as we perform a new engagement with 
canonical and minor academic literatures. In keeping with new materialism’s 
interdisciplinarity, our mapping shows us how new materialist accounts are 
similar to certain (empirical) tendencies in accounting for nature on the one 
hand and cognitive accounts of culture and nature on the other.
Chapter 5
The Transversality of New Materialism
Manuel DeLanda and Rosi Braidotti—independently of one another—first 
started using “neo-materialism” or “new materialism” in the second half of 
the 1990s, for a cultural theory that does not privilege the side of culture, 
but focuses on what Donna Haraway (2003) would call “naturecultures” 
or what Bruno Latour simply referred to as “collectives” ([1991] 1993). 
The term proposes a cultural theory that radically rethinks the dualisms 
so central to our (post-)modern thinking and always starts its analysis 
from how these oppositions (between nature and culture, matter and 
mind, the human and the inhuman) are produced in action itself. It thus 
has a profound interest in the morphology of change and gives special 
attention to matter (materiality, processes of materialization) as it has been 
so much neglected by dualist thought. In the same breath we then always 
already start with the mater, as Braidotti (2002b, 170) already emphasized 
elsewhere. This explains why, along with the interest in science seen in 
particular with DeLanda and Latour, the emancipation of mat(t)er is also by 
nature a feminist project.1
For those familiar with the materialism of Walter Benjamin, “new 
materialism” is ironic for several reasons. Analyzing modernity, Benjamin 
([1982] 2002, 22) rejects the modern fetish of newness and the illusions 
it presumes. Particularly because he considers “[n]ewness […] a quality 
independent of the use value of the commodity,” staging a materialism that 
is “new” would make no sense at all. But of course there is no reason why 
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we should confine ourselves to such a linear modernist idea of History. 
Especially if, in following Latour ([1991] 1993, 82), we claim that “[h]istory 
is no longer simply the history of people, it becomes the history of natural 
things as well,” Benjamin’s critique can be put aside. The newness we are 
interested in is not so much a better or improved version of “old” (historical, 
Marxist-inspired) materialism. DeLanda for instance has made it very 
clear that he rewrites this Marxism and its (humanist) take on the material 
(though Benjamin in particular offers us many ways out of these traps). 
Therefore DeLanda also wrote his famous A Thousand Years of Nonlinear 
History (1997) in which he puts such an “other” history, as proposed by 
Latour, to work (see also Harman 2008).
In this book it is not so much a history that is presented to the reader, 
but rather, following Braidotti, a mapping of how the materialism that 
is referred to as a new materialism is at work in the humanities and in 
the sciences at this very moment. Of course that does not mean that we 
exclude historicity, time, or memory; texts are read insofar as they are 
considered important and valuable for the non-dualist, materialist current 
in contemporary thought, and not judged according to when they were 
conceived. Thus, it is no problem to state that we see this new materialism 
we are interested in at work in Spinoza’s Ethics. Benedict Spinoza, already 
in 1677, claims that the mind is the idea of the body, making the body 
necessarily the object of the mind. The mind and the body are the same 
thing, as he stresses repeatedly. This is a most interesting contribution to a 
new materialist thinking. Similarly, the present book develops an interest 
in the new materialist thoughts to be found in the work of the authors 
mentioned so far, but also in that of Simone de Beauvoir, Henri Bergson, 
Alfred North Whitehead and Brian Massumi, among others.
There is a good reason why a book on new materialism is written now. 
In recent years new materialism has proven to be capable of opposing the 
transcendental and humanist traditions that are haunting cultural theory, 
standing on the brink of the post-postmodern era. Of course dualist 
traditions are stubborn and have buried themselves deep in the minds of 
(common-sense) scholars today. These traditions continue to stir debates, 
which are being opened up by new materialists (think of the feminist 
polemic about the failed materialism in the work of Judith Butler (Kirby 
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2006), and of the Saussurian/ Lacanian linguistic heritage in media and 
cultural studies (Dolphijn 2010), which as Karen Barad (2007) has shown, 
have prevented the theorization of “agential matter” from being effectuated). 
But at the start of the 21st century, this new materialist ambition does seem 
to offer a more than equal alternative for scholars working in the humanities 
and beyond. Perhaps for the first time in its history, this “minor tradition” in 
thinking (as Gilles Deleuze would label it) is getting the attention it needs, 
freeing itself from the Platonist, Christian, and Modernist rule under which 
it suffered for so long.
In the work of both Braidotti and DeLanda it has been through a 
rethinking of several French philosophers closely connected to May ‘68 
(including Michel Foucault, Luce Irigaray, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari) that their thinking came about. And it was the work of Deleuze 
(and Guattari) that was actually most important to them. Especially in 
his early work, Deleuze tried to show that the materialist philosophy 
he proposed was not new but fell into the rich though minor tradition 
already mentioned. By writing on philosophers like Spinoza, Nietzsche, 
and Bergson, but also on writers like Marcel Proust and Franz Kafka, 
Deleuze intended to rewrite the history of thinking by giving attention to 
those materialist authors it had rejected or marginalized for such a long 
time. At the start of his career, Deleuze puts the emphasis on re-reading 
radical minds like Spinoza, thus showing how they actually offer philosophy 
a new way of thinking—namely, a philosophy of the body. And it is by 
traversing these different philosophies of the body that Deleuze’s other 
work (sometimes with Guattari) really starts exploring materialist/monist 
thought to the fullest, creating the fertile ground upon which new materialist 
scholars like Braidotti and DeLanda take root today.
Most faithful to the work of Deleuze (and Guattari), DeLanda’s early 
version of new materialism proffered the claim that the concept “abstract 
machine” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987) captures processes without 
form of substance that can be found in concrete assemblages of biology, 
sociology, and geology alike, in a manner that enables cultural theory at 
large to move away from linguistic representationalism towards “the realm 
of engineering diagrams” which are “shared by very different physical 
assemblages. Thus there would be an “abstract motor” with different 
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physical instantiations in technological objects and natural atmospheric 
processes” (DeLanda 1996, n.p.). This new materialism engenders immanent 
thought and, as a consequence, it breaks through not only the mind-matter 
and culture-nature divides of transcendental humanist thought, but also 
thinking causal structures and teleology (i.e. a determinism):
This conception of very specific abstract machines […] 
indeed points towards a new form of materialist philosophy in 
which raw matter-energy through a variety of self-organizing 
processes and an intense power of morphogenesis, generates 
all the structures that surround us. Furthermore, the structures 
generated cease to be the primary reality, and matter-energy 
flows now acquire this special status (ibid.).
The way in which matter seems to gain primacy in DeLanda’s new 
materialism points instead at a “generative matter,” which is a concept 
that does not capture matter-as-opposed-to-signification, but captures 
mattering as simultaneously material and representational (cf. Cheah 1999, 
Barad 2007).
Braidotti introduced new materialism or “a more radical sense of 
materialism” by framing it as “[r]ethinking the embodied structure of 
human subjectivity after Foucault” (Braidotti 2000, 158). Coming from 
a very rich materialist tradition in Australian feminism, Braidotti’s “after 
Foucault” should not so much be read as a reference to a move beyond 
Foucault, given that she and DeLanda (as well as other new materialists) 
can be said to affirm, one way or another, the much-noted prediction of 
Foucault ([1970] 1998, 343) that “perhaps, one day, this century will be 
known as Deleuzian.” Compared to DeLanda, Braidotti’s new materialism 
is equally immanent and non-linear, and “embodied subjectivity” is 
conceptualized accordingly:
A piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text 
written by the unfolding of genetic encoding. Neither a 
sacralized inner sanctum, nor a pure socially shaped entity, 
the enfleshed Deleuzian subject is rather an “in-between”: 
it is a folding-in of external influences and a simultaneous 
unfolding outwards of affects. A mobile entity, an enfleshed 
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sort of memory that repeats and is capable of lasting through 
sets of discontinuous variations, while remaining faithful to 
itself. The Deleuzian body is ultimately an embodied memory 
(Braidotti 2000, 159).
Apart from the immanence of the new materialism qualitatively shifting 
the many instantiations of cultural theory that exemplify the transcendental, 
there is a strong emphasis on the intra-action2 of the technological and the 
natural, or as Braidotti has called it, on “the ‘posthuman’ predicament” 
which entails “much more than the definitive loss of the naturalistic 
paradigm” (ibid., 158). Bringing “nature” into cultural theory does not 
make new materialists susceptible to adopting the ontology of the so-called 
positivist natural sciences. One of the pillars of the new materialism is the 
claim that modern natural science and postmodern cultural theory are both 
humanisms (cf. Colebrook 2004). In Braidotti’s work the shared humanist 
subject of biological determinism and social constructivism is exchanged for 
a post-humanist subject, which entails for starters a qualitative shift away from 
the two poles of present-day epistemology: positivism and postmodernism 
(cf. Haraway 1988).
In their subsequent work, DeLanda and Braidotti continued constituting 
new materialism by posing dual oppositions as their main target. Reworking 
and eventually breaking through dualism appears to be the key to new 
materialism. Dualism comes to the fore as the structuring principle of the 
transcendental and humanist traditions that they want to shift in their work. 
Prioritizing mind over matter or culture over nature is a transcendentalizing 
gesture following humanist and dialecticist thought. It posits postmodernism 
as overcoming the flaws of positivism, and social constructivism as 
overcoming biological determinism. As such, the gesture is predicated upon 
sequential negation, and has a progress narrative structure. The reliance 
upon dialecticism has been uncovered as an effect of what Lynn Hankinson 
Nelson (1993, 127–8) termed “unreal dichotomies” or “non-exhaustive 
oppositions.” Nelson has made clear that one pole of a dichotomy or binary 
opposition is always already implied in the other as its negation, which 
makes dichotomies unreal and oppositions non-exhaustive. In the words of 
Michel Serres:
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An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, albeit 
affected by the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, 
the more you remain in the same framework of thought (Serres 
with Latour 1995, 81).
The intimate relation between two so-called opposites makes it clear 
that the transcendental and humanist tendencies, which are fought by 
new materialist theorists are fundamentally reductive. After all, negation 
implies a relation, which is precisely what is undone by the dependence of 
transcendental humanist thought on dualism.
Attempting to break through reductive dualist thought in A New 
Philosophy of Society, DeLanda (2006, 45–6; original emphasis) makes the 
following statement:
[…] general categories do not refer to anything in the real world 
and […] to believe they do (i.e. to reify them) leads directly to 
essentialism. Social constructivism is supposed to be an antidote 
to this, in the sense that by showing that general categories are 
mere stereotypes it blocks the move towards their reification. 
But by coupling the idea that perception is intrinsically 
linguistic with the ontological assumption that only the contents 
of experience really exist, this position leads directly to a form of 
social essentialism.
Linguisticality (which is not denied, but given its proper place, that is, 
a more modest one) forms the nexus of DeLanda’s non-dualist argument 
about new materialism. Anti-representationalism (an immanent gesture) is 
employed so as to break through the assumed binary opposition between 
realist essentialism and social constructivism. Due to the fact that causally 
linear, predetermined and constrained reasoning has been left behind 
(or at least is included in an open, constrained yet undecidable3 notion 
of causality that fills up all of its dimensions), it cannot be argued that 
new materialism entails a simple move beyond social constructivism in a 
progressive way. According to DeLanda, new materialism is neither realist 
nor social constructivist. It is precisely the commonalities of realism and 
social constructivism that are being recognized, though shifted.
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Braidotti (2006, 130; cf. Rossini 2006) theorizes similar moves in 
Transpositions, yet with a clear focus on feminist politics:
In the political economy of phallologocentrism and of 
anthropocentric humanism, which predicates the sovereignty 
of Sameness in a falsely universalistic mode, my sex fell on 
the side of ‘Otherness,’ understood as pejorative difference, or 
as being-worth-less-than. The becoming-animal/ becoming-
world speaks to my feminist self, partly because my gender, 
historically speaking, never quite made it into full humanity, so 
my allegiance to that category is at best negotiable and never to 
be taken for granted.
This is neither an essentialist statement, nor one of semiotic 
constructivism. It is rather the materialist acknowledgement of 
a historical location: a starting position of asymmetrical power 
differentials. This location is not only geopolitical, but also 
genealogical and time-bound.
Braidotti’s claim is anti-representationalist in two ways. First of all, 
she cuts across a biological (or Platonic) essentialism and “semiotic 
constructivism” (here, a relativism) in a manner that mirrors DeLanda. 
Secondly, a feminist politics is conceptualized, which does not embrace the 
dualist move of creating counter-identities (a modernist feminist project) 
nor does it attempt to move beyond dualism by producing a plethora of 
counter-identities according to a pluralizing gesture (a postmodernist 
feminist project, and again a relativism). Feminists “rather go further and 
push towards qualitatively stronger de-territorializations” (ibid., 134), that 
is, towards becoming-animal/becoming-world, which entails a breakthrough 
of the naturalizing tendencies of both sexist humanism and the de-
naturalizing tendencies of modern and postmodern feminisms.
What we find in the work of DeLanda and Braidotti is a series of moves 
that complexify cultural theory in the light of the habit of dualism. We 
claim that the immanent philosophies of DeLanda and Braidotti (though 
by no means exclusively), in their early as well as their recent incarnations, 
exemplify the constitution and enactment of new materialist cultural theory.
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This chapter engages with the constitution of new materialism, 
as an object of study and a shared ambition with the scholars whose 
work we study. Following the interviews in Part One of this book, and 
building on a comprehensive review of enactments or instantiations of 
new materialism in recent cultural theory, this chapter proposes that the 
immanent gesture of new materialism is transversal rather than dualist as it 
intersects academic (neo-)disciplines (for instance feminist theory, science 
and technology studies, and media and cultural studies), paradigms (for 
instance the Saussurian/Lacanian linguisticism that is still prevalent in 
cultural theory today, or the dualistic take on the natural sciences and the 
humanities), and the linear spatiotemporalities conventionally assigned to 
epistemic trends (for instance “new” materialism versus Marxist historical 
materialism as practiced by Benjamin for instance4 ). Our proposition is 
that new materialism is itself a distinctive trend, both in feminist theory 
and in cultural theory more broadly, and a device or tool for opening up 
theory formation. This is to say that new materialism not only allows for 
addressing the conventional epistemic tendency to what can be summarized 
as classification or territorialization (when a new trend appears on the 
academic stage, it is usually interpreted as a “class” that can be added to 
an existing classification of epistemologies), but also—and at the same 
time—for de-territorializing the academic territories, tribes, and temporalities 
traditionally considered central to scholarship. After all, the classificatory 
strategy perfectly exemplifies transcendentalism and the two characteristics 
of dualism (sequential negation and a narrative of progress). Braidotti has 
summarized the need for this double move as a “qualitative leap” towards 
“creating conditions for the implementation of transversality” (ibid., 123). 
In this chapter, we intend to affirm the transversality of new materialism. 
That is to say, we study and propose a new materialism that cuts across or 
intersects dual oppositions in an immanent way. Félix Guattari ([1964] 
1984), coining this term as early as 1964, insists on the “micropolitical” 
nature of transversality, introducing it as a means to search for the new—not 
by critiquing the old, but by radically questioning (or smoothening out) 
all the barriers that supported its logic. “Transversality is the transference 
become vehicular” as Gary Genosko (1996, 15) then concludes. The 
strength of new materialism is precisely this nomadic traversing of the 
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territories of science and the humanities, performing the agential or non-
innocent nature of all matter5 that seems to have escaped both modernist 
(positivist) and postmodernist humanist epistemologies.
New Materialism Generated: Depending on Disciplines
Although we want to show here that a first instantiation of transversality 
enacted by new materialist cultural theorists cuts across scholarly 
disciplines, there is a whole range of scholars working on new materialism 
from their respective disciplinary locations. In these specific disciplinary 
takes on new materialism, the potentialities of the new materialism get lost 
in unnecessarily narrow understandings. Introducing new materialism into 
a discipline entails a transcendental gesture according to which the new 
materialism and the discipline in question (e.g. sociology) are positioned 
as pre-existing or generated rather than generative, and consequently as 
interacting rather than intra-acting. In other words, due to the presumed 
schism or dualism, the transversality of new materialism is being undone 
rather than affirmed or put to work. To transversalize can only be done when 
always already “invoking a new frame of analysis,” as Jonathan Gil Harris 
(2003, 281) puts it. A new materialism that emerges from a discipline is an 
immanent gesture that we will discuss in the next section.
Momin Rahman and Anne Witz (2003, 245) in “What Really Matters? 
The Elusive Quality of the Material in Feminist Thought,” for instance, 
focus exclusively on sociologically induced feminisms, and argue that 
“there needs to be a recognition of both the limits of a constructionism 
grounded in materialism and the potential of a constructionism that 
deploys materiality as a more porous and flexible concept.” Rahman and 
Witz recognize the shift engendered by a new materialism (conceptualizing 
“materiality”), and claim that the conceptualization of the material 
employed in the early days of feminist sociology was more complex than 
simply economical. This cartography is in line with what we want to 
present here. Although new materialism has set in motion a qualitative 
shift in cultural theory at large, this shift is transversal, not dualist. Striking 
alliances between the old and the new, Rahman and Witz claim that early 
feminists broadened the definition of the economically determinist material 
to include social relations and the domestic sphere, and worked on the 
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material as including everyday and institutional practices as well (ibid., 
250). As a consequence, they read Butler’s claim about “the distinction 
between the material and the cultural [being] no longer a stable or viable 
one” (ibid., 249) as an outrage, precisely because of the fact that 1970s and 
1980s feminist sociology did not necessarily work along the lines of such 
a distinction. In the work of Butler, they imply, a second-wave feminist 
materialism functions as a straw person.6 Rahman and Witz find that 
good-old feminist sociological work worked along the lines of an expanded 
conceptualization of the material.
Simultaneously, however, they claim that the good-old feminist 
sociological work simply added new (relativist, they say) theoretical 
frameworks to the existing economically determinist materialism. They 
question whether, in such a context, “the distinctive materiality of 
materialism has any residual conceptual integrity” (ibid., 252). In other 
words, they stumble upon the problems of additive/quantitative epistemic 
approaches, especially, we would say, when the two quantified approaches 
are non-exhaustive oppositions. We claim that adding a so-called feminist 
postmodern epistemology with relativist inclinations to a modern 
epistemology, feminist or not, materialist or not, does not necessarily result 
in a qualitative shifting of either the modern or the feminist postmodern. 
This is why the questioning of conceptual integrity is justified in the case 
of the cartography of Rahman and Witz, but not in the context of new 
(feminist) materialism per se. The conceptualization of “materiality” that 
the sociologists Rahman and Witz engage with does not necessarily shift the 
term towards something that differs from the economical simply because 
of the fact that early feminist sociologists seem to have added a bodily 
materiality to the economical.
The materialism brought to the fore by Rahman and Witz—if compared 
with economical (neo-classical) materialism, the constructionist approach 
remains constant, as DeLanda also stressed in the interview in Part 
One—should in fact be labeled “new” in the teleological sense of the 
term, whereas we have argued that it is among other things teleology (as 
shared by realist/totalizing/modern and social constructivist/relativist/
postmodern epistemologies) that is broken down in new materialism. 
Rahman and Witz themselves yearn for a breakdown of linear continuity 
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as well, while remaining in a dualistic mode (pre-distinguishing the social 
and the physical), which we would interpret as an artifact of their territorial 
approach to new theory formation:
The social constructionism being worked at here is not one 
that is limited by physical matter, but rather one that is able 
to incorporate body matters as an indivisible part of lived, 
gendered experience and action. […] it seems to us that 
there is an attempt to consider the social effectivity of the 
physical—materiality as embodiment, experienced and rendered 
meaningful within gendered and sexualized frameworks of 
meaning and action (ibid., 256; original emphasis).
Rahman and Witz thus affirm dualisms throughout their article—the 
dualism between new materialism and sociology being the starting point, 
and the one between physicality and sociality being the end result. It seems 
as if they have wanted to rescue (good-old) feminist sociology in light of 
a materialism that is new in the teleological sense of the term.7 Analyzing 
their article, we have shown that such an approach does not allow for 
the qualitative shifting of concepts that is to be found in the work of, 
among others, Braidotti and DeLanda. The materiality celebrated remains 
reduced to being the polar opposite of a sociality—that is, the material 
here has to be made socially effective, rather than seeing the social and 
the material as co-constitutive forces through, for instance, the “abstract 
machine.” We read this absence as an artifact of the authors buying into 
disciplinary territoriality. Bringing new materialism (here assumed to be a 
pre-existing body of work) into contact with a scholarly discipline (equally 
assumed to be pre-existing) has distortive effects. The presupposition that 
a new materialism is generated contradicts new materialism’s own anti-
representationalism. New materialism, then, takes scholarship into absolute 
deterritorialization, and is not an epistemic class that has a clear referent. 
New materialism is something to be put to work.8
Cultural theory being less disciplined than (feminist) sociology, the 
beginnings of a transversal understanding of new materialism can be found 
in Susan Sheridan’s “Words and Things: Some Feminist Debates on 
Culture and Materialism.” Sheridan (2002, 23), while not using the term 
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new materialism herself, argues that the impact of post-structuralism on 
feminist cultural theory has resulted in the displacement of “the primacy 
of social and economic relations in analyses of women’s situation,” and in 
the implementation of taking into consideration the primacy of “issues of 
sexuality, subjectivity and textuality.” Sheridan claims that this seeming shift 
rests on a misinterpretation of post-structuralist theory, in which words 
and things got separated (all of a sudden “words” gained primacy) whereas 
post-structuralism, if read unpolemically, and together with recent work on 
matter, “demonstrates how inseparable are the symbolic and the material 
in examining the discursive construction of ‘objects’ of knowledge, and 
the material effects of that discursive power” (ibid., 25). In other words, 
post-structuralism and new materialism in Sheridan’s understanding 
should not be read as dual opposites, and together they should not be 
seen as theoretical moves beyond a feminist sociological materialism. This 
cartography is qualitatively different from the one presented by Rahman 
and Witz, and it finds confirmation in the work of French post-structuralist 
feminists such as Hélène Cixous ([1975] 1976, 879, 884), one of whose 
main concerns, after all, was representationalism.
Sheridan, like Braidotti, positions herself amongst post-structuralist 
feminists who have argued that cultural constructivist feminism “is 
not materialist enough” (ibid., 27), and who have attacked “reductive 
(essentialist) representations of the nature/culture binary divide itself” 
(ibid., 28). Here, a post-structuralist feminist cultural theory seems to 
be dualistically opposed to a “cultural constructivism.” Post-structuralist 
feminists are said to have critiqued cultural constructivism for working 
with a “de-materialised body,” whereas another critique is that they have 
been working with “understandings of ‘discourse’” that are “limited” 
when language is taken to be performative (ibid.). At the same time, post-
structuralist feminist cultural theory is said to have attacked the reductive 
essentialism of both feminist sociology (focusing on the material) and 
cultural constructivism (focusing on the cultural). Traversing the non-
exhaustive opposites of feminist sociology and cultural constructivism, and 
analyzing the reductivism effected on the basis of a reliance on either matter 
or discourse demonstrates transversality. In other words, Sheridan argues 
that the current rise in new materialist analyses in cultural theory shows that 
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both language-oriented cultural constructivisms and sociologically induced 
feminisms are to be critiqued, since neither has fully employed the agential 
qualities of matter. Sheridan’s reading of what she calls a “new stage” (ibid.; 
cf. Hekman 2010, 7 on a “new settlement”) in feminist theory generates a 
focus not only on biological matter or on a cultural theory incorporating 
insights from the natural sciences, but also on the matter of the political 
economy, thus qualitatively shifting a concept of matter as purely physical 
and opposed to the social or linguistic.
The new stage’s disciplinary transversality comes to be fully delineated 
by Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (2008, 9–10; cf. Squier and 
Littlefield 2004) as a new materialism (here called “material feminism”) 
that is to be found in the disciplines of “science studies, environmental 
feminisms, corporeal feminisms, queer theory, disability studies, theories 
of race and ethnicity, environmental justice, (post-)Marxist feminism, 
globalization studies, and cultural studies,” and which as an epistemic trend 
is involved in “integrating them into what amounts to a new paradigm 
for feminist thought. […] this paradigm is currently emerging and […] 
is a necessary and exhilarating move for contemporary feminism.” In 
The Material of Knowledge: Feminist Disclosures, Hekman (2010) goes so 
far as to demonstrate that new materialism is to be found in all scholarly 
disciplines, cutting across the trans-Atlantic disconnection between analytic 
and continental philosophy, and putting feminist theory at the forefront. 
For us, too, the new materialism allows for a move away from disciplines 
towards the meta-disciplinary, in feminist theory and in cultural theory 
more broadly, which is a claim that alludes to the importance of studying 
and engaging with the effect that this move might have on the paradigms 
of contemporary cultural theory. In what ways does new materialism 
traverse paradigms?
Generating New Materialism: Playing with Paradigms
Demonstrating the workings of new materialism, that is, generating a 
new materialism rather than relying upon a new materialism already 
pre-generated, Braidotti (2000, 160) argues that what is to be found in 
postmodern cultural theory (i.e. the body of social/semiotic constructivist 
cultural theory considered state-of-the-art once theory formation is 
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positioned on a global classificatory map) is a “denial of the materiality 
of the bodily self” in paradoxical conjunction with the fast circulation 
of an excessive number of theoretical discourses about, and cultural 
representations of, the human body. In other words, cultural theory in the 
postmodern era has been unable to account fully for materiality, whereas it 
found itself surrounded by an excessive representation (thus objectification) 
of (bodily and non-bodily, organic and inorganic, always already feminized) 
matter in popular culture as well as cultural theory. Braidotti takes 
postmodernist constructivism’s specific form of anti-essentialism, which 
affirms representationalism, to be responsible for this curious situation. 
Postmodernist constructivism is discovered to be a paradigm in which 
the space for materialism is, in Alistair Welchman’s words (2005, 390), 
“restricted,” and postmodern cultural theorists are simply included in the 
huge category of “critics who use an impoverished conception of matter 
inherited from non-materialist systems of thought” (ibid., 388). Postmodern 
cultural theory, otherwise seen as constituting and having been constituted 
by the Crisis of Reason, seems to have continued to work within the legacy 
of modernism’s foundationalism. The modernist system of thought relying 
on Reason (and concepts like Logos, Mind, Representation) has not been 
fully broken down, and this is why transcendental and humanist tendencies 
continue to haunt present-day cultural theory. We have already explained 
that a postmodernism dualistically opposing modernism cannot entail 
anything but a continuation of the Same (cf. Alaimo and Hekman 2008, 
2–3, Hekman 2010, 48). How does new materialism succeed in qualitatively 
shifting the paradigm that had supposedly already left the academic stage 
after May ‘68? And how does it introduce a conception of matter that is not 
impoverished?
As already stated, Braidotti’s new materialism, which she also terms a 
“bodily” or “carnal” materialism (2006, 182) begins with “the enfleshed 
Deleuzean subject,” which is “a folding-in of external influences and a 
simultaneous unfolding outwards of affects.” The exterior and the interior, 
the subject(ive) and the object(ive), the individual, the social, and the 
symbolic are conceptualized as co-constitutive instead of pre-determined 
levels or layers. The genealogy of this Deleuzean subject is created in 
Continental thought; it includes “Descartes’ nightmare, Spinoza’s hope, 
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Nietzsche’s complaint, Freud’s obsession, Lacan’s favorite fantasy, 
Marx’s omission” (Braidotti 2000, 159). This cartography shows that new 
materialism has something to say about Reason/the modernist paradigm as 
well as the Crisis of Reason/the postmodernist paradigm. In other words, it 
is a qualified cartography, which opens up for a qualitative shifting of a dual 
opposition. This shifting is done by rethinking matter. Affirming a radical 
sense of materialism, or simply radical immanence, instead of starting from 
Reason (whether adjectified, thus postmodernized, or not), Braidotti does 
not define matter as solid and stable, as self-identical. A radically immanent 
conceptualization of matter necessarily affirms its ongoing “metamorphosis” 
(Braidotti 2002a), or in the words of DeLanda (1996, 2002), its ongoing 
“morphogenesis” as it shows an interest in intensive material processes and 
the actual forms they can produce.
According to a philosophy of radical immanence informed by a 
Bergsonian concept of time (durée instead of linearity and progress), 
matter is not thought of as Matter, the photonegative of Reason or Logos 
or Mind or Representation, but rather by a focus on “duration [inserted] 
into matter” (Grosz 2005, 111). It is a focus, indeed, on metamorphosis or 
morphogenesis:
What endures, what is fundamentally immersed in time is not 
what remains unchanging or the same over time, a Platonic 
essence, but what diverges and transforms itself with the passage 
of time (ibid., 110).
This boils down to matter immanently escaping every possible 
representation in the modernist, scientistic meaning as well as in the 
postmodernist, social or semiotic constructivist sense of the term according 
to which representation is not the scientistic “mirror of nature” but rather 
the equally representationalist “mirror of culture” (Barad 2007). This is 
to say that whereas a modernist scientific materialism allows for one, True 
representation of matter, and a postmodernist cultural constructivism 
allows for a plethora of equally true representations, it is the shared 
representationalism that is questioned and shifted by new materialism. Matter 
is a transformative force in itself, which, in its ongoing change, will not allow 
any representation to take root. This is also how Miguel de Beistegui (2004, 
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110) reads Deleuze with Heidegger, elusively concluding that: “Behind 
or, better said perhaps, beneath every object, every representation, every 
physical of metaphysical ideality lies a phenomenon, which is the flesh and 
blood of the world, the life that continues to live in and through being as it is 
represented in itself. This is being as it is lived.”9
In “What is the Matter of Feminist Criticism?” Mariam Fraser affirms 
Braidotti’s new materialism, by working on the academic whom Claire 
Colebrook (2004, 293) has called the epitome of contemporary (feminist) 
postmodern cultural theory: Judith Butler. Representationalism or 
linguisticality is key to the work of Butler.10 Fraser (2002, 613) claims that 
in this work, language ends up addressing only the exterior. As a corollary, 
the interior appears as fundamentally ungraspable as any grasping is done 
through language. How do Barad and Vicki Kirby, whom Fraser positions 
alongside Braidotti for the generation of new materialism, qualitatively 
shift the relation between matter/materiality and language, between the 
exterior and the interior of the body? The key point is the abandonment 
of assumptions about linguisticality, and about who does the speaking/
writing. For Barad (1998, 105 in ibid., 618; original emphasis), “what is 
being described by our theories is not nature itself, but our participation 
within nature.” She theorizes the intra-action of the observer, the observed, 
and observing instruments, all of which are “agential.” In line with this, 
Kirby starts from the literacy of matter, re-reading Derrida and Saussure 
in order to show that a close reading of their work also uncovers their 
emphasis on materiality-in-change. In the work of Kirby, matter appears as 
something that is not only spoken about or spoken with, but rather as itself 
simply speaking. Nature and culture, word and flesh are “all emergent within 
a force field of differentiations that has no exteriority in any final sense” 
(Kirby 1997, 126–7 in Fraser 2002, 619; original emphasis). Both cases of 
transversality, signified by the “within,” entail leaving behind the primacy 
of either language/culture or matter/nature. In other words, a false dualism 
comes to be traversed. New materialism, that is, cuts across postmodernist 
and modernist paradigms as it shows that both epistemologies start from a 
distinctive pole of what Colebrook (2004, 56) has called “the representation/ 
materiality dichotomy.” Questioning this dichotomy involved the following:
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When feminists criticized or rejected the notion of women as 
mired in material embodiment, they did so because matter 
was deemed to be devoid of dynamism. When, subsequently, 
that phobia regarding matter was questioned, it was precisely 
because the border between mind and matter was deemed 
to be the effect of a prior linguistic or social production. And 
when ‘linguisticism,’ in turn, was challenged, this was because 
language had been erroneously taken to be a fixed, determining, 
and inhuman grid imposed upon life, rather than a living force 
(Colebrook 2008, 64).
Bodies are texts that unfold according to genetic encoding, Braidotti says, 
which implies traversing the material and the representational.
Key to the new materialist paradigm, then, is an emphasis on the 
“material-discursive” or “material-semiotic” that we know from the 
paradigm-shifting work of Haraway (1988, 595; original emphasis):
[…] bodies as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic 
generative nodes. Their boundaries materialize in social 
interaction. Boundaries are drawn by mapping practices; 
‘objects’ do not pre-exist as such. Objects are boundary projects. 
But boundaries shift from within; boundaries are very tricky. 
What boundaries provisionally contain remains generative, 
productive of meanings and bodies. Siting (sighting) boundaries 
is a risky practice.
Such a claim is transversal when it comes to the broad (modernist 
and postmodernist) paradigms of cultural theory. The focus on the 
materialization of bodies and other so-called objects of investigation 
demonstrates how “duration” has in fact gotten “inserted into matter” 
(how DeLanda, for instance, got to focus on “matter-energy flows”), 
and how the “the representation/materiality dichotomy” has indeed been 
broken down (how Braidotti, for example, came to conceptualize the body 
as “a piece of meat activated by electric waves of desire, a text written by 
the unfolding of genetic encoding”) in new materialist cultural theory. 
Working with “material-semiotic agents,” as Haraway calls them, allows 
for a complexification of the way in which matter used to be defined. An 
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object is no longer passive matter that has to be re-presented; meaning-
making takes place on a two-way track.11 Here it is also demonstrated how 
new materialism does not discard signification (cf. Ahmed 2008, 34) but 
rather directs it to its proper place and qualitatively shifts the linguistic turn 
accordingly (i.e. non-dualistically).
In the passage cited above as well as in her later work, Haraway focuses 
upon the ways in which bodies and systems of scholarly signification/
representation materialize alongside each other. Harawayian instantiations of 
new materialism affirm what Barad (2007) has called an onto-epistemology, 
or even an ethico-onto-epistemology, according to which being and knowing 
(and the good) become indistinguishable. Inspired by Haraway and Barad, 
we lastly wish to discuss the cartographical methodology that generates and 
is generated by the disciplinary and paradigmatic transversalities of new 
materialism.
Cartography Rather Than Classification
New materialism is a cultural theory for the twenty-first century that 
attempts to show how postmodern cultural theory, even while claiming 
otherwise, has made use of a conceptualization of “post-” that is dualistic. 
Postmodern cultural theory re-confirmed modern cultural theory, thus 
allowing transcendental and humanist traditions to haunt cultural theory 
after the Crisis of Reason. New materialist cultural theory shifts (post-) 
modern cultural theory, and provides an immanent answer to transcendental 
humanism. It is a cultural theory that is non-foundationalist yet non-
relativist. In conformity with the interviewees in Part One of this book, 
we have shown that there is much to be gained from an argument such 
as the latter; after all, postmodernisms and modernisms are manifold, on 
the one hand, and epistemologically very similar on the other. It is for this 
reason that new materialism continues to rewrite the history of philosophy. 
As already stated, the minor tradition Deleuze proposed is now widely 
read and commented upon, but increasingly, great minds of the past are 
being given the attention that their work needs. For there is no need to 
limit this tradition to a series of personae or even to what the History of 
Philosophy has labeled a particular “type” of thinking. Scholars at work 
within modernism such as Bergson, Whitehead, William James and Edmund 
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Husserl, all of whom had been pushed aside or reinterpreted by dualist 
thinking, are in need of serious materialist re-readings, which are in fact 
being carried out by an increasing number of scholars today. There is not 
even any reason to exclude Hegel from this list. For when he stated that 
“Action divides [spirit] into substance and consciousness of the substance” 
(Hegel [1807] 1977, paragraph 444), this not only comes very close to 
Spinoza’s solution to the mind-body problem with which this chapter 
began, it also allows us to rethink Marx’s (Hegel-inspired) materialism 
as a (non-dualist) neo-materialism. The richness of all these philosophies 
had by and large been suffering from dualism-dominated modernism 
and postmodernism. The way in which new materialism was generated 
in the previous paragraph alluded to the fact that duration not only came 
to be inserted into matter (ontology), but also and simultaneously into 
theory formation (epistemology). In other words, theory formation also 
entails the materialization of boundaries. Starting theory formation from 
movement alludes to cartography rather than classification, which is the third 
instantiation of transversality that we intend to highlight in this chapter.
In the introduction we claimed that new materialism not only enacts 
a thinking about theory formation that is other than classificatory (new 
materialism sets in motion a non-dualistic epistemic practice), but also that 
it enables us to understand the way in which theory formation used to be 
thought (following a territorialization pattern). We claimed that classification 
exemplifies the territorial and is fully dualistic, and throughout this chapter 
we have made clear how seemingly opposite epistemic tendencies or classes 
are in fact non-exhaustive oppositions. New materialism criticizes not only 
the use of “a discipline” or “a paradigm” as pre-determined, but is also 
critical, along the lines of the dismantling of binary oppositions that it enacts 
of the pre-determination of classifications of theoretical trends. Classifying 
epistemic tendencies that are supposedly prevalent in cultural theory implies 
working along territorial lines, which is a transcendentalizing gesture along 
with invoking sequential negation and a narrative of progress (i.e., it is 
dualist). This does not allow for the (un)folding of cultural theory—the 
matter-energy flows of theory formation, the non-linear coding practices, the 
cutting across matter and signification—to be captured. New materialism 
de-territorializes the ways in which cultural theory has been classified, and 
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this process we call cartographical. We referred above to Colebrook, who 
questioned a conceptualization of “language” as “a fixed, determining, and 
inhuman grid imposed upon life.” She defined new materialism as allowing 
us to see not only matter, but also language as a “living force.” Questioning 
fixity thus opens up the possibility of thinking about theory formation in a 
non-linear, cartographical way.
Barad’s “Re(con)figuring Space, Time, and Matter” is useful for 
explaining the move away from the classificatory towards the cartographical. 
Earlier we mentioned Barad’s neologism “intra-action,” which allowed us 
to demonstrate that terms such as mind and matter, or sociology and new 
materialism, do not exist independently before they begin to inter-act. Barad 
(2001, 98) explains the machinery of intra-action as follows:
[…] structures are to be understood as material-discursive 
phenomena that are iteratively (re)produced through ongoing 
material-discursive intra-actions. This machine is not a 
Euclidean device, nor is it merely a static instrument with a non-
Euclidean geometry. It is a topological animal which mutates 
through a dynamics of intra-activity. Questions of connectivity, 
boundary formation, and exclusion (topological concerns) 
must supplement and inform concerns about positionality and 
location (too often figured in geometrical terms).
Affirming onto-epistemology, Barad talks about mapping practices 
that draw boundaries, and she claims that the same objects/boundaries 
materialize in non-exhaustively opposite mapping practices (Euclidean space 
versus stasis in non-Euclidean space). The mapping practice, generating 
intra-action and generated through it, shifts both options and works along 
the following lines:
What we need are genealogies of the material-discursive 
apparatuses of production which take account of the intra-
active topological dynamics that reconfigure the spacetime 
manifold. In particular, it is important that they include an 
analysis of the connectivity of phenomena at different scales. 
[…] The topological dynamics of space, time, and matter are 
an agential matter and as such require an ethics of knowing 
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and being: Intra-actions have the potential to do more than 
participate in the constitution of the geometries of power, 
they open up possibilities for changes in its topology, and as 
such interventions in the manifold possibilities made available 
reconfigure both that will be possible. The space of possibilities 
does not represent a fixed event horizon within which the 
social location of knowers can be mapped, nor a homogenous 
fixed uniform container of choices. Rather the dynamics of the 
spacetime manifold is produced by agential interventions made 
possible in its very re(con)figuration (ibid., 103–4).
These genealogies, or “cartographies” in our vocabulary, are non-dualist 
approaches to theory formation that allow for absolute deterritorializing. 
Not primarily interested in representation, signification, and disciplinarity, 
new materialism is fascinated by affect, force, and movement as it travels in 
all directions. It searches not for the objectivity of things in themselves but 
for an objectivity of actualization and realization. It searches for how matter 
comes into agential realism, how matter is materialized in it. It is interested 
in speeds and slownesses, in how the event unfolds according to the in-
between, according to intra-action. New materialism argues that we know 
nothing of the (social) body until we know what it can do. It agrees with 
studying the multiplicity of modes that travel natureculture as the perpetual 
flow it has always already been.
In the next chapter we will take up the question of non-dualism, and we 
will discuss in a detailed manner how new materialism pushes dualism into 
non-dualism, thus allowing for a non-reductive take on matter and language.
Notes
1. This mapping of new materialism overlaps considerably with the one produced by 
Myra J. Hird (2004, 2006), albeit that we (much like Barad in the interview earlier 
in this book) do not argue that new materialism has gotten off the ground in the 
natural sciences, and that there are varieties of feminist applications of new mate-
rialism. We will demonstrate in this book how new materialism traverses both the 
sciences and the humanities necessarily, and how it is immediately a feminism.
2. For this term see Barad 2007.
3. We take this formulation from Grosz 2005.
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4. For an interesting take on Benjamin’s take on historical materialism, see Tiedemann 
2005, 157–63.
5. See Dolphijn 2004, 24.
6. See van der Tuin 2009 for a conceptualization of “second-” and “third-wave femi-
nist epistemologies.”
7. See van der Tuin 2008 and Davis 2009 for a critique of a biologically tainted argu-
ment about new materialism (namely Ahmed 2008). A comparison between Sara 
Ahmed’s work and Rahman and Witz will show that, whether sociologically or 
biologically biased, a disciplinary take on the new materialism is always already a 
reduction. New materialism proposes to study the biological and the sociological 
as intra-acting, thus as relating, rather than as two independent relata that might 
interact.
8. Despite the most original and radical thoughts by which DeLanda has inspired so 
many scholars and scientists all over the world, a returning critique on his work 
has to be that the scholarly areas of his interest never even seem to connect to one 
another. Whether it concerns his revolutionary take on geology, biology, sociology, 
architecture, mathematics or historiography (which only seem to be some of the 
fields of which he has proven himself to be an expert), the disciplinary boundaries, 
contrary to the way Deleuze and a lot of other scholars working with Deleuze today 
deal with this, stay firmly in tact.
9. It is necessary, for an affirmative reading of Heidegger, that we do not consider his 
conceptualization of “being” as opposed to a (for instance Whiteheadian) becom-
ing, as Shaviro (2009, ix) proposes. This is very possible if we commit ourselves 
to a different reading of the former’s texts. For when, in conceptualizing “being,” 
Heidegger ([1980] 1994, 66) states: “Hegel brings the absolute restlessness of absol-
vence into this quiet ‘is’ of the general proposition,” he affirms that “being” equals 
this “true immediacy” which allows us to understand being as equal to metamor-
phosis or morphogenetic change. Beistegui’s “phenomenon” provides further proof 
for new materialism’s (as yet underresearched) relation with (new) phenomenology.
10. Although it is undeniable that Butler features as the epitome of linguisticism in 
new materialist theory formation, new materialist theorists also try to read her af-
firmatively. Kirby’s Judith Butler: Live Theory from 2006 is an excellent example 
hereof, since one reads the attempt to push Butler beyond linguisticism, and thereby 
towards new materialism, between the lines on every page. Kirby (2006, 162, n. 2; 
original emphasis) states that “[…] contributions to the question of matter are com-
patible with Butler’s political project, even through they radically extend its terms.” 
Butler herself often feeds the dualism between new feminist materialism and linguis-
ticist feminist theory. In her recent work Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? for 
instance, Butler (2009, 30) distances herself explicitly from Spinozist currents that 
are so influential, above all, in contemporary Australian feminist (materialist) theory 
(cf. Kirby 2006, 150 ff ). Also when she (Butler) claims that the body reveals itself 
to us in and according to language (she uses the term “the interstices of language” 
([1987] 1999, 193) it makes it easy to conclude that indeed this is a linguisticism at 
work.
11. Instantiations are to be found in the work of among others Gallagher (2005) and 
Massumi (2002).
Chapter 6
Pushing Dualism to an Extreme
This chapter engages with the way in which several significant contemporary 
(Continental) philosophers establish a philosophy of difference in the form 
of a “new materialism.” It builds on work on new materialism’s specific 
philosophical impetus as well as carefully unpacking the methodology 
through which it is actualized. Though we will demonstrate that this 
double move concerning ontology on the one hand and methodology 
on the other is inherent in the new materialism, most contemporary 
commentaries focus on ontology only by positing the new philosophical 
stance. In other words, the materialism of new materialism is reflected 
upon, whereas a clear perspective on how new materialism is new remains 
underdeveloped. This chapter addresses this discrepancy by demonstrating 
how the new materialism produces a revolution in thought by traversing 
modernity’s dualisms (structured by a negative relation between terms), 
and by constituting a new conceptualization of difference (structured by 
an affirmative relation) along the way. This conceptualization of difference 
entails an ontological philosophical practice predicated on leaving behind 
all prioritizations (implicitly) involved in modern dualistic thinking, since 
a difference structured by affirmation does not work with predetermined 
relations (e.g. between mind and body) nor does it involve a counter-
hierarchy between terms (which would make the new materialism into a 
postmodern philosophical exercise).
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The “new” of new materialism (that is, the way in which its non-dualist 
philosophy is related to dualist philosophical stances) comes close to Jean-
François Lyotard’s plea for a “rewriting” of “modernity.” In chapter 2 of 
his The Inhuman ([1988] 1991) Lyotard, who is famous for his thoughts 
on “post-modernism,” critiques this concept in particular because of its 
implicit notion of time. Postmodernism is modernism in the sense that the 
issues raised by modernism are also on the agenda of postmodernism, which 
is rather an after-modernism. Issues, as Lyotard continually stresses, that 
predominantly include the emancipation of humanity as a whole. Yet by 
appropriating the term post-modernism, his project automatically claims 
itself to be a linear consequence of modernism and (at the same time) 
refuses to think the here and now (or at least, it can only think the here and 
now as a consequence of a period in cultural history long gone). In re-
reading Aristotle’s Physics (Book IV), however, Lyotard agrees with the idea 
that what has already taken place (proteron) and what is about to take place 
(husteron) cannot be considered apart from the now. Both history and the 
future unfold from the now. Our age then should not be considered an age 
that follows from modernity, but rather an age that sets itself to a continuous 
rewriting of several of the (emancipatory) features that have been raised 
by modernity, thus actively creating a past (while projecting a future). 
That is why Lyotard ([1988] 1991, 24) suggests rephrasing his project as 
“rewriting modernity.”
The idea of rewriting modernity might also be considered a good 
description of what Gilles Deleuze (Lyotard’s close colleague at the 
University of Vincennes) proposed. Deleuze (e.g. [1966] 1991) too seems to 
accept the Aristotelian notion of time, which, in his books, is mainly at work 
in how Henri Bergson rewrote Aristotle (using the concepts of actuality 
and virtuality). Deleuze himself (like his interpreters) always claimed that 
he intended to rewrite the history of philosophy as a whole, or at least, 
his goal—especially in the early part of his career—was to question the 
History of Philosophy (with capital letters) as a whole, as its dominant lines 
of thought overcoded many ideas that he considered to be of the greatest 
value. Yet without prejudice to his timeless contributions to thought, there 
are good reasons to consider the work of Deleuze not so much a rewriting 
of the entire History of Philosophy, but rather as a rewriting of modernity. 
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For although authors like Lucretius, Duns Scotus, and the Stoics play 
an important role in his thinking, they have never been at the centre of 
a particular study, nor has Deleuze made much effort to shed new light 
on their ideas. He did, however, give philosophy and many other parts of 
academia important rewritings of philosophers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, 
Nietzsche and Bergson, and writers like Proust and Kafka. These were 
authors who, in very different ways, all lived their lives in the so-called 
modern era. Renaming Deleuze’s project as “rewriting modernity” seems 
all the more agreeable, because its key feature, being the emancipation of 
humanity in its most radical form, seems precisely what Deleuze’s philosophy 
is all about. Gilles Deleuze’s (and Félix Guattari’s) rewriting of modernity 
was about the rewriting of a “minor tradition” in thought, as it was named 
(e.g. Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987), which is mainly based on the 
four “modernist” thinkers mentioned above. By rewriting their modernity, 
and not in the least place modernist ways of thinking emancipation, 
Deleuze did not create a post-modernism that continued (in any way) 
the traits that had given form to the modern era. Rather, in line with how 
Lyotard conceptualized it, Deleuze’s goal was to set this whole tradition in 
movement. We will show later that Deleuze’s take on the Other, for instance, 
cannot be captured by the post-modern countering of the One.
In Lyotard’s wake, the perpetual rewriting of modernity is something 
also taken very seriously by those inspired by new materialist thought today, 
as already seen in the interviews in Part One of this book and subsequently 
noted at the end of the previous chapter. The work of this rapidly growing 
group of contemporary scholars rewrites modernism, or bits of modernism, 
opening this (philosophical) tradition up to the arts and the sciences, 
actualizing and realizing it in the here and now. Some authors, like Braidotti 
and DeLanda, are very much interested in re-reading Deleuze and his minor 
tradition, though it should be mentioned that both of them are also using 
other fertile (modern) grounds. Braidotti has always shown an interest in 
psychoanalysis (Freudian psychoanalysis in particular). DeLanda, on the 
other hand, though always viewed as a committed Deleuzian, makes at 
least as much use of the work of Fernand Braudel, Mario Bunge, and Max 
Weber. Others, like Karen Barad and Quentin Meillassoux, have come to 
this path through still other routes. Barad (2007), emerging from the field 
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of theoretical physics, is mostly inspired by the work of Niels Bohr. Quentin 
Meillassoux ([2006] 2008) sets himself to rewriting the dominant stream in 
the modernist project as a whole (which he labels “correlationalist”), which 
brings him back most of all to an affirmative re-reading of David Hume.
All of these authors are in touch with a material spirit whose 
imperceptible forces they perform in their writing in diverse ways. Yet their 
common interest in doing this affirmatively, in and through a re-reading of 
modernity, demands more refinement. For instance, in Nomadic Subjects 
Braidotti (1994, 171), in a Lyotardian vein and in reference to Deleuze’s 
minor tradition, states that we ought to “work through” the notion of 
woman: “Like the gradual peeling off of old skins, the achievement of 
change has to be earned by careful working through; it is the metabolic 
consumption of the old that can engender the new.” Expanding their interest 
in “naturecultures” (as Donna Haraway [2003] puts it) or in “collectives” 
(which is a concept of Bruno Latour ([1991] 1993)), the way in which 
they rewrite modernity’s processes is by rewriting the dualisms that are so 
central to modern thought. Latour for instance has stated that he is “trying 
the tricky move of unveiling the modern Constitution without resorting to 
the modern type of debunking” due to the fact that his project is to affirm 
“that the [modern] Constitution, if it is to be effective, has to be aware of 
what it allows” (Latour [1991] 1993, 43). This kind of argumentation can 
be summarized, in the words of Bergson ([1896] 2004, 236), as a movement 
of “push[ing] dualism to an extreme.” In this chapter we discuss the way 
in which a new materialism comes to be constituted precisely by this 
movement, which Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 32) in discussing Bergson 
has typified as methodological (it touches upon ways of arguing, ways of 
doing philosophy) as well as ontological (it is interested in a material spirit, 
that is, in what Brian Massumi [2002, 66] calls “ontologically prior”). It is 
the type of movement Deleuze himself has adopted as his own methodology, 
especially in Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the diptych written together 
with Guattari. In their Anti-Oedipus ([1972] 1983), they already claimed 
to perform what they called a “schizoanalysis” (a materialist philosophical 
practice interested in conceptualizing sexuality beyond the male/female 
dualism and even beyond human sexuality), and in breaking through 
the Oedipal plot that overcodes the ways in which we think (through 
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psychoanalysis), and oftentimes individually and collectively experience, 
desire. Far from respecting Cartesian dualisms, this style of thinking is much 
more interested in rethinking Spinoza’s monist solution by means of these 
oppositions and what they can do, as Eugene Holland argues (1999, 111–2). 
But it was in A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 20) 
that they came closest to capturing their project in words, when they state 
as follows: “We invoke one dualism only to challenge another. We employ 
a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges 
all models.” Hence, the methodology and ontology proposed in rewriting 
modernity in no way “follows from” modernity. By pushing dualism to 
an extreme, “difference is pushed to the limit” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 
45). Consequently, by radically rewriting the dualisms of modernity, new 
materialism precisely becomes a philosophy of difference that opens up for a 
“new” ontology, or rather, a “new” ontogenesis.
In the previous chapter we suggested that new materialism is a 
transversal cultural theory that qualitatively shifts the dualist gesture of 
prioritizing mind over matter, soul over body, and culture over nature that 
can be found in modernist as well as post-modernist cultural theories. 
We thus “invoke[d] the same testimony” (Bergson [1896] 2004, 236) 
against two seemingly opposite cultural theories. Despite the fact that 
such prioritization appears commonsensical even today in prominent 
parts of the sciences and the humanities, its reliance on dualism is by no 
means beyond question. The outcomes of the prioritization exercises are 
generally presented as True in its most totalizing meaning, whereas minor 
traditions throughout the centuries have opposed them in convincing 
ways. In other words: a new materialism is constituted by demonstrating 
how the canonized relations between the aforementioned terms are in 
fact the outcomes of “power/knowledge” according to which Truth is an 
instantiation of a politics or régime, as Michel Foucault (1980) would 
have it. In this chapter we will take our previous arguments a step further 
by focusing on the methodological and ontological issues surrounding the 
present-day rise of non-dualist thought. We will begin by considering what 
a radical rewriting of modernity in the case of new materialism entails. 
How do scholars such as Braidotti, DeLanda, Barad, and Meillassoux 
produce their work?
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New Materialism’s Radical Rewriting of Modernity
Let us agree on the point that a cultural theory can only be truly distinctive 
and original if its establishment does not claim to be the next step in a 
discussion that is structured according to the dominant lines of sequential 
negation and the narrative of progress; that is, if its installment does not 
follow the classificatory lines that started dominating thought within 
modernism as it has branched off into so many different parts of life. 
Similarly, opposing this narrative is also not an option. Lyotard has already 
taught us that his increasing concern with the idea of postmodernism also 
had to do with the prefix “post-,” and the way this opposed yet (re)created 
the narratives of modernity. As already mentioned in the previous chapter, it 
was Michel Serres who put the latter into a general theory, when he stated: 
“An idea opposed to another idea is always the same idea, albeit affected by 
the negative sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain 
in the same framework of thought” (Serres with Latour 1995, 81).
Therefore, not just the idea of postmodernism but actually all thought 
that starts either with classification or with the repudiation of it, does not 
radically rewrite, cannot set forth a revolution in thought. Elizabeth Grosz 
(2005, 165), who follows Luce Irigaray’s investment in thinking through 
(feminist) revolutions in thought, states most clearly that it is only in a 
radical rewriting that revolutions in thought can come into being. After all, 
such movement
is not a revolution on any known model, for it cannot be the 
overthrow of all previous thought, the radical disconnection 
from the concepts and language of the past: a revolution in 
thought can only use the language and the concepts that 
presently exist or have already existed, and can only produce 
itself against the background and history of the present.
Earlier, Grosz (2000) had already explained that the seemingly 
constraining model, or framework of thought, or concept allows in fact 
for the indeterminacy of a revolution in thought.1 Wishing to anticipate 
future thoughts and practices by negating the past, one positions oneself 
in a relation to past thoughts and practices that is solely constraining. In 
such a situation, the past undergoes nothing but re-confirmation in the 
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present, albeit that progress is assumed to be made. This, we want to argue, 
is the structuring principle of classificatory modes of thinking, which are 
consequently prevented from a radical rewriting of thought, from being truly 
revolutionary.
Our goal in this chapter should thus be to find out in what way the 
revolutionary constitution of new materialist cultural theory rewrites 
modernity as a present according to which a past and future unfold. In order 
to get there we shall first demonstrate by what means the new materialist 
breakdown of dualism, of the structuring principle of modernist cultural 
theories, stirs a revolution in thought. New materialist cultural theorists do 
not involve themselves with ongoing repetitive discussions in the modernist 
humanities (cf. Serres with Latour 1995, 86). New materialism helps us 
analyze and (therefore) shift the structuring principles of these discussions 
by showing how classificatory negation involves a specific relationality, which 
is reductive. Later we will demonstrate how new materialist cultural theories 
are not relational in a negative, reductive manner, but rather are structured 
along the lines of an affirmative intensity, which in the end turns into a non-
dualism, a monist philosophy of difference, or more precisely, immanence. 
Invoking one dualism in order to challenge another allows new materialism 
to rewrite modernity as an emancipation.
Dualism: A Negation is a Relation Structured by Negativity
Bergson ([1869] 2004, 297) argued that “[t]he difficulties of ordinary 
dualism come, not from the distinction of the two terms, but from the 
impossibility of seeing how the one is grafted upon the other.” Bergson’s 
“ordinary dualism” indicates the structuring principle of Serres’ repetitive 
discussions, and Grosz’s (failed) overthrow of previous thought. Even in our 
time cultural theory is structured predominantly according to this ordinary 
dualism. It continues—implicitly or explicitly—the modernist framework 
of thought, accepting and thinking along the dominant lines of dualist 
distinctions of mind and matter, soul and body, and culture and nature. 
But although Bergson demonstrated that ordinary dualism is inherently 
problematic, the act of making distinctions between terms is not. The 
treatment the distinguished terms receive is what makes dominant cultural 
theory, then as now, questionable. Bergson implies that as long as we are 
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clear about the fact that one term of a dichotomy is “grafted upon” the 
other, we will not fall into the trap of setting up a discussion that leads us 
away from serious thought. This also applies to how contemporary thought, 
often through denial, is grafted upon modernist cultural theory—such as 
through Barad’s term “representationalism,” as will be discussed below.
Let us provide an example that proves our point. Consider a big name 
in contemporary sociology and philosophy: Jean Baudrillard. Baudrillard 
was no doubt part of a very talented generation of French scholars that 
also included Lyotard and Deleuze. But in contrast with the latter two, 
Baudrillard was from the outset very much accepted in mainstream cultural 
theory. He is the prototype of those post-modernist thinkers from whom 
Lyotard implicitly wanted to distance himself, insofar as Baudrillard 
wholeheartedly accepts the modernist dualisms and continues their 
arguments. There is no other way to think, for instance, of Baudrillard’s 
theory of simulacra (e.g. Baudrillard [1981] 1995, [1995] 1996) as anything 
other than a continuation of modernity, as a general acceptance of its 
theories, and a refusal actually to rewrite the dualisms involved. Discussing 
for example the imaginary of Disneyland, he concluded that “[i]t is no 
longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology) but of 
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the 
reality principle” (Baudrillard [1981] 1995, 12–3), he refuses to make any 
analysis whatsoever of the duality of real vs. representational. Accepting the 
difference (even while twisting it around) is by no means the way in which 
new materialism is always already questioning these principles and rewriting 
them from the start.
Thus the time has come to draw a formal difference between this 
ordinary dualism, as Bergson analyzes it, and the radical writing of 
modernist dualisms as proposed by Lyotard and Deleuze, but also by 
scholars such as Latour. The difference lies not in the fact that this latter 
group suggests a dualism that begins with the act of relating whereas 
ordinary dualism denies this relational nature. Rather, both groups start 
from this relating (insofar as it exists outside of its terms). Yet ordinary 
dualism is undergirded by a negative relationality, and it is this particular 
type of relationality that is not subscribed to by Lyotard, Deleuze, or Latour 
(or even Bergson, for that matter). Let us continue therefore by focusing 
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more specifically upon the set-up of argumentations about the deficiency 
of ordinary dualism. We have to return once more to Bergson, whose work 
provides insight into the ways in which the concrete cases of ordinary 
dualism that structure cultural theory (the humanities) as well as scientism 
and common sense can be overcome. Yet his work also shows how non-
dualist philosophy is always “onto-epistemological” (Barad’s term)—that is, 
how philosophy involves the way in which “concept and creation are related 
to each other” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994, 11). This refers back to 
Deleuze’s remark about the work of Bergson as both methodological and 
ontological: Bergson not only provides insight into ordinary dualism as the 
structuring principle of non-revolutionary thought, but also he re-writes 
modernism so as to provide a non-dualist ontology structured by the “unity 
of the thing and the concept” (Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 33).
When Bergson introduces the concept of ordinary dualism in Matter 
and Memory, he works on the problem of the union of body and soul. The 
centrality of this union comes to the fore, according to Bergson ([1896] 
2004, 235), on the basis of a distinction made between matter and spirit. 
This ontological distinction, and more importantly the specific way in which 
it is treated, constitutes Bergson’s analysis as exemplary of the (necessary) 
circumvention of ordinary dualism. Moreover, a distinction is still being 
made between terms:
We maintain, as against materialism, that perception overflows 
the cerebral state; but we have endeavoured to establish, as 
against idealism, that matter goes in every direction beyond our 
representation of it […] And against these two doctrines we 
invoke the same testimony, that of consciousness, which shows 
us our body as one image among others and our understanding 
as a certain faculty of dissociating, of distinguishing, of opposing 
logically, but not of creating or of constructing. Thus, […] it 
would seem that, after having exacerbated the conflicts raised 
by ordinary dualism, we have closed all the avenues of escape 
[…] But, just because we have pushed dualism to an extreme, 
our analysis has perhaps dissociated its contradictory elements 
(ibid., 236; cf. Balibar [1989] 1998, 106 on Spinoza).
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This lengthy quotation provides insight into the way in which the terms 
that are divided up by ordinary dualism are grafted upon one another, but 
also in the way in which ontology and methodology/epistemology are grafted 
onto one another. The two levels of analysis (for lack of a better term) 
indicated here are intrinsically intertwined. We want to underline that “all 
the avenues of escape” do exactly not end up being “closed,” because of the 
complexity with which Bergson shifts ordinary dualism and moves into the 
direction of thinking differently, of thinking a non-dualist ontology. Let us 
explain this complex move by seeking recourse to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
What is Philosophy?, this time read through the work of Barad.
Deleuze and Guattari ([1991] 1994, 11) state that “the question of 
philosophy is the singular point where concept and creation are related 
to each other.” Not defining the nature of philosophy as such would 
seduce one into uncritically affirming commonsensical and scientistic 
representationalism, found also in the humanities, which is predicated 
upon an ordinary dualism in a two-leveled manner. Barad (though without 
referring to Deleuze and Guattari) elaborates upon precisely this point. In 
“Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter 
Comes to Matter” she states:
The idea that beings exist as individuals with inherent 
attributes, anterior to their representation, is a metaphysical 
presupposition that underlies the belief in political, linguistic, 
and epistemological forms of representationalism. […] 
representationalism is the belief in the ontological distinction 
between representations and that which they purport to 
represent […] (Barad 2003, 804).
In other words: what she calls for is a “performative understanding, 
which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to discursive practices” 
(ibid., 807).2 We have alluded to these practices already, when we explained 
how philosophy both addresses and explains the structuring principles of 
the dominant, classificatory lines of thought. The work of Barad can explain 
that what Bergson ([1896] 2004, 260) calls thinking through scientism, or 
common sense, or the one pole of any dualism (in the humanities too) “in 
its remotest aspirations,” one affirms an onto-epistemology. According to 
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onto-epistemologies, “[w]e do not obtain knowledge by standing outside 
of the world; we know because “we” are of the world. We are part of the 
world in its differential becoming” (Barad 2003, 829; original emphasis). 
Onto-epistemology demonstrates how philosophers do philosophy, which 
following Deleuze and Guattari ([1991] 1994, 11) is a discursive practice 
according to which
the concept is not given, it is created; it is to be created. It is 
not formed but posits itself in itself—it is a self-positing […] 
The concept posits itself to the same extent that it is created. 
What depends on a free creative activity is also that which, 
independently and necessarily, posits itself in itself: the most 
subjective will be the most objective.
Philosophers do philosophy in their work with concepts, when studying 
the concepts that arise in a specific practice and which are related to 
concepts that are at work in other practices with which they interfere. 
Elsewhere, Deleuze clearly states that when it comes to what philosophy 
does, he will not accept that it is any form of representational dualism 
structured by negative relationality. The created concepts, he claims, 
are no less “practical, effective or existent” (Deleuze [1985] 2000, 280) 
than the practices in which they happen. Thus “philosophical theory is 
itself a practice just as much as its object. It is no more abstract than its 
object” (ibid.). Doing philosophy, then, means engaging in this creation of 
concepts, and not relying on “referential signs” (our term).3 The latter is a 
representationalism, implying a negative relationality that does not do justice 
to matter as “the aggregate of images” and perception of matter as “these 
same images referred to the eventual action of one particular image, my 
body” (Bergson [1986] 2004, 8; original emphasis).
When Bergson ([1896] 2004, 243) invokes “consciousness” against 
materialism and idealism, and against empiricism and dogmatism, he claims 
that this concept can show that “a third course lay open,” which allows 
him to escape from the representationalist traps affirmed in any dualist 
philosophy. His conceptualization of consciousness, which shows in this case 
how the four epistemic classes are all predicated on ordinary dualism on the 
two levels of analysis simultaneously, breaks through ordinary dualisms by 
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positing a continuity against discontinuity, that is, a “pure duration” (ibid., 
243). Such a concept cuts across metaphysical classes, that is, it creates a 
third, and revolutionary course:
Homogenous space and homogenous time are then neither 
properties of things [materialism, realism] nor essential 
conditions of our faculty of knowing them [idealism, 
dogmatism]: they express, in an abstract form, the double 
work of solidification and of division which we effect on the 
moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum 
for our action, in order to fix within it starting-points for our 
operation, in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are 
the diagrammatic design of our eventual action upon matter 
(ibid., 280).
The third course, then, opens the way for “the true power of creation” 
(ibid., 236), which we already encountered in the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari, and will find in the work of de Beauvoir as well. This power 
is not attributed to either body or mind, either matter or the perception/
representation of matter, or any other such alternative. The creation of 
concepts entails the breakdown of representationalism on two levels. This 
revolutionary shifting entails precisely the activity of “pushing dualism to an 
extreme,” which opens the way for a thinking in action that is affirmative, 
practical and thus necessarily revolutionary.4
Difference, or: The Shift to Affirmative Relationality
Pushing dualism to an extreme helps to further our thoughts about new 
materialist cultural theories and the way in which they are constituted. 
New materialism does not rely upon a representationalism; it shifts the 
representationalist metaphysical premises of Bergson’s ordinary dualism 
by invoking a discursive practice centered on the creation of concepts in 
their relationality. The often binary oppositions that dominated modernity, 
and that are still accepted as premises in much of the theory of our age 
(which can therefore be considered post-modern, as Lyotard defined it) are 
structured by a relation of negations, and by re-affirming these negations. 
New materialists instead install a philosophy of difference by engaging in 
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the activity of creating concepts, which is an onto-epistemological activity. 
A relationality in the negative, dualistic sense presupposes the terms of the 
relation in question, whereas the creation of concepts entails a traversing of 
dualisms, and the establishment of a relationality that is affirmative—i.e., 
structured by positivity rather than negativity. What happens here is 
that “difference is pushed to the limit” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 45). By 
“pushing dualism to an extreme,” “difference is pushed to the limit,” the 
latter movement being less evaluative and more performative. Let us now 
demonstrate the workings of the affirmative relationality and the philosophy 
of difference thus constituted.
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 20–1) 
state that they “[a]rrive at the magic formula we all seek—PLURALISM = 
MONISM—via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary 
enemy, the furniture we are forever rearranging.” Similar to Bergson, 
Deleuze and Guattari do not avoid or negate dualisms, but traverse or pass 
through them. This affirmative approach to the modern, ordinary dualisms 
is an instance of what Lyotard called a rewriting of modernity. It shows 
how dualisms are inherently untenable, whereas holding on to a negative 
relationality between terms appears historically to be seductive. (Even 
feminists have fallen into the trap of relying too much on such a dualist 
logic!) Bergson and Deleuze and Guattari effectuate an affirmative take on 
the way in which two terms relate, and this shifts dualism by pushing it to 
an extreme. In an affirmative approach, a dualism does not only involve a 
binary opposition, a relation structured by negativity according to which 
different-from is necessarily worth-less-than (Braidotti 1994, 147).5 The 
starting point is that “[r]elated terms belong to one another” (Deleuze 
[1968] 1994, 30). Only when this sense of belonging is affirmed are we able 
to work “towards an absolute concept, once liberated from the condition 
which made difference an entirely relative maximum” (ibid., 33). It is 
precisely the activity of working towards an absolute concept that defines the 
rewriting, the revolution in thought that interests us.
Deleuze contends in Difference and Repetition that “The negative and 
negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the 
phantom or the epiphenomenon” ([1968] 1994, 52). This phantom-like 
character of negation should be taken literally, because here Deleuze 
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produces a critique of representationalism. Capturing difference can only 
be done when “difference” is “shown differing” (ibid., 56; original emphasis) 
when the thinking does not start with the respective phenomena that are 
then claimed to be different from one another, but with mapping difference 
in itself. How does this work? In “Postmodernism is a Humanism: Deleuze 
and Equivocity,” Claire Colebrook (2004, 287) asserts that “one should go 
beyond the fantasy and structure of signification to its possibility.” What we 
are looking at here is the invention of the conditions of invention (cf. Serres 
with Latour 1995, 86)—namely, the establishment of a non-dualist logic of 
univocity as opposed to the dualist logic of equivocity: whereas “equivocity 
posits two radically incommensurable levels” (that which signifies, e.g. 
gender, and that which is signified, e.g. sex/the body), “there is just one 
plane of expression” according to a static univocal logic (Colebrook 2004, 
288). Colebrook goes on by stating that “both the simple image—as a world 
of simulation, signification, representation or social construction—and the 
criticism of this notion are equivocal without justification,”6 whereas under 
a univocal logic “truth may be intuited as that which expresses itself, not 
as that which is in itself and then belied by relations, but that which gives 
birth to—while remaining irreducible to—relations” (ibid., 290; original 
emphasis. Cf. Bleeker 2008). Under univocal logic, “a perception of x is 
perceived as a power to x” (Colebrook 2004, 297; original emphasis) which 
is to say that difference is shown differing. Here we see an affirmation that 
feminism as a practice has nothing to offer but paradoxes: it posits sexual 
difference and is emancipatory insofar as the hierarchical element (different-
from as worth-less-than) is broken down. Equivocity, that is, is locked up in 
a dualist framework of thought, structured by negativity (and linear time: 
sexual difference implies that women/femininity should become equal to 
men/humanity), whereas univocity pushes difference to the limit, producing 
a shift to an affirmative relationality (producing a situation in which, as we 
will see that de Beauvoir envisioned, new and as-yet inconceivable carnal 
and affective relations between the sexes are born). By way of another 
example: in the concluding section of “Postmodernism is a Humanism” 
Colebrook talks about the work of Virginia Woolf who pushes equivocal 
gender to univocal sexual difference, thus evoking a situation in which 
“[t]here are no longer distinct kinds or generalities, or genders, so much 
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as essences that are the power to differ, essences that are sexual precisely 
because they have their sole being in creation” (ibid., 304; cf. below).
The remaining question is how exactly differing or affirmative 
relationality is a non-dualist univocity? Deleuze demonstrates how 
representationalism is an identity politics or régime in what he calls the 
major History of Philosophy (with capitals). In case difference is thought 
of in terms of identity (under this dominant way of thinking, assuming 
one perspective or multiple perspectives), the Other (e.g. the woman), a 
concept so central in the work of other early philosophies of difference 
(think of Levinas and Derrida, for instance), can only be thought to exist in 
relation to the One, or Same, or Centre. Rejecting the idea that otherness 
can be reduced to a particular subject or object, thus refuting the idea 
that his philosophy starts with an ontology of the One (as Alain Badiou 
[1999] wrongly supposes), Deleuze ([1969] 1990, 307) then concludes 
that “the Other is initially a structure of the perceptual field, without 
which the entire field could not function as it does. […] It is the structure 
of the possible. […] The terrified countenance bears no resemblance to 
the terrifying thing. It implicates it, it envelopes it as something else, in a 
kind of torsion which situates what is expressed in the expressing.” This 
is when and where a dualism comes to be installed that is structured by 
negativity (distribution), and when and where different-from is transformed 
into worth-less-than (hierarchy or asymmetry). It is for that reason that 
Deleuze himself, contrary to his contemporaries, found it difficult to relate 
this concept to his thoughts. The Other is the expression of a possible 
world as he, reading Tournier’s Friday, developed this idea in Difference and 
Repetition. In an interview with Magazine Littéraire (reprinted in Deleuze 
[1988] 1995, 135–155) and in a letter he wrote to his Japanese translator 
Kuniichi Uno (reprinted in Deleuze 2006, 201–203) he continued this 
argument by making an implicit comment on Derrida’s “Letter to a 
Japanese Friend” ([1985] 1988) and his use of the Other as Deleuze comes 
up with a Japanese man whose words can function as the expression of a 
possible world. Contrary to Derrida (referring to Heidegger [1959] 1971) 
who emphasizes the non-translatability of his French text into Japanese 
and yet simultaneously the necessity to do so, Deleuze does not accept the 
relative existence of the One (the Same, the Centre) and the Other (here the 
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French language and the Japanese language) and the negative relation drawn 
between them. In line with the anti-correlationism of Meillassoux, Deleuze 
([1988] 1995, 147) stresses that the expression of a possible world (even 
when done in Japanese), “confers reality on the possible world as such, the 
reality of the possible as something possible [...].”
In contrast to the negative dualism then, and in line with the Bergsonian 
virtual/actual pair, Deleuze proposes a logic according to which “[e]ach 
point of view must itself be the object, or the object must belong to the 
point of view.” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 56; cf. Leibniz [1714] 1962, 263 
§57, Deleuze [1956/2002] 2004, 39) That is to say, the moment we think 
differing or difference in itself a univocal logic is established. This occurs when 
we think dualism to an extreme—Deleuze states that it is within Kantianism, 
or “in the same stroke” (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 58; original emphasis) that 
such a shift is effectuated. Difference is then established as “the element, the 
ultimate unity,” that is, difference that “refer[s] to other differences which 
never identify it but rather differentiate it” (ibid., 56). Difference then comes 
awfully close to the (mathematical) object that speculative realists and 
materialists like Graham Harman and Meillassoux talk about. Meillassoux’s 
statement that “[t]here is no reason for anything to be or to remain self-
identical” (Meillassoux [2006] 2008, 88) emphasizes this difference in 
itself, this difference always already differing. Refusing the idea that “to be 
is to be in a correlate,” (as Harman [2011b, 15] summarizes Meillassoux’s 
critique of correlationist ontology), Deleuze states that difference is not in 
need of relations yet at the same time does not exist in a void. It is a thinking 
according to which
[e]ach difference passes through all the others; it must “will” 
itself or find itself through all the others. […] a world of 
differences implicated one in the other, […] a complicated, 
properly chaotic world without identity (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 
57; original emphasis).
Referring to the work of Nietzsche, Deleuze states that
What is then revealed is being, which is said of differences 
which are neither in substance nor in a subject: so many 
subterranean affirmations. […] for a brief moment we enter into 
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that schizophrenia in principle which characterises the highest 
power of thought, and opens Being directly on to difference, 
despite all the mediations, all the reconciliations, of the concept 
(ibid., 58).
In other words: what is established is the univocal logic (ibid., 67).
It should not come as a surprise that it is not only Nietzsche who then 
practices philosophy as a creative act, but Bergson as well. In “Bergson’s 
Conception of Difference,” Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 33; original 
emphasis) states that “either philosophy proposes for itself this means 
(differences of nature) and this end (to arrive at internal difference)” or else 
it would always end up in a representationalist, equivocal logic. Bergsonism, 
as said, is looking for “the unity of the thing and the concept,” that is, for 
a philosophy that practices a univocal logic. Such a logic enacts what we 
previously called an onto-epistemology whose concept of difference is 
predicated on affirmation. Deleuze is explicit about this when he says that 
Bergson “rais[es] difference up to the absolute” (ibid., 39) by thinking 
difference following a univocal logic, which entails a qualitative shift away 
from equivocity, that is, among other things, negation:
If duration differs from itself, that from which it differs is still 
duration in a certain sense. It is not a question of dividing 
duration in the same way we divided what is composite: 
duration is simple, indivisible, pure. The simple is not divided, 
it differentiates itself. This is the essence of the simple, or the 
movement of difference. So, the composite divides into two 
tendencies, one of which is the indivisible, but the indivisible 
differentiates itself into two tendencies, the other of which is the 
principle of the divisible (ibid.; original emphasis).
The relational nature of the structuring logic is kept in place (previously 
we saw that Bergson continues to make distinctions). But relationality at 
work is not predicated on equivocal notions such as negation, or analogy 
for that matter, because the relationality is never predeterminable from the 
outside. Deleuze ([1956/2002] 2004, 40, 42) even explicates how “vital 
difference” for Bergson is “not a determination” but rather “indetermination 
itself,” which is not to say that it is “accidental” but rather that it is 
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“essential.” In other words, “[d]ifferentiation is the movement of a virtuality 
actualizing itself.” This non-reductive, univocal take on difference cannot 
be a dialectic and cannot be structured according to dualism, because 
according to Bergson
the negation of one real term by the other is only the positive 
actualization of a virtuality that contains both terms at once. 
[…] The opposition of two terms is only the actualization of a 
virtuality that contained them both: this is tantamount to saying 
that difference is more profound than negation or contradiction 
(ibid., 42–3).
Allowing for the virtual, for pure recollection, to be reflected in the 
actual, constantly exchanging the two into one another as it creates the 
circuit of duration—this is what Bergsonism does. Such a philosophy, which 
amounts to a new materialist rewriting of modernity, is the production of 
revolutions in thought not by negating ordinary dualism (the structuring 
principle or equivocal logic of modernist thought), but rather by pushing 
ordinary dualism to the extreme, thus installing a new take on difference, 
the univocal logic of which is an affirmative relationality. Such a philosophy 
is the activity of pushing difference to the limit by traversing dualism.
When speculative realists and speculative materialists today propose 
to move away from Kantian correlationism to the “eternal-in-itself, whose 
being is indifferent to whether or not it is thought” (Meillassoux [2006] 
2008, 63), they push dualism to the extreme in a similar way. When Harman 
(2010, 202) for instance notes a “[…] global dualism between the reality 
of objects and their more or less distorted or translated versions for other 
objects,” he follows Bergson’s distinction between difference in itself and 
ordinary difference. The latter is representationalist and negative, while the 
former demonstrates an interest in the true power of creation (Bergson), 
morphogenesis (DeLanda), or metamorphosis (Braidotti).
New Feminist Materialism Pushes Sexual Difference 
to the Limit
Let us close with a provocative example of a rewriting of modernity, which 
will be developed further in the next chapter. Previously we hinted at 
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the possibility of transforming equivocal gender—which is structured by 
a negative relationality (distribution and asymmetry) between men and 
women, masculinity and femininity—into univocal sexual difference, which 
allows sexual difference to differ. New feminist materialism is the cultural 
theory that enacts this possibility. New feminist materialist cultural theorists 
work along the lines of affirmative relationality, the workings of which we 
have demonstrated in the previous section. In doing so, they push sexual 
difference to the limit by pushing the dualism that is ordinarily installed 
(gender) to an extreme. The new feminist materialism does practical 
philosophy and thus produces a revolution in (feminist) thought. In this 
final section we will address new feminist materialist cultural theory, not 
only because it can demonstrate the workings of difference structured 
by a univocal logic of affirmative relationality, but also because feminism 
per se is an interesting site for our exposé about new mater-ialist cultural 
theory, that starts with difference as a practice, that is not “about” sexuality 
or gender (as a theory opposed to the practice or act) but that is a practice 
or act itself, by means of the concepts it gives rise to and through which it 
practices its power.
Feminism has always enveloped sexual difference in its ordinary dualist 
sense as well as the traversing thereof. Both movements were a necessity for 
feminism, as Joan Wallach Scott (1996, 3–4; original emphasis) explains:
Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion; its 
goal was to eliminate “sexual difference” in politics, but it had 
to make its claim on behalf of “women” (who were discursively 
produced through “sexual difference”). To the extent that it 
acted for “women,” feminism produced the “sexual difference” 
it sought to eliminate. This paradox—the need both to accept 
and to refuse “sexual difference”—was the constitutive 
condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its 
long history.
The book in which Scott makes this complex diagnosis is entitled Only 
Paradoxes to Offer, and we want to demonstrate here why the situation she 
explores is in fact not at all paradoxical. Sue Thornham (2000, 188; original 
emphasis) makes exactly this point, when she explores the work of Irigaray:
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One cannot, she writes, analyse the gendered nature of culture 
by stepping out of the identity “woman” into a gender-neutral 
discourse—by claiming an “equal right” to speak—because 
there is no gender-neutral discourse; the public discourse of 
analysis is thoroughly masculine. To write from outside that 
discourse is, however, to be ignored. To do either is to remain 
within the terms of the dominant discourse.
Despite the fact that many feminists, including Irigaray and Braidotti 
and Grosz and Colebrook, have found their individual and/or generational 
answer to the seeming paradox, we want to show here how feminism is 
Scott’s diagnosis, which is not a paradox that is in need of a solution.
Grosz (2005, 156), a feminist new materialist, states that major 
Philosophy, a philosophy structured by the dominant lines of thought, has 
traditionally excluded women, whereas it has produced a discourse that 
is implicitly gendered masculine. Philosophy has objectified women, thus 
erecting the male philosopher figure. The Irigarayian analysis of this onto-
epistemological diagnosis proceeds as follows:
The question of sexual difference signals the virtual framework 
of the future. What today is actual is sexual opposition 
or binarism, the defining of the two sexes in terms of the 
characteristics of one. Sexual difference is that which is virtual; 
it is the potential of this opposition to function otherwise, to 
function without negation, to function as full positivity. It is the 
future we may be able to make, but which has not yet come into 
existence (ibid., 164).
That is to say, sexual difference functions prominently in feminist theory: 
namely, both as an ordinary dualism and as virtuality. Feminist theory 
will produce a revolution in dualist thought not by overcoming sexual 
difference (conceptualizing emancipation as a striving for equal gender 
relations or as the overthrow of a discourse that is gendered masculine) but 
by traversing it (allowing for sexual differing). Feminist theory has to push 
sexual difference as an ordinary dualism to an extreme precisely so as to 
push sexual difference to the limit. A sexual difference according to which 
women are worth-less-than men, to speak with Braidotti, has to be pushed 
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to an extreme so as to release sexual difference as that which is virtual. This 
is precisely how we should read Simone de Beauvoir’s conclusion to The 
Second Sex, which indeed thinks through the emancipation of humanity 
in its most radical form. After a full description of the dialectic of sex (a 
dualism structured by a negative relationality), she concludes that: “new 
carnal and affective relations of which we cannot conceive will be born 
between the sexes” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 765). It is precisely by 
thinking through sexual difference to its remotest aspirations, thus alluding 
to difference structured by an affirmative relationality, that de Beauvoir 
came to produce the revolution in thought that has made her famous (and 
infamous), for constituting feminism as a rewriting of modernity—that is, 
feminism-as-differing. de Beauvoir exemplifies a new materialist take on 
difference, since by traversing the (sexual) dualism structuring modernist 
thought, modernity comes to be rewritten and difference is showndiffering.
Notes
1. The feminist point being that women are not “to deny […] the resources of prevail-
ing knowledges as a mode of critique of those knowledges” (Grosz 2005, 165). When 
modernity can be (re)thought as thinking emancipation, women had better affirm it.
2. Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 66) use the concept of “discourse” similarly 
to how Barad does. Following Foucault, this long quote brilliantly explains how 
this does away with the linguistic representations that have been so important in 
academia up until today:
Let us follow Foucault in his exemplary analysis, which, though it seems not to be, 
is eminently concerned with linguistics. Take a thing like the prison: the prison 
is a form, the ‘prison-form’; it is a form of content on a stratum and is related to 
other forms of content (schools, barracks, hospital, factory). This thing or form 
does not refer back to the word “prison,” but to entirely different words and con-
cepts, such as ‘delinquent’ and ‘delinquency’, which express a new way of classify-
ing, stating, translating and even committing criminal acts. ‘Delinquency’ is the 
form of expression in reciprocal presupposition with the form of content ‘prison.’ 
Delinquency is in no way a signifier, even a juridical signifier, the signified would 
be that of the prison. That would flatten the entire analysis.
3. Grosz (2005, 123) reminds us of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of precisely the 
onto-epistemological aspect of the work of Bergson. He claims that it is a transcen-
dentalism. We, however, do not define the onto-epistemological as “collapsing our 
knowledge of a thing with its being” and accept another onto-epistemology.
4. In an article that questions the monism of Bergson and claims that his work is 
Eurocentric and phallocentric, Rebecca Hill (2008, 132–3) ends with the follow-
ing conclusion, thus undoing the argument presented in the article, yet affirming 
consciousness as a concept:
136 Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin
In my view these passages demonstrate the valorization of a hypermasculine the-
ory of life and corresponding devaluation of matter as feminine. This is not a bi-
nary hierarchy because Bergson’s concepts of life and matter are never actualised 
as pure activity and pure space. […] matter’s inclination towards pure repetition is 
never fully achieved. […] At the same time, life is not manifested as pure creative 
energy. […] Moreover, Bergson admits that if materiality was pure repetition, con-
sciousness could never have installed itself within matter’s palpitations.
5. When different-from translates into worth-less-than, emancipation either means the 
inclusion of women, laborers, black people, and other Others in the hierarchically 
privileged domain (a strategy of equality) or the revaluation of the underprivileged 
domain (a strategy of difference). This binary opposition will be repositioned in the 
final section of this chapter.
6. In other words: modern and post-modern cultural theories are both structured along 
the lines of an equivocal logic.
Chapter 7
Sexual Differing
Feminist historiography writes histories of feminist thought as well as 
providing a specific definition of feminism. As such, “feminism” is not 
only reflected upon by feminist historiographers; feminism is also created 
in feminist historiography. We already saw how in Only Paradoxes to Offer: 
French Feminists and the Rights of Man, Joan Wallach Scott (1996, 3–4; 
original emphasis) specifies how “sexual difference,” in turn, structures and 
is structured by feminism:
Feminism was a protest against women’s political exclusion; its 
goal was to eliminate “sexual difference” in politics, but it had 
to make its claim on behalf of “women” (who were discursively 
produced through “sexual difference”). To the extent that it 
acted for “women,” feminism produced the “sexual difference” 
it sought to eliminate. This paradox—the need both to accept 
and to refuse “sexual difference”—was the constitutive 
condition of feminism as a political movement throughout its 
long history.
Sexual difference, then, serves two purposes at the same time, which 
(as Olympe de Gouges already remarked) is the cause of a sense of 
paradox: on the one hand, “exclusion was legitimated by reference to 
the different biologies of women and men,” whereas on the other hand, 
“‘sexual difference’ was established not only as a natural fact, but also as 
an ontological basis for social and political differentiation.” (ibid., 3) This 
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diagnosis implies a diversified and unusual ontology of sexual difference, 
an ontology not made explicit in the major historiographical tradition in 
gender studies. Its major tradition all too often involves the need to choose 
between (biological) essentialism and social constructivism as well as a 
critique of patriarchal politics, which does not allow feminism or gender 
studies to move beyond a merely reactionary stance. As we will show below, 
a critical stance re-affirms what is critiqued. A radical feminism does not 
allow itself to exist as encapsulated by the political mainstream. When 
feminism is constructed as inherently paradoxical, however, one’s ontological 
condition as a woman/female feminist is not seen as predetermined by 
either biology or social construction (whether this is a strategic essentialism 
or a diversification of the category of “women”). Rather, (biological) 
essentialism and social constructivism are two discourses that feminism 
traverses, which implies a performative understanding of ontology. In other 
words, the category of woman materializes through the traversing of non-
feminist and feminist discourses that make sexual differentiations. Here, 
feminism’s opposition to biological determinism, translating into a social 
constructivism as of the dominant Anglo-American reception of Simone 
de Beauvoir’s seminal work The Second Sex, is shifted by allowing for 
“natural facts” or “sex” to have a place on the conceptual map, the leaving 
behind of biological predetermination notwithstanding. Such mappings of 
relations between the sexes do not seem to allow for nature and culture 
to be disentangled. An ontology that we have specified as “performative” 
implies diverting from the major tradition in feminist historiography (a 
tradition predicated on dualism structured by negation) and “reading for 
the historically specific paradoxes that feminist subjects embody, enact, and 
expose” (ibid., 16).
Unconfined by the parameters of the dominant feminist historiography, 
Scott’s analysis can be specified as an instantiation of Jean-François 
Lyotard’s “rewriting modernity.” Commenting on a teleological conception 
of the history of Marxism, Lyotard ([1988] 1991, 28) writes that whereas 
Karl Marx seems to have thought that by revealing the hidden source of 
“the unhappiness of modernity” humanity could reach full emancipation, 
the history of Marxism in fact shows nothing but the need for “opening 
the same wound again. The localization and diagnosis may change, but the 
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same illness re-emerges in this rewriting.” “[C]losure or resolution” (Scott 
1996, 17) is not to be found on the horizon of (the history of) Marxism 
and feminism; all we find is a perpetual offering of historically specific 
paradoxes. These paradoxes, in the context of feminism, concern the false 
opposition between biological essentialism and social constructivism, a 
problem inherent to “the dualist logic of modernity” (Lyon 1999, 169). 
The double bind of biological essentialism and social constructivism 
shows how “biology” and ontology feature prominently in the history and 
historiography of feminism, or: have been dominating its discourses for 
a very long time. Traversing the poles of this dualism constitutes a minor 
tradition in feminist historiography that allows feminism to move beyond 
the intrinsically dualistic and reactionary stance we identified above. This 
tradition is minor, in the words of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari ([1980] 
1987, 105), when it is “different from that of the constant […] by nature 
and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem.” 
A minor tradition never gets stuck as it always finds itself, like Scott’s 
paradoxes, in creative movement (ibid.: 105–6). Exemplifications of this 
minor tradition in feminist historiography which work along these lines 
can be found in the so-called “French feminism” from the 1980s (think of 
Hélène Cixous, Julia Kristeva, and especially Luce Irigaray) and in today’s 
new materialist writing as we see it at work in, for instance, Rosi Braidotti 
and Elizabeth Grosz.1 This chapter seeks to hook onto this minor tradition, 
and to re-read the work of de Beauvoir along the lines that it sets out. This 
chapter, by presenting a new materialist case study on sexual difference, 
zooms in on the way in which new materialism, by way of its traversing of 
dualisms, is always already a feminism that is not identity political.
According to Grosz, the majority of feminist theories, or feminist 
historiographies, which are theories of the history of feminism, are 
teleological. As Grosz (2005, 162) claims:
The future of feminism, on this understanding, is limited to the 
foreseeable and to contesting the recognized and the known. 
This limited temporality characterizes all feminist projects of 
equalization and inclusion as well as a number of projects within 
postmodern feminism.
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The sense of paradox experienced by feminists is understood as a 
consequence of the teleological dialectics structuring the relation between 
the two feminist waves, and between feminism and patriarchy. An alternative 
position involves a historically specific, or an-teleological take on the history 
of feminism in which feminist subjectivity is seen as materializing, that is, 
in which the ontology of sexual difference is strictly performative. Whereas 
Scott is still in the process of opening up feminism to this new ontology 
by critiquing the major tradition in the historiography of feminist thought, 
Grosz seems to map a radically new materialism that has structural links to 
French feminism. Grosz indeed starts from “Irigaray, whose work on sexual 
difference has signaled the indeterminate, and possible indeterminable, 
necessity of feminist thought, a necessity which parallels or, in her terms, 
is isomorphic with, that of sexual difference, one of the incontestable and 
most inventive forms of biological and cultural existence” (ibid., 163). For 
Irigaray, feminism consists of the wish to restructure the relations through 
which the sexes are created as well as of the traversing of prevailing sexual 
differentiations on the personal, social, and symbolic level. These traversings, 
in addition, are always already at work in the practice of making sexual 
differentiations. Feminism as a restructuring and traversing exercise is in 
no way a dialectic, since all dialectics are prevented from affirming “the 
development of modes of action, thought, and language appropriate to 
and developed by both of the sexes” (ibid., 164). William James’ radical 
empiricism already noted that any kind of position is necessarily preceded 
by a relationality thanks to which a position can be established. Along the 
same lines, while speaking about how gender, race, and sexual orientation 
also emerge and back-form their own realities, Brian Massumi (2002, 8) 
argues: “Passage precedes construction. But construction does effectively 
back-form its reality. Grids happen. So social and cultural determinations 
feed back into the process from which they arose. […] To say that passage 
and indeterminacy ‘come first’ or ‘are primary’ is more a statement of 
ontological priority than the assertion of a time sequence.”
Affirming such a development of traversing can engender what Irigaray 
calls a “revolution in thought,” which does not imply “the overthrow of 
all previous thought, the radical disconnection from the concepts and 
language of the past,” that is, a critique with reactionary consequences, 
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but rather “a certain kind of insinuation of sexual difference back into 
those places where it has been elided, the insistence on the necessity that 
every practice, method, and knowledge can be undertaken in another way” 
(Grosz 2005, 165). Feminism is now seen as a “practical philosophy” that 
focuses on “the singular point where concept and creation are related to 
each other” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994, 11). The outcomes of 
such a practical philosophy remain unforeseen, because “[w]hat today is 
actual is sexual opposition or binarism, the defining of the two sexes in 
terms of the characteristics of one. Sexual difference is that which is virtual; 
it is the potential of this opposition to function otherwise, to function 
without negation, to function as full positivity” (Grosz 2005, 164). The 
practical philosophy it puts forward, then, is structured by a “performative 
understanding, which shifts the focus from linguistic representations to 
discursive practices” (Barad 2003, 807).
In this chapter, we try to further the development of sexual difference 
as a performative ontology. We call this “sexual differing”: an allowance for 
sexual difference actually to differ. It involves a rewriting of sexual difference 
and sexuality not by means of dualist premises, but as a practical philosophy 
in which difference in itself comes to being. In a manner similar to how 
other important fields in contemporary cultural theory, circling around 
concepts like “race”/ethnicity, class, sexuality, and most recently age or 
generationality, are slowly crashing against the limits of critique, feminism 
too seems to get stuck within its emphasis on sexual difference as a social 
construction (gender) opposite to a biological essence (sex). Surrounded 
by a so-called post-feminist popular and academic imagery, gender studies 
scholars today find themselves paralyzed by the “paradoxes” that their 
pasts have offered on the basis of teleology, and dualism structured by 
negation. Earlier we argued for writing the modernist oppositions as a form 
of continuously rewriting them, and we can now add that there is no reason 
why feminism or gender studies should place themselves beyond or outside 
the dualist paradigms in which they have been circling for so long. Instead, 
the aim we set for ourselves is to find out in what way we are to develop a 
different feminism that sets itself to a radical and continuous rewriting of this 
opposition, postponing the epistemological finitude (to use Meillassoux’s 
term) that it suggests. The feminism to come then works with sexual 
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difference not as a paradox that needs to be solved, but rather as a virtuality, 
or as a discursive practice of sexual differing. Thus we set ourselves here 
to finding traces of sexual differing that can rewrite feminist theory, 
experimenting with the minor statements in the work of contemporary 
feminists, feminists of the past, and scholars who came from elsewhere but 
are equally engaged in the production of a performative ontology of sexual 
difference (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari, but also Rosi Braidotti and Karen 
Barad). For feminism to be indeterminate (infinite), not to be formed 
around critique, it has to allow for the provocation that practical philosophy 
offers sexual difference. This entails the affirmation of the fact that feminism 
materializes sexual difference described as paradoxical, and that feminism 
has to be understood precisely as such.
Despite the fact that the major tradition in feminist historiography 
features her work differently, we aim to show that the conclusion to The 
Second Sex neatly mirrors the Irigarayan undecidability affirmed by Grosz. 
We justify this claim by following Sara Heinämaa (1997, 33–4, n. 4) who 
has suggested that “we should reject the sex/gender distinction and Sartre’s 
existentialism [which is also based on dualism structured by negation] as 
keys to de Beauvoir’s texts” without, however, fully affirming Heinämaa’s 
subsumption of the work under a Merleau-Pontian phenomenology 
instead.2 Following a full description of sexual difference, de Beauvoir 
([1949] 2010, 765) states that “new carnal and affective relations of which 
we cannot conceive will be born between the sexes.” In other words, 
she finds that the asymmetries between the sexes are traversed while 
installed and maintained in patriarchy. Read as a practical philosophy, thus 
restructuring and traversing the gendered dualist logic of modernity, The 
Second Sex opens the way for the indeterminacy of sexual differing; right 
after the previous quote de Beauvoir claims that she “do[es] not see […] 
that freedom has ever created uniformity” (ibid., 765). We will demonstrate 
in this chapter that opening up the dominant historiography of feminism 
by re-reading de Beauvoir has the potential to break through the multiple 
paralyses experienced by contemporary feminists. Along with that, the 
re-reading can offer us a way out of dualist thought per se that might 
be equally important to other minor streams of culture, that is, to those 
interested in searching for a meaningful alternative to how the concepts of 
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“race”/ethnicity, class, sexuality and age have been equally paralyzed by this 
“binary” take on dualism. Rewriting feminist historiography thus builds up 
to a materialist rewriting of academia as a whole.
Neither Sex Nor Gender But Sexual Difference
The received view on de Beauvoir3 is laid out in Judith Butler’s “Sex and 
Gender in Simone de Beauvoir’s Second Sex,” which is a philosophical 
meditation on de Beauvoir’s famous statement that “[o]ne is not born, but 
rather becomes, woman” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 283). Butler (1986, 35) 
explains how de Beauvoir has disconnected sex and gender thus allowing for 
“a radical heteronomy of natural bodies and constructed genders with the 
consequence that ‘being’ female and ‘being’ a woman are two very different 
sorts of being.” “Gender,” then, “must be understood as a modality of 
taking on or realizing possibilities, a process of interpreting the body, giving 
it cultural form. In other words, to be a woman is to become a woman; it 
is not a matter of acquiescing to a fixed ontological status, in which case 
one could be born a woman, but, rather, an active process of appropriating, 
interpreting, and reinterpreting received cultural possibilities” (ibid., 36). 
This passage is important for its two implications that obviously structure 
Butler’s own later work on the concept of gender (cf. Sönser Breen and 
Blümenfeld 2005).
First, Butler does not qualitatively shift ontology’s assumed fixed status. 
In gender theory, natural bodies are implicitly ascribed to, albeit that the 
traditional assumption that sex defines gender is reversed. When gender 
defines sex, sex or bodily matter, however malleable, is still assumed to be 
passive. Butler (1986, 35) argues that “the female body is the arbitrary locus 
of the gender “woman,” and there is no reason to preclude the possibility of 
that body becoming the locus of other constructions of gender.” In Butler’s 
reading of de Beauvoir, a strict dualism is installed, now articulated by 
gender as it refers to a form of expression, and sex as it refers to a form of 
content. The relation created between how both content and expression 
are formed is not relative but absolute. Extracting a signifier from the word 
(gender) and from the thing (sex), a signified in conformity with the word, 
subjected to the word, Butler restricts herself to an oversimplified idea of 
language which refuses to see how the politics active in sex and gender 
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build upon a series of statements and states of things that have always 
already been intrinsically entwined with one another and that are always 
in processes of morphogenesis corresponding to one another. The ever-
changing flows of matter and meaning would never allow themselves to be 
reduced to one signifier and one signified creating one sign. When Deleuze 
and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 67) speak of the “discursive multiplicities” 
of expression and the “nondiscursive multiplicities” of content they refer 
precisely to this infinite (not one-on-one) enfolding of matter and meaning, 
which has always already led to the “material-discursive,” as Barad 
(following Donna Haraway) conceptualizes it. In terms of Butler’s feminism, 
the (female) body is not understood to be performative, or, in Vicki Kirby’s 
terms, “telling flesh” (Kirby 1997).
Second, and following from its fixed position as a signifier (of a 
signified), gender gets a fixed meaning too by suggesting that it is a modality 
of taking on or realizing possibilities. Grosz (2005, 106) has argued for the 
need to import the Bergsonian distinction between the conceptual pairs 
virtual/actual and possible/real in feminist theory, conceptual pairs that are 
defined as follows:
The real creates an image of itself, which, by projecting itself 
back into the past, gives it the status of always-having-been-
possible. The possible is ideally preexistent, an existence that 
precedes materialization. The possible, instead of being a reverse 
projection of the real, might be better understood in terms of 
the virtual, which has reality without being actual (ibid., 107).
Despite Butler’s great hopes, conceptualizations along the lines of the 
possible/real limit biological or anatomical sex to the culturally foreseeable, 
recognized, and known (which is the equally limited “gender”). Grosz 
claims that “[t]o reduce the possible to a preexistent phantom-like real is 
to curtail the possibility of thinking the new, of thinking an open future, a 
future not bound to the present, just as the present is itself a production of 
the past” (ibid., 108). Butler’s Lacanian re-reading of de Beauvoir, then, 
read along with Grosz, severely limits the potential of feminism to make 
a difference as its ontology and epistemology are confined by historically 
established gendered patterns, predicated on a linear and causal theory of 
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time. Locating gender ultimately in the female body, that is, projecting the 
word into the thing like the present is projected back into the past, turns 
the future of feminism into a descriptive historicism, enslaved by a major 
History (Deleuze and Guattari’s abovementioned “constant”) according to 
which its paths are set out.
It is worth noting that Butler discusses ontology in de Beauvoir (and 
“women” in feminism; see Butler 1993, 187–222) in terms of paradoxes.4 
She states that for de Beauvoir “[w]e never experience or know ourselves 
as a body pure and simple, i.e. as our ‘sex,’ because we never know our 
sex outside of its expression of gender. Lived or experienced ‘sex’ is always 
already gendered. We become our genders, but we become them from a 
place which cannot be found and which, strictly speaking, cannot be said 
to exist” (Butler 1986, 39). Here we see that, indeed, sex is the Lacanian 
signified which needs to be coded by a (linguistic) signifier which is gender 
(only revealing itself temporarily and fragmentarily through metonyms and 
metaphors). Later on in the article, Butler states that “[n]ot only is gender 
no longer dictated by anatomy, but anatomy does not seem to pose any 
necessary limits to the possibilities of gender” (ibid., 45), thus ultimately 
affirming the body as fully malleable. The temporality underlying all of this 
is one according to which “gender is a contemporary way of organizing past 
and future cultural norms, a way of situating oneself with respect to those 
norms, an active style of living one’s body in the world” (ibid., 40). This is 
where we find Grosz’s observations confirmed: the past (sex) is constituted 
in the present (gender) and so is the future along the lines of a realization 
of possibilities. The possible in Butler’s reading of de Beauvoir is a reverse 
projection of the real; we cannot know the possible outside of the real just 
as it has no active role in signification. The real, then, is sexual opposition 
or binarism indeed, which is projected back into the past. Flesh appears as 
mute; Butler’s seeming revolution in thought vis-à-vis de Beauvoir is undone 
by the representationalism implied by the possible/real and the signifier/
signified couplings (cf. Colebrook 2004). But how, then, should de Beauvoir 
be read so as to ascribe this Irigarayan undecidability, affirmed by Grosz, 
to the work?
In “de Beauvoir and Biology: A Second Look,” Moira Gatens (2003, 
274) clearly states that de Beauvoir’s “point in The Second Sex is not that 
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the natural body has no hold on social values or that it is ‘value all the way 
down.’” Gatens reads de Beauvoir as affirming “an interactive loop between 
bodies and values” (ibid., 274) and gives two examples from The Second 
Sex of the entanglement of, rather than the unilinear causality between, 
sex and gender, one of which she discusses at length (the post-menopausal 
woman [ibid., 278–9]) and the other she mentions only in passing (women’s 
eroticism [ibid., 273]). The post-menopausal woman, Gatens affirms, 
proposes an important challenge to the Butlerian grid laid over the work of 
de Beauvoir by allowing for the bodies (sex) of these self-identified women 
to influence their cultural interpretation, namely as non-feminine (gender). 
The body that is no longer menstruating is one of those examples that 
show how a body cannot be grasped with signifier/signified or possible/
real, as this sexed body refuses to conform to the word “gender” nor to a 
realization of sexual binarism. The same goes for women’s eroticism, the 
other example Gatens comes up with. Like Gatens, Karen Vintges ([1992] 
1996, 47) clearly states in Philosophy as Passion: The Thinking of Simone de 
Beauvoir that intersubjectivity, despite Jean-Paul Sartre debunking the 
notion, “comes about because both partners undergo a metamorphosis into 
flesh (chair) through emotional intoxication, and experience themselves 
and the other simultaneously as subjectivity and as passivity.” In a slightly 
different register, then, making love allows for a “becoming ‘flesh’ [also: 
incarnation] through emotion” resulting in “a unification of body and 
consciousness” (ibid., 48). Vintges presents another convincing argument 
about de Beauvoir’s anti-representationalism and her usage of the virtual/
actual coupling; the love-making de Beauvoir finds enabling is not modelled 
on certain modes (e.g. the Marquis de Sade’s sadomasochism, or marital 
sex), and affects both sexes in unforeseeable ways (ibid., 48–9). Gatens 
(2003, 283) indeed states that the future, for de Beauvoir, is open and as yet 
unknowable to the mind (unfeelable by the body), due to her strong belief in 
truths as unfixed, as ambiguous, as inherently paradoxical. She affirms that 
“the incessant play between the two terms of a pair, say, nature and culture, 
is what constitutes our situation as always ambiguous, always involving a free 
‘becoming,’ rather than mere ‘being’” (Gatens 2003, 282).
Here, then, we have arrived at a radically different reading of de 
Beauvoir, as her model of becoming a woman now involves something that 
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is not to be grasped with social constructivism (gender defines sex).5 By not 
ascribing to biological essentialism (sex defines gender) either, de Beauvoir 
opens the way for a performative understanding of ontology, or better yet, of 
ontogenesis. de Beauvoir introduces a sexual differing, the fulcrum of which, 
we want to propose, is to be found in her concept “flesh.” In The Second Sex, 
flesh is one of those singular points at which the conceptual and the creative 
meet. It is a term usually associated with Georges Bataille, Antonin Artaud, 
and Maurice Merleau–Ponty, who also make use of it in order to come 
closer to the morphogenetic essence of the human body. With de Beauvoir 
the concept functions as the point of departure from which she taps into 
the ongoing rewriting of sexual difference, since flesh allows her to traverse 
the signs that stick to the body, that decide the “situation of woman.” In the 
end—and this is crucial—conceptualizing flesh allows her to be undecidable 
about the relations between the sexes that are to come.
First she provides a diagnosis of sexual difference via flesh, or 
incarnation, engaging herself with the psychoanalytical idea of the phallus.6 
The phallus involves signification—“the apprehension of a signification 
through an analogue of the signifying object” (de Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 
56). Signification is the source of alienation: “the anxiety of his freedom 
leads the subject to search for himself in things, which is a way to flee 
from himself” (ibid., 57). This process of “bad faith” differs for the two 
sexes. For man, “the fleshy incarnation of transcendence” (ibid.) happens 
through the flesh of the penis, whereas woman “does not alienate herself in 
a graspable thing, does not reclaim herself: she is thus led to make her entire 
self an object, to posit herself as the Other” (ibid., 57–8). So whereas de 
Beauvoir immediately reminds us that “[o]nly within the situation grasped 
in its totality does anatomical privilege found a truly human privilege” 
(ibid., 58), the relation between the sexes is dualist when considering 
the phallus. In the context of the phallus or the totem, women can do 
nothing but “perpetuat[e] carnal existence” (ibid., 82) whereas men can 
incarnate transcendence via the phallus, a dualism which has asymmetrical 
consequences:
Woman is sometimes designated as ‘sex’: it is she who is the 
flesh, its delights and its dangers. That for woman it is man who 
is sexed and carnal is a truth that has never been proclaimed 
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because there is no one to proclaim it. The representation of 
the world as the world itself is the work of men; they describe 
it from a point of view that is their own and that they confound 
with the absolute truth. […] since the coming of patriarchy, life 
in man’s eyes has taken on a dual aspect: it is consciousness, 
will, transcendence, it is intellect; and it is matter, passivity, 
immanence, it is flesh (ibid., 162–3).
The current representation of sexual difference, de Beauvoir shows, 
is projected back into the past—as if sexual binarism precedes and thus 
justifies patriarchy, and as if young girls are destined to become woman.
Second, the way out of sexual difference (that is, the road to sexual 
differing) presents itself equally in The Second Sex through the flesh, and we 
have already seen this in our discussion of eroticism. Only by starting with 
the flesh, de Beauvoir moves towards an Irigarayan undecidability of sexual 
difference, a true becoming woman. Examples of this are the experiences of 
women in natural environments. In women’s literature, among other things, 
de Beauvoir has found instances that, away from the house and the city, 
“show the comfort the adolescent girl finds in the fields and woods” (ibid., 
376), which leads her to the important claim that here:
[e]xistence is not only an abstract destiny inscribed in town 
hall registers; it is future and carnal richness. Having a body 
no longer seems like a shameful failing […] Flesh is no longer 
filth: it is joy and beauty. Merged with sky and heath, the girl 
is this vague breath that stirs up and kindles the universe, 
and she is every sprig of heather; an individual rooted in the 
soil and infinite consciousness, she is both spirit and life; her 
presence is imperious and triumphant like that of the earth itself 
(ibid., 376–7).
Much like Artaud (1971) and his use of flesh, de Beauvoir proposes 
to think from a very naïve stance, which is not romanticizing a kind of 
youthfulness (think for instance how the same argument can be found when 
she talks about the post-menopausal woman), nor do we need to undo or 
forget how the processes of subjectification, of becoming a woman, are at 
work in our lives (a kind of Aristophanic return). What she instead asks us to 
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do is to rethink sexual difference from a very pragmatic or empirical point of 
view. In fact, de Beauvoir introduces us to a naïve ethics that, as its point of 
departure, is not willing to accept received sociobiological or socio-cultural 
differences between the sexes. As with Artaud, it is an ethics that starts from 
the soil within which a force of life that gives form to flesh and spirit is at 
work. In contrast to the way de Beauvoir is usually read in feminist theory, 
she takes here an affirmative stance, trying to think of feminism not as a 
critical but as a vitalist project.
Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 276–7) appear to be very much 
inspired by de Beauvoir’s materialist feminism of the flesh as they equate 
her becoming-woman with “the girl.” It is a thoroughly vitalist concept that 
performs the hysteric reality of all bodies-to-come:
Doubtless, the girl becomes a woman in the molar or organic 
sense. But conversely, becoming-woman or the molecular 
woman is the girl herself. […] She never ceases to roam upon 
a body without organs. […] Thus girls do not belong to an age 
group, sex, order, or kingdom: they slip in everywhere, between 
orders, acts, ages, sexes; they produce n molecular sexes on the 
line of flight in relation to the dualism machines they cross right 
through. The only way to get outside the dualisms is to be-
between, to pass between. […] It is not the girl who becomes a 
woman; it is becoming-woman that produces the universal girl.7
      
By opposing the molar to the molecular and by favoring this molecular 
stance, Deleuze and Guattari do the same as de Beauvoir: they favor 
becoming over being, they study movement and affect instead of signs 
and codes. Contrary to Butler, who seems to be chasing a molar narrative, 
Deleuze and Guattari affirm de Beauvoir (and Artaud) in proposing a 
feminism that is an equally materialist and equally vitalist search for de 
Beauvoir’s fleshy future.
For it is no coincidence that de Beauvoir does not say that the girl 
becomes the woman. There is not a projection backwards of the woman, 
of sexual binarism, onto the girl. The sexed body of the girl is not fully 
captured by the word “woman.” de Beauvoir says here that there is 
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becoming from the girl to the woman. It is a naiveté to come, an Irigarayan 
undecidability. It is a discovery of the flesh that is always already taking 
place. The virtual (the girl: sexual differing) has reality without being actual 
(because we are subjected to femininity: sexual difference). de Beauvoir’s 
practical philosophy, which culminates in the flesh, asks us to commit 
ourselves to an ethics of rethinking feminism from its most elementary basis.
What Is Practical Philosophy?
In an interview Guattari tells us how he and Deleuze worked with this life 
force they found in the work of Artaud and de Beauvoir, amongst others, by 
always starting their analysis with “desire.” This is true not least place when 
they come to speak of the woman:
If Gilles Deleuze and I have adopted the position of practically 
not speaking of sexuality, and instead speaking of desire, it’s 
because we consider that the problems of life and creation 
are never reducible to physiological functions, reproductive 
functions, to some particular dimension of the body. They 
always involve elements that are either beyond the individual 
in the social or political field, or else before the individual level 
(Guattari and Rolnik [1982] 2008, 411).
By starting with desire, Guattari and Deleuze radically ward off the 
critical perspective that turned out to be so central to feminist theory built 
on the dominant (molar) reception of de Beauvoir. It places fundamental 
question marks after its emphasis on power, which they replaced by an 
emphasis on desire. Power ascribes to the representationalism underlying 
sexual difference, whereas with desire the qualitative shift towards sexual 
differing can be made. Only in a short comment regarding the work of 
Michel Foucault, Deleuze (1997, 186) explains in a nutshell this important 
shift when claiming:
In short, it is not the dispositifs of power that assemble 
[agenceraient], nor would they be constitutive; it is rather 
the agencements of desire that would spread throughout the 
formations of power following one of their dimensions.
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Again, though we are now mainly concerned with feminist theory and 
sexual difference, this argument not only shifts the critical perspective as 
practiced in gender studies, it also offers an alternative to the way in which 
concepts like “race”/ethnicity, class, and age have been dominating the 
discussions within other fields in the humanities and the social sciences 
since the 1980’s.
Let us first of all ensure that this concept of desire, which traverses the 
aforementioned categories and which might give one the impression that 
only the mind is now at stake (and not the body), is actually a materialist 
concept with Deleuze and Guattari. For although Guattari especially has 
a strong background in (Lacanian) psychoanalysis, their idea of desire is 
without a doubt Spinozist. Spinoza, and most of all the Spinoza of the 
Ethics, might very well be considered the first (the foremost) new materialist. 
Especially his formula—being the mind is an idea of the body, while the 
body is the object of the mind—is undisputedly the starting point of all new 
materialist thinking, and it has for that reason appeared in various guises 
throughout the work of new materialists. Spinoza’s definition of desire starts 
from the sameness of the mind and body as it composes our nature, or 
as he puts it:
All our efforts or desires follow from the necessity of our nature 
in such a manner that they can be understood either through 
it alone as their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part 
of nature, which part cannot be adequately conceived through 
itself and without the other individuals (Spinoza [1677] 
2001, E4App.1).
Desire, according to Spinoza and to Deleuze and Guattari, thus points 
at an essence that is formed in terms of the body and the mind created in its 
relation to other individuals which it is either affected by (that gives it joy) 
or that it tries to move away from (that offers it sadness). Of course, essence 
with Spinoza and Deleuze and Guattari is never the biological determinist 
type of essence re-affirmed in contemporary scholarship. It is a concept that 
allows them to express how our nature is taking up a form that necessarily 
re-creates itself in its relations to others, ad infinitum.
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Essence equals the desiring flesh that does not know (yet) of sexual 
difference. Essence is a cut-out in nature (as de Beauvoir would put it), and 
equally within God (as Spinoza would put it) that acts as one, yet always 
in relation to how it pertains to others, and vice versa. The emphasis on 
desire and essence, then, does not deny the existence of male and female, 
of sexual difference, but instead denounces the ignorance with which 
epistemologies have folded into nature and cut it up into genus and species. 
A vitalist emphasis on desire, essence and the flesh, allows us to rethink such 
categorizations in a most revolutionary way. Indeed a Spinozist or Deleuzo-
Guattarian perspective, as it claims that the essence is determined by what 
affects the thing and by how it is affected, starts from how life is being 
formed and how categories like sexual difference are created in it by the 
actions of the mind and the body.
Such an affirmative vitalism allows us to rethink feminism (and all other 
minor fields in cultural theory) not by critiquing the “being” of a woman, 
but rather by affirming the molecular ways in which the body and mind can 
be conceptualized as “female” in how they are created (as one), or in how 
they affect and are affected. That is why Deleuze and Guattari ([1980] 1987, 
291), re-reading de Beauvoir, claim that a becoming-woman “necessarily 
affects men just as much as women.” That is why the girl deterritorializes 
all forms of life (as well as the non-organic). For just as a becoming Jewish 
affects the non-Jew as it affects the Jew, as they stated before this last quote, 
men also, in the ongoing questioning of their essence, enter the trajectories 
of “femininity” as it moves them away from the dominant (molar) socio-
cultural (male-oriented) stance from which society is organized. Starting 
with the body, with the affections that befall the body and how they present 
us with ideas in the mind (see e.g. Spinoza [1677] 2001, E2P16), this 
then allows us a radical complexification of the asymmetry indicated by de 
Beauvoir, “For the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular combinations 
bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the 
man, but the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny 
sexes” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 213).
Deleuze ([1981] 1988, 124) already noted that “[…] if you define bodies 
and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, many things 
change.” In terms of its consequences for feminism, Grosz (1994) sees 
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this as the starting point for a way of rethinking sexual difference not as a 
meaning imposed upon bodies, but as the expression of bodies (earlier we 
called this material-discursive). In other words, sexual differing is about the 
way the body is able to sediment itself or form itself within the socio-cultural 
according to the practices in which it acts:
So an animal, a thing is never separable from its relations 
with the world. The interior is only a selected exterior, and 
the exterior, a projected interior. The speed and slowness of 
metabolisms, perceptions, actions and reactions, link together 
to constitute a particular individual in the world (Deleuze 
[1981] 1988, 125).
In sum, then, the move from sexual difference, as it has dominated 
feminism over the past half-century, to sexual differing, as we can already 
find in de Beauvoir, means an emphasis on the agencements of desire and 
the way they allow us to think of the flesh and its nature in the way it 
becomes actualized and realized within practices. Then power is an action 
upon an action, as Foucault already put it. Or rather, power sets itself to 
the structuring of the socio-cultural by means of prohibition, as Claire 
Colebrook describes it. For she claims: “There is only a phallus rather than 
a penis, through the process of collective inscription” (Colebrook 2002, 
134). This materialist stance does not want to critique collective (molar) 
inscription, but rather asks us how, in life, the creation of the woman (and 
the man) comes about in the (mute, fleshy, molecular) affects to which these 
collective inscriptionsrespond.
From Sexual Difference to Sexual Differing
Let us end with a close reading of the conclusion to The Second Sex, as it 
is here that de Beauvoir’s practical philosophy comes to full fruition. In 
the text, de Beauvoir ([1949] 2010, 758) is truly opening up for a sexual 
differing, a pushing of sexual difference to the extreme, because she claims 
that neither men nor women have so far been willing to “assum[e] all the 
consequences of this situation that one proposes and the other undergoes.” 
What happens when we do assume all the consequences of sexual 
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difference? When we no longer critique the collective inscription of sexual 
difference, but ask an affirmative question instead?
First, de Beauvoir states that “today’s woman is torn between the 
past and the present” (ibid., 761). She is torn, that is, between collective 
inscriptions, and the linear, causal theory of time with which they work, 
and creative evolution, which, speaking with Henri Bergson, comes with 
the vitual/actual, with durée as it opens up a world to come. The collective 
inscriptions need not be critiqued as in equality or postmodern feminism, 
but one must ask to what materialist, fleshy desires these collective 
inscriptions respond. Patriarchy utilizes what it finds for its own self-
perpetuation. But a revolutionary feminism does not have a model. We could 
say that for women, the molding into utilities of affects, of life forces leads to 
a being torn between past and present, between sexual difference and sexual 
differing. And this is actually something we can affirm, as it shows how 
sexual difference implies sexual differing all along. de Beauvoir describes the 
situation as follows:
[M]ost often, she appears as a ‘real woman’ disguised as a 
man, and she feels as awkward in her woman’s body as in her 
masculine garb. She has to shed her old skin and cut her own 
clothes. She will only be able to do this if there is a collective 
change. No one teacher can today shape a ‘female human being’ 
that would be an exact homologue to the ‘male human being’: if 
raised like boy, the young girl feels she is an exception, and that 
subjects her to a new kind of specification (ibid.).
An upbringing like a boy and masculine clothing (that is to say, 
emancipation) is what de Beauvoir’s woman wants to move away from, 
similar to the way in which she wants to move away from an unemancipated 
world. Neither the inscriptions of equality feminism nor those of an 
androcentric world fit her flesh. Woman, according to de Beauvoir, has to rid 
herself of these inscriptions. This means, following an ethics of affirmation, 
that she has to cut her own clothes. Despite the dominant reception of her 
work even in French feminism, de Beauvoir thus clearly speaks the language 
of difference. As she states:
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Woman is defined neither by her hormones nor by mysterious 
instincts but by the way she grasps, through foreign 
consciousness, her body and her relation to the world […] it 
would be impossible to keep woman from being what she was 
made, and she will always trail this past behind her; if the weight 
of this past is accurately measured, it is obvious that her destiny 
is not fixed in eternity (ibid., 761; original emphasis).
This fragment, even though it has been read as existentialism par 
excellence, is not only crystal clear about collective inscriptions. It also 
clarifies how we could read the evolution de Beauvoir alluded to in the 
previously given quote. This evolution—which after postmodern feminism 
seems wholly individualized in this fragment, but throughout The Second 
Sex appears as (equally) collective—we can read in a manner similar to 
how we read de Beauvoir’s interpretation of young girls’ naiveté. Equality 
feminism is a narrative of progress, predicated on the coupling possible/real, 
on a linear and causal theory of time. It wants sexual difference to be solved 
once and for all. Difference feminism thinks of emancipation differently: “To 
emancipate woman is to refuse to enclose her in the relations she sustains 
with man, but not to deny them” (ibid., 766). The latter feminism allows for 
bringing along the past that shadows woman for life; it has gotten rid of the 
habit of narratives of progress, and speaks the language of true duration, of 
becoming a thousand tiny sexes, of sexual differing.
Where, then, is this new conceptualization of emancipation to be 
found? It is not to be found in our fearful imaginings of a future without 
sexual difference, because, says de Beauvoir: “Let us beware lest our lack of 
imagination impoverish the future; the future is only an abstraction for us; 
each one of us secretly laments the absence in it of what was” (ibid., 765). 
de Beauvoir does not want women to be confined by sexual difference, nor 
does she want to deny them relations with men. Although it has often been 
remarked in feminist scholarship that de Beauvoir seems to say that men are 
to liberate women by giving up their privileges, our reading of de Beauvoir 
suggests an alternative take on the following, oft-discredited fragment, in 
which she ends her masterpiece by saying:
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Within the given world, it is up to man to make the reign of 
freedom triumph; to carry off this supreme victory, men and 
women must, among other things and beyond their natural 
differentiations, unequivocally affirm their brotherhood (ibid., 
766; emphasis added).
What we see here is that it is in sexual difference that we can find sexual 
differing. Sexual difference is nothing but a collective molar habit of mind, 
and, up until the conclusion, The Second Sex has described this habit as 
well as where it undid itself. Sexual differing is not found in the future, but 
between the linguistic codes of sexual difference where it always already 
roams, materially and vitally.
Notes
1. For the intrinsic link between these exemplifications, see van der Tuin (2009).
2. Note, however, that Heinämaa (1997, 27) reads this phenomenology as breaking 
through the nature/culture divide. She also states that with de Beauvoir as well as 
Butler we can break through the divide between the mental and the bodily (ibid., 
22).
3. Let us state clearly that we are aware of the fierce criticism that the received view of 
de Beauvoir in general, and of The Second Sex in particular, has received from femi-
nist scholars in both the United States and Europe. We are also aware of the transla-
tion problem surrounding The Second Sex prior to when Constance Borde and Sheila 
Malovany-Chevallier’s 2010 translation appeared. A huge body of work has been 
produced around these issues that is impossible to reference even when one privileg-
es, with Donna Haraway, a partial perspective. We thus refrain from the referencing, 
albeit that these discussions form the background of this chapter. It might be argued 
that this chapter is to be placed in the tradition of post-poststructuralist scholarship 
on de Beauvoir, as Sonia Kruks (2005, 290) calls it, moving beyond biological essen-
tialism and social constructivism indeed. It might also be seen as an attempt to move 
out of another double bind that is so often to be found around de Beauvoir. Attempts 
to free The Second Sex from Sartre often confine the text to another Master, and, 
consequently, it is again not subjected to a close reading (ibid., 294).
4. Feminist scholarship dismissing or criticizing the paradoxes in the work of de 
Beauvoir is rampant. Although many scholars try to affirm the paradoxes as a neces-
sary part of de Beauvoir’s feminist philosophy, it is hardly ever affirmed that these 
paradoxes actually are (her) feminism. For very recent examples, see Changfoot 
(2009a, 2009b).
5. Note that by not accepting the sex/gender distinction as a key to The Second Sex, we 
arrive at conclusions that differ from those of Hughes and Witz (1997).
6. Remember that de Beauvoir is as ambiguous about Marxism as she is about psy-
choanalysis. Throughout The Second Sex, both are subscribed to for their accurate 
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descriptions as well as utopianism and critiqued for their genderblindness. The 
virtue of the latter, in particular, is that it proposes that “the existent is a body” (de 
Beauvoir [1949] 2010, 68), even that
[t]he existent is a sexed body; in its relations with other existents that are also 
sexed bodies, sexuality is thus always involved (ibid., 55).
7. Bergson ([1907] 1998, 313) makes the same argument concerning a boy which sup-
ports Deleuze’s argument all the more. His version runs as follows:
The truth is that if language here were molded on reality, we should not say ‘The 
child becomes the man,’ but ‘There is becoming from the child to the man.’ […] 
In the second proposition, ‘becoming’ is a subject. It comes to the front. It is the 
reality itself; childhood and manhood are then only possible stops, mere views of 
the mind; we now have to do with the objective movement itself […].
Chapter 8
The End of (Wo)Man
Although so far we have discussed large portions of the humanities, we 
have focused in particular on feminist theory. We have demonstrated how 
new materialism is being developed here, and how feminist theory allows 
us to rewrite the most common intellectual history in order to create 
concepts and produce insights that are less distortedly based on (gendered) 
hierarchies. Subsequently, these insights are less dependent on gaps between 
culture and nature, language and materiality, and body and mind—not by 
doing away with them, but by pushing them to the extreme. Due to the fact 
that “substance dualism” has been diagnosed as one of the most prominent 
ca(u)ses of gendering since Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal The Second Sex 
([1949] 2010), feminist theory is one of the key sites of critical reflection 
upon substance dualism. Such reflection, if we can call it that, is also a key 
to the development of the new materialism. Yet feminist theory is not about 
critique, and therewith about reflection. As in many other parts of academia, 
one of the defining creative features of feminism in academia is its focus on 
theories of the subject (Braidotti 1991, 164). Albeit that this focus can easily 
be historically substantiated with a reference to women’s explicit exclusion 
from academic knowledge production until the late nineteenth century 
in most Western countries, the implied anthropocentrism does not suit 
new materialism’s metaphysics. It is even questionable whether substance 
dualism can be overcome epistemologically, because the defining feature 
of epistemology seems to be the presupposed hierarchical split between 
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the subject and the object, and therewith the split between epistemology 
(knowing) and ontology (being). How then can the main conceptual 
creation in feminist theory be defined so that a new materialism gets to 
be fully enfleshed? In this chapter we will propose that not all (feminist) 
theories of the subject imply a human-subject-centered epistemology, as our 
interviewees in Part One have already shown us. Mapping a new materialism 
by re-writing these theories is key to this final chapter.
Sandra Harding’s The Science Question in Feminism from 1986, which 
is the standard reference text in feminist epistemology, does perform an 
anthropocentrism. Notwithstanding the fact that Donna Haraway’s famous 
response to Harding in “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in 
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” discussed its limits and 
offered us a new feminist materialism as early as 1988, via concepts such 
as the “material-semiotic actor” and the “apparatus of bodily production” 
(Haraway 1988, 595), feminist epistemology in general has always 
been structured by the desire to make clear that humanism is in fact an 
androcentrism in need of alternatives. “Feminist standpoint theory” and 
“feminist postmodernism” are both examples of this move. In the former 
case a specific “woman’s way of knowing” was proposed, while in the 
latter, following a pluralization act, a plethora of women’s ways of knowing 
was put to the fore in order to shift gross generalizations about the nature 
and culture of women (Harding 1986, 1991). The fact that even feminist 
postmodernism has not been able to shift such humanism owing to a dualist 
response to both androcentrism and feminist standpoint theory, and has 
confined itself to an anthropocentric linguisticism as a result, has been 
demonstrated by Claire Colebrook’s “Postmodernism is a Humanism: 
Deleuze and Equivocity” from 2004, which was discussed in earlier 
chapters. The fundamental claim in that article is that
[o]ne must recognize oneself as this or that gendered identity 
in order to take part in what [Judith] Butler refers to as the 
heterosexual matrix; but, precisely because this matrix is 
constituted through speech, acts and performatives, it is also 
always capable of being rendered otherwise, of producing new 
relations (Colebrook 2004, 292–3)
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This outlines the fact that linguisticism (language, and “the interstices of 
language” as they reveal themselves with language, to use Butler’s concepts) 
as well as anthropocentrism are equally reductive results owing to a dualist 
argumentation (cf. Kirby 1997, 2006, 2011). We have spent enough time 
in earlier chapters of this part of the book situating and re-writing any 
linguisticism and the way its practitioners consider materiality intrinsically 
semiotic (that is, in itself mute) the time has now come for a radical 
elimination of any anthropocentrism from our materialism.
Here we might hook up with an early and apt diagnosis of the 
anthropocentrism that manifests itself in the aforementioned dualist 
response to a supposedly inclusive but in fact profoundly androcentric 
humanism that can be found in Genevieve Lloyd’s “Preface to the Second 
Edition” of the seminal The Man of Reason (originally published in 1984). 
Following the methodological gesture of contrasting Cartesian dualism 
and Spinozist monism, Lloyd ([1984] 1993, xii-xiii; original emphasis) 
claims as follows:
What must be the relation between minds and bodies for it to 
be possible for the symbolic content of man and woman to feed 
into the formation of our sense of ourselves as male or female? 
[…] Spinoza’s rapprochement between reason and passion can 
[…] be seen as a point where the grip of male-female symbolism 
might have been broken. And his treatment of the mind as an 
idea of the body suggests a starting point, too, for a clearer 
understanding of how the meanings given to bodies can be both 
metaphorical and rightly experienced as ‘real’ differences.
Contrary to feminist (post)modernism, Lloyd thus asks how a gendered 
(dualist) organization and a linguisticism emerge from a monist multiplicity, 
just like Alphonso Lingis (1994), Arun Saldanha (2006), and Michael 
Hames-García (2008) ask how a racial linguisticism emerges from the same 
flux. Although in the present book we do not equate new materialism’s 
metaphysics with a Spinozism, monism has run like an electrical current 
through our conceptualization. It is monist metaphysics that truly shifts 
anthropocentrism, and which is at work in one way or another in the 
materialisms of the authors discussed in this final chapter.1
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Recently, cultural theory’s monist take on culture and nature, language 
and materiality, and body and mind has stirred an abundance of neologisms. 
These neologisms provide a first insight into the monist proposal, always 
in keeping with Lyotard’s, Deleuze’s, and Latour’s rewriting of modernity 
(see Chapter 6 above), to provide a non-anthropocentric mapping of the 
morphogenetic changes of the real. Let us give two examples. Karen Barad 
in Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning from 2007 has coined the term “intra-action.” Barad 
(2007, 33; cf. Barad 2010, 244) writes that “in contrast to the usual 
“interaction,” which assumes that there are separate individual agencies 
that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that 
distinct agencies […] emerge through, their intra-action.” This process 
ontology shifts an atomist metaphysics of pre-existing entities, and suggests 
a world which Haraway (2003: 6), alluding to the work of Alfred North 
Whitehead, has been characterized as one in which “[b]eings do not preexist 
their relatings.” Similar to Lloyd’s, Lingis’, Saldanha’s and Hames-García’s 
question after the emergence of a gendered/racialized (dualist) organization 
from a monist multiplicity, Barad (2010, 254) states explicitly “intra-actions 
necessarily entail constitutive exclusions, which constitute an irreducible 
openness,” which is not only to say that dualism can only happen within 
monism, and not the other way around, but also that dualism is never 
fully fixed. This is why Barad, while reading Niels Bohr through Jacques 
Derrida, terms ontology a “hauntology.” Barad frees Derrida from a possible 
linguisticist interpretation, just as Vicki Kirby (2011) does, since hauntology 
prefers neither the mind (or the immaterial, cultural, linguistic) nor the body 
(or the muted material, the natural). It is therefore non-anthropocentric, 
insofar it works with an ontology of “the world’s radical aliveness” (Barad 
2007, 33). Starting from the spectral and shadows that are “constitutive 
without belonging to” (Kochhar-Lindgren 2011, 25) the material, does 
not affirm the dualist desire to try to represent and thus the possibility of 
fully capturing the world while being radically separate from it. On the 
contrary, hauntology necessarily includes all of the unforeseen (un-human) 
radical powers.
A second example can be found in the work of Manuel DeLanda, 
whose “morphogenesis” from “The Geology of Morals: A Neo-Materialist 
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Interpretation” (1996) we borrowed in this book. In A Thousand Years 
of Nonlinear History DeLanda (1997, 32; original emphasis) speaks of 
“meshworks” in order to maintain a differentiation between “self-organized 
meshworks of diverse elements” and “hierarchies of uniform elements” which 
“not only coexist and intermingle, [but...] give rise to one another.” The 
creation of the concept of the meshwork, which equals the “collective” 
composed of “hybrids” coined in We Have Never Been Modern of Bruno 
Latour ([1991] 1993, 47), is part of a monist metaphysics. In A New 
Philosophy of Society DeLanda (2006, 6) says to focus on “the movement 
that in reality generates all these emergent wholes” in which “language 
plays an important but not a constitutive role” (ibid., 3). Furthermore, 
DeLanda makes clear that “the properties of a whole cannot be reduced to 
those of its parts [because] they are the result not of an aggregation of the 
components’ own properties but of the actual exercise of their capabilities” 
(ibid., 11). DeLanda (2002, 4) thus introduces a concept that not only 
“grants reality full autonomy from the human mind” but also one that 
comes very close to the neologisms put to work by Barad. DeLanda’s work 
demonstrates how Barad’s suggested contrast between inter- and intra-action 
is a methodological step. The dualism seemingly suggested is introduced in 
order to retain intra-action.
Apart from it being a rewriting, the introduction of neologisms does 
not aim at exchanging a seemingly “wrong” academic terminology for 
a terminology with which the world can be captured “better.” Such an 
epistemic stance would presuppose a subject independent of an object, and 
such a representationalist hierarchy or gap does not fit the proposed monist 
metaphysics. Combining Whitehead’s “event” and Deleuze’s “sense,” Mike 
Halewood (2009, 50) in “Language, Subjectivity and Individuality” states: 
“the world creates (or constructs) sense as an effect of the interrelation 
of singularities within the virtual. Given that all subjects are part of this 
world they are also created within such creativity.” Here we clearly see that 
the subject according to a monist metaphysics is a consequence rather 
than the full-fledged starting point of an epistemic experience. Albeit that 
Barad (2010, 247, 253) with “queer causality” warns us against any easy 
opposition to linear causality due to haunting, this departure from the 
prioritization of the subject breaks through anthropocentrism, and proposes 
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a non-anthropocentric take on what supposedly forms the core of what is 
human (language, and subjectivity). Deleuze’s “The tree greens” (1990, 
21 in Halewood 2009, 51) and Whitehead’s “We enjoy the green foliage of 
the spring greenly” (1967, 251 in ibid.) propose that greenness itself is an 
active expression, and that we prehend the greenness of the tree. It is the 
state of affairs that enables language, and this language or expression is not 
just human. Whitehead in Process and Reality ([1929/1978] 1985, 52) states 
that he has “adopted the term ‘prehension,’ to express the activity whereby 
an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things” which shows 
once more that the metaphysics proposed here is not an anthropocentric 
linguisticism. First, the focus is on the activity, process, event, and, second, 
cause and effect have been “queered” vis-à-vis a dualist metaphysics.
Let us now fully immerse ourselves in the non-anthropocentric 
metaphysics of new materialism. Therefore we will read Michel Foucault’s 
birth and death of the subject via a discussion of parts of his secondary 
thesis, recently published as Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology from 2008 
(though the thesis was submitted in 1961). Foucault addresses the question 
of how anthropocentrism has shaped dualism, and how it has in fact 
distorted our (representationalist) strategies of studying the real. Quentin 
Meillassoux, who, in After Finitude ([2006] 2008) re-reads Kant as well, 
offers us a different (yet equally non-humanist, non-anthropocentric) way 
out compared with Foucault’s famous thesis, as we have already seen in 
our interview with him in the first part of this book (Chapter 4). Putting 
the (dis-) connection between Foucault and Meillassoux at center stage in 
order to show in what directions new materialism’s anti-anthropocentrism 
leads us, we will then open up the notion of subjectivity by reading a 
mathematics in materialist thinking. Speculative materialism or realism, as 
it is being developed by Meillassoux, but also by Ray Brassier and Graham 
Harman (Bryant et al, eds. 2011), is then diffractively read with those new 
materialist scholars who are big in science studies today, several of whom 
have already been discussed in previous chapters of this book: DeLanda, 
Barad, Kirby, and Brian Massumi. By involving mathematics (set theory, 
geometry, topology) as a means of breaking open the Kantian definitions of 
epistemology and ontology, we are offered important new materialist claims 
that (implicitly) push those fundamental humanist oppositions—like (wo)
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man—to the extreme. After all, science studies has been characterized as 
being an anthropology on/with objects (Mol 2002, 32), and thus has been 
implicitly criticized for an ongoing focus on the Kantian (subjectivist) 
problematic while trying to dualistically move away from epistemology as a 
representationalist practice (ibid., vii).
The Birth of the Subject = The Death of the Subject
(Part of) Foucault’s project has been to understand the coming into being 
of the sciences of man (Foucault [1966/1970] 1994). Immanuel Kant, that 
is, the anthropological turn in philosophy that started with Kant, is being 
rewritten in Foucault’s work. For Foucault, the birth of the subject equals 
the death of the subject, or in a Nietzschean mode, the death of God equals 
the death of man. Foucault states in his Introduction that an unfinished and 
unpublished correspondence with Kant’s (former) student Jakob Sigismund 
Beck in conjunction with the published version of the former’s Anthropology 
from a Pragmatic Point of View from 1798 makes clear that Kant managed
[…] to define the space which an anthropology, in general, 
could occupy: a space in which self-observation bears not upon 
the subject as such, nor upon the pure ‘I’ of the synthesis, 
but upon “a ‘I’” that is object and present solely in its singular 
phenonemal [sic] truth. But this “‘I’-object,” […] is no stranger 
to the determining subject; for it is ultimately nothing more than 
the subject as it is affected by itself. [The space of anthropology] 
is entirely taken over by the presence of a deaf, unbound, and 
often errant freedom which operates in the domain of originary 
passivity (Foucault 2008, 39; original emphasis).
Foucault notes that the Preface to the Anthropology states that Kant’s 
object was “what man makes of himself—or can and should make 
of himself—as a free-acting being” (Foucault 2008, 44) thus making 
anthropology pragmatic. Anthropology deals with the balancing act in 
which “man is considered to be a “citizen of the world,” as belonging, 
that is, to the realm of the concrete universal, in which the legal subject is 
determined by and submits to certain laws, but is at the same time a human 
being who, in his or her freedom, acts according to a universal moral code” 
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(ibid., 42). And it shows “how a juridical relationship of the order of a 
possession, which is to say a jus rerum, manages to preserve the moral kernel 
of a person construed as a free subject” (ibid.). Pragmatics then deals not 
with human nature or essence, but with “a movement where nature and 
freedom are bound up in the Gebrauch—one of the meanings of which is 
given in the word ‘usage’” (ibid., 51). To be more precise, “in Anthropology, 
man is neither a homo natura, nor a purely free subject; he is caught by the 
syntheses already operated by his relationship to the world” (ibid., 54–5). 
Studying a different set of concepts (Gemüt and Geist) allows Foucault to 
claim that in the Anthropology no space is given, however, to “being tied to 
the passivity of phenomenal determinations” (ibid., 63) since
The Geist is […] the principle, in the Gemüt, of a de-
dialecticized, nontranscendental dialectic oriented towards 
the domain of experience and playing an integral part in the 
play of phenomena itself. It is the Geist which offers the Gemüt 
the freedom of the possible, stripping it of its determinations, 
and providing it with a future which it owes to nothing but 
itself (ibid.).
On this basis, Foucault comes to claim that the “I”/Subject of the Kritik 
is wholly inverted in the Anthropology, in a way that is more complex than 
an exchange of cause and effect. Namely “it appears in the density of a 
becoming where its sudden emergence infallibly assumes the retrospectively 
constituted meaning of the already there” (ibid., 67).
In the introduction to the Logik, published in 1800 (nearly twenty years 
after his first Kritik) Kant famously summarizes his critical project in not 
three, but four questions. He summarized his three critiques by asking 
himself “what can I know?,” “what should I do?,” and “what may I hope 
for?.” He then added a fourth question to the list, namely: “what is man?” 
Only in his later notes (Notes and Fragments (2005)) he realizes that this 
sentence in fact captured his main contribution to thought. For whereas 
in those days it was still common to start thinking first and foremost from 
a thorough conceptualization of God, from which thoughts on nature and 
on the human being subsequently arose, Kant started his philosophy with 
the human being—or even better, with human thought and its relation 
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to nature. In other words, Kant turned (theological) metaphysics into 
transcendental anthropology. Kant’s second Copernican revolution, as it 
revolves around concepts like the Subject, Geist and Gemüt, was by all means 
a humanist revolution, since it turned the relations between the three poles 
mentioned around. This is clearly noted by Foucault (2008, 78):
At last man emerges as universal synthesis, forming a real 
unity in which the personality of God and the objectivity of the 
world are rejoined, the sensible principle and the supra sensible; 
and man becomes the mediatory from which “einer absoluter 
Ganze” takes shape. It is from the starting point of man that the 
absolute can be thought.
Foucault claims that it is with Kant that man has not only turned 
into the origin of thought, but that both God and the world (nature) 
subsequently arise. Yet as “[…] man immediately defines himself as a citizen 
of the world, as ‘Weltbewohner’: ‘Der Mensch gehört zwar mit zur Welt.’ And 
completing the circle, all reflection on man involves reflection on the world” 
(ibid., 78–9), Foucault makes clear that this does not involve a naturalism 
(“where a science of man implies a knowledge of nature,” ibid. 79) nor a 
determinism “on the level of the phenomena” (ibid.) but rather “it is the 
development of self-awareness and of the ‘I am’: the subject self-affecting by 
the movement in which he becomes aware of himself as an object” (ibid.). 
This affirmative rewriting of Kant, contrary to how Meillassoux reads 
Kant (as we will see later) boils down to what we could call, with Barad, 
an intra-action between (social) world and Subject. Foucault even states 
that “the world, as a whole (Ganz)” seems to be excluded from language, 
yet has structure or meaning (ibid., 80). The way in which he then explains 
the world comes close to DeLanda’s immanent morphogenetic changes of 
the real, where the world is source, domain, and limit (ibid., 80–1). That 
is to say, the metaphysics according to which Foucault re-writes Kant is 
wholly monist: “the whole of existence defines what belongs to it necessarily 
and originarily” (ibid., 84). The death of the Subject is encapsulated in its 
Kantian birth.
The End of (Wo)Man 167
Anthropocentrism (Un)Solved, or: Critiquing Critique
In After Finitude, Meillassoux takes on a similar project as Foucault, which 
we might summarize as a rewriting of Kantian paradigms that concern 
the human being (the Subject) and the object. Yet he does so by asking 
a different opening question. Foucault is interested in Kant from what 
we might call a post-Nietzschean perspective. For although a historian, 
Foucault’s call for the End of Man is about a resistance against the Absolute 
powers from the pre-critical period, as they keep haunting man and the way 
in which man conceptualizes his newfound rationality. Foucault sets himself 
to a discovering of empirical reason, what Foucault earlier referred to as a 
pragmatics, and it is thus that he wants to push Kant’s dualist thinking to 
the limit. Foucault already notices this emphasis on the empirical in Kant 
himself when Foucault (2008, 63) summarizes Kant’s final steps: “The 
movement which, in the Critique, gave rise to the transcendental mirage is 
extended and prolonged in the Anthropology in the form of the empirical, 
concrete life of the Gemüt.”
In the preface to After Finitude, Alain Badiou claims that Meillassoux’s 
approach to the three questions that summarize Kant’s Critiques, rather than 
re-reading their dynamics in the empirical, pushes them to the point of a 
“critique of Critique” (Badiou in Meillassoux [2006] 2008, vii) which is to 
say that Kantian anthropocentrism has not at all been “solved” by Foucault 
or his followers. For whereas the first and foremost Kantian question (“what 
can I know?”) has been attacked primarily (by Foucault for instance) for 
its use of the “I am,” or, the construction of Subjectivity (the “I think”) 
which it entails, Meillassoux’s critique of Critique focuses on the necessity 
of “knowledge” and the way Kant’s notion of knowledge is built on an odd 
kind of dualism. Foucault (2008, 78) already noticed clearly that “it is from 
the starting point of man that the absolute can be thought” and it is this idea 
in particular that Meillassoux considers corrupt. Thus, without doing away 
with the subject and the object (he actually affirms it rigorously), the latter 
sets himself to a rethinking of how this opposition relates to one another in 
terms of knowledge.
In Kant, Meillassoux sees a metaphysics being developed which he 
refers to as “correlationism.” He defines it as such: “Correlationism 
consists in disqualifying the claim that it is possible to consider the realms 
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of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one another” (Meillassoux 
[2006] 2008, 5). Meillassoux does not negate correlationism as such; 
later in his work it is in fact through “weak correlationism” that he sets up 
the necessity of his speculative materialism. But the way in which Kant 
introduced correlationism in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft in 1781 was, as 
Meillassoux ([2006] 2008, 124) calls it, a “catastrophe” for philosophy.
Crucial for Kant’s correlationism is the idea that the objects in the 
world consist in themselves, independent of any observation, and at the same 
time have subjective qualities that allow them to reveal themselves in an 
observation (ibid., 31). For a human being, then, the things in themselves are 
not knowable but we can think them; whereas we can get rational knowledge 
(about a thing) only in the observation, in how the object allows itself to 
be represented. It is thus that the world as a whole (das Ganze) subjectively 
comes into being, from the perspective of the “I am.” Meillassoux’s critique 
of this Kantian relation between subject and object is twofold. First, he 
questions the limits that Kant puts to rational knowledge. Why can’t the 
object itself be known? How can thought ever be given “limited access” to 
the object (which thus in the presentation allows itself to be thought but not 
to be known)? Secondly, he asks himself why Kant demands the object to be 
presented in order for it to be thought. This notion of givenness (the object 
has to be confronted with the subject in order to become part of the world) 
also sounds questionable because it is deeply anthropocentric.
In order to clarify his reservations, Meillassoux gives us the example 
of what he calls the “arche-fossil” (a life that has ceased to be before the 
human being and its thinking came into existence) or the question of the 
ancestral. He wonders whether it could be possible, as Kantian thinking 
seems to presuppose, that “Science can think a world wherein spatio-
temporal givenness itself came into being within a time and a space which 
preceded every variety of givenness” (ibid., 22). Or, how is correlationism 
liable to interpret ancestral statements? The answer of course is that it 
(philosophically) cannot, which is a serious critique of Kant and of the 
anthropocentrism that he proposes. The paleobiologist confronted with 
the arche-fossil has a problem thinking ancestral space-time that never 
“appeared” to him and to which he thus has no access (since it does not 
take place). Meillassoux’s critique of Critical (correlationist) thinking is 
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a critique not of the being but of the knowing Subject. His alternative is a 
speculative metaphysics, which is not subjective, but rather demands that 
philosophy turn to objectivity again. The critique of Critique is thus a 
critique of epistemology as we know it.
Doing this he also comes back to God and the tripartite taxonomy of 
thought discussed earlier. Contrary to Foucault, whom we have called a 
post-Nietzschean, Meillassoux is by all means an anti-Nietzschean. For 
whereas Nietzsche, at the close of the nineteenth century claimed that the 
Age of Reason (introduced to us by Kant among others) has caused us 
to murder God, Meillassoux claims exactly the opposite. He states that 
Kantian thinking, in which the absolute has been closed off from thought for 
good, expelled from the metaphysical, has caused the remarkable return of 
religious fundamentalism today as it allowed for the absolute to be removed 
from knowing and thus to be revived in the form of believing (ibid., 45).
Both Foucault’s and Nietzsche’s comments are of course not 
correlationist, in Meillassoux’s opinion. Rethinking the Kantian “I am” 
empirically, they push the whole subject-object opposition to the extreme, 
introducing us to a new kind of thinking that has been able to firmly rewrite 
correlationism. Meillassoux calls this thinking a “subjective metaphysics,” 
which is all about absolutizing the correlate itself:
A metaphysics of this type may select from among various 
forms of subjectivity, but it is invariably characterized by the 
fact that it hypostatizes some mental, sentient, or vital term: 
representation in the Leibnizian monad; Schelling’s Nature, or 
the objective subject-object; Hegelian Mind; Schopenhauer’s 
Will; the Will (or Wills) to Power in Nietzsche; perception 
loaded with memory in Bergson; Deleuze’s Life, etc. (ibid., 37).
Meillassoux goes on defining this subjective metaphysics, in a mode 
that resembles the oppositional logic that we have discussed in chapter 6 
of this book, and which also characterizes Barad’s reading of hauntology as 
affirmed through Bohr’s complementarity (Barad 2010, 253):
Even in those cases where the vitalist hypostatization of the 
correlation (as in Nietzsche of Deleuze) is explicitly identified 
with a critique of ‘the subject’ or of ‘metaphysics,’ it shares 
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with speculative idealism the same twofold decision which 
ensures its irreducibility to naïve realism or some variant of 
transcendental idealism:
The concepts created by subjective metaphysics, as they are nowadays 
increasingly popular within cultural theory, create a metaphysics that we 
could also call a metaphysics of the event (referring to Whitehead). It has 
no eye for individual objects, or at least these individual objects do not exist 
in their entirety but only insofar as they are actualized in the event. And it 
is this actualization which in the end, as Leibniz put it, is the only possible 
world. Foucault can be accused in a sense of forgetting the object, but we 
will get back to this later.
It is important to understand that this twofold definition of subjective 
metaphysics makes any materialism impossible, as Meillassoux claims. Just 
before he confronts us with this definition of subjective metaphysics, which 
(as stated) cannot think the Epicurean atom, he says that Epicureanism is in 
fact the paradigm of all materialisms. In Epicureanism
[…] thought can access the absolute nature of all things through 
the notions of atoms and void, and which asserts that this nature 
is not necessarily correlated with an act of thought, since thought 
exists only in an aleatory manner, being immanent to contingent 
atomic compounds (for the gods themselves are decomposable), 
which are in-essential for the existence of elementary natures 
(ibid., 36; emphasis added).
The speculative materialism that Meillassoux proposes seems very 
different from the materialisms discussed so far, as indeed it does not 
seem to underpin the Spinozist monism which we have been developing 
up till now.
When stating that absolute reality consists of entities without thought, or 
even of entities that necessarily precede thought (we now see why he started 
his argument with the arche-fossil, which indeed turns into the perfect 
example of an event preceding human thought), he radically does away with 
Spinoza’s pantheism. According to Meillassoux, Spinoza’s claim that God 
equals nature (since both are unlimited, they must be one) is a subjective 
metaphysical definition of God as it creates a larger whole which equals the 
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absolute. Considering God as equivalent to nature also means that nature is 
rational (which, of course, paleobiologists also believe when they consider 
their readings of nature “real,” as in, the same as the objective materiality) 
and this too is an impossible anthropocentrism to Meillassoux. For him 
nature is contingent, especially because it precedes thought, or even better, 
because it precedes any system of logic that we could come up with (see his 
argument on “spatio-temporal givenness,” ibid., 22). Again in contrast with 
Spinozism, Meillassoux claims there is no such thing as the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason; every cause can have an endless amount of consequences 
and these consequences are in no way “given” in thought. In the end he 
therefore feels much closer to David Hume than to Kant’s correlationism 
in which knowledge of any synthethic proposition can never be a priori. 
This manifest stability of chaos, Meillassoux argues, “[…] would allow us to 
penetrate much deeper into the nature of a temporality delivered from real 
necessity” (ibid., 101).
Pushing Kant’s weak correlationism to the extreme, Meillassoux 
composes a speculative materialism that is quite different from Foucauldian 
and post-Nietzschean thought, but which is nevertheless of the greatest 
importance for the new materialist project. For although his fiercely 
argumentative rewriting of the history of philosophy comes up with quite 
a different cartography compared to the sketches we have produced 
in the previous chapters—his appreciation of Descartes is especially 
hard to combine with what has been said above—his moves away from 
anthropocentrism contribute a great deal to the project announced 
by Foucault.
Let us therefore take a closer look at the closing of his first chapter (and 
the start of the second) in which he discusses ancestrality. Here Meillassoux 
introduces us to the two grand speculative materialist themes. First, there 
is a radical break between objects (matter) and the thoughts that follow. 
With this claim, however, he does not accept linear space-time (which 
the word “follow” might suggest); he does away with linear space-time by 
stating: “to inscribe these conditions in time is to turn them into objects 
and hence to anthropologize them” (ibid., 23). The claim thus emphasizes 
the contingency of matter (nature, the object) and is interested in how 
thought is capable of accessing the uncorrelated, the world not-given. 
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Second, though it is not elaborated upon in After Finitude but employed as 
a recurring referent to speculative materialist futures, Meillassoux keeps 
stressing “mathematics’ ability to discourse about the great outdoors; to 
discourse about a past where both humanity and life are absent” (ibid., 26).
The two “propositions” refer us once more to Spinoza and actually 
reveal a more similar approach. For although the first part of the Ethics 
elaborates on the existence of only One substance (which is necessarily 
both the absolute infinite God and Nature), it is immediately added that 
it holds in it the attributes (for instance a human being), and is organized 
in different modes (for instance thought and extension). Concerning the 
human being, mind and body are “the same thing” since they are the 
essence of the individual (and make up one attribute of God). This is 
sometimes referred to as Spinoza’s parallelism (although the term comes 
from Leibniz), yet this term is probably a bit too “equivocal,” as it seems to 
suggest a sort of similarity that cannot be observed. An important argument 
for its univocity is that although Spinoza claims that all that is action in 
the body is also action in the mind, an idea (an action of the mind) is a 
consequence of its body. This does not mean that the body can determine 
the mind to think (as the mind also cannot determine the body to move) 
([1677] 2001, E3P2), it does mean that the body (res extensa) is what 
Brian Massumi (2002, 8) would call ontologically prior to the mind, since 
bodies “[…] have ontological privilege in the sense that they constitute the 
field of the emergence.” Much as with Meillassoux, this is not a temporal 
distinction, and thus it refuses anthropocentrism.
This now requires a formal expressionism that, as Brian Rotman 
envisions, should push us “outside the domain of the sign.” Whereas 
Meillassoux claims that it is through mathematics that his philosophy is able 
to understand the object in itself (the absolute), the subtitle of Spinoza’s 
Ethics (Ordine Geometrico Demonstrate) shows that the latter makes use of 
geometry in order to achieve an understanding of the Absolute. Let us map 
the trajectories sketched.
Mathematics, Geometry, Topology
The relation between mathematics (which includes geometry and topology) 
and the body is now at stake. Of course Spinoza and Meillassoux are not 
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reductive, nor do they practice a linguisticism. Yet “what mathematics can 
do” needs more thought.
Contrary to both Spinoza and Meillassoux, there are scholars who 
do not see how mathematics or a geometrical order would be able to 
make universal claims. George Lakoff and Rafael E. Núñez (2000, 
xvi) for instance claim that “[h]uman mathematics, the only kind of 
mathematics that human beings know, cannot be a subspecies of an abstract 
transcendental mathematics. Instead, it appears that mathematics as we 
know it arises from the nature of our brains and our embodied experience.” 
Their book entitled Where Mathematics Comes From: How the Embodied 
Mind Brings Mathematics into Being intends to show that all thought, thus 
including mathematics, follows from our bodily motor existence (which 
they then presumably consider to be uniquely human). Their arguments 
are in line with Ricardo Nemirovsky and Francesca Ferrara who claim that 
“[t]hinking is not a process that takes place ‘behind’ or ‘underneath’ bodily 
activity, but is bodily activity itself” (in Rotman 2008, 33). Claims like these, 
since they seem to limit mathematics to a bodily interior, are obviously 
anthropocentric, since all forms of calculus, all formulas and geometrical 
figures (straight lines, curves, etc.) are then believed to be consequences 
of our bodily being. By suggesting that mathematical figures necessarily 
spring from a (human) body, it seems that the figures found outside of us 
are merely projections of our inside, which then indicates what Meillassoux 
would call a strong correlationism as it supports “the thesis of the essential 
inseparability of the act of thinking from its content. All we ever engage with 
is what is given-to-thought, never an entity subsisting by itself” (Meillassoux 
[2006] 2008, 36).
Read with Brian Rotman, however, this relation between mathematics 
and the human body seems to be less confined by the boundary of our skins. 
In Becoming Beside Ourselves: The Alphabet, Ghosts, and Distributed Human 
Being from 2008 Rotman introduces the concept of “gesture” in order to 
show how mathematics and the body are one non-linguistic materialist 
morphogenetic process, countering the general yet largely unacknowledged 
agreement that in mathematics “Platonism is the contemporary orthodoxy” 
(Rotman 1997, 18 in Kirby 2003, 422):
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[…] gesture is outside the domain of the sign insofar as signs are 
coded and call for a hermeneutics, an interpretative apparatus 
separable from, and in place prior to, the act of signification. 
Rather, the mode of action of gesture is enactive, exterior 
to anything prior to its own performance: it works through 
bodily executed events, creating meaning and mathematical 
significance ‘before one knows it’ (2008, 36).
In line with Barad, DeLanda, Massumi, Lloyd, and Meillassoux as well, 
Rotman calls for mathematics as a key to the ontologically prior. And in 
contrast with the mathematical anthropocentrism suggested earlier, Rotman 
does not lock the argument into the body. A gesture always already suggests 
a kind of rhythm as it necessarily moves with the outside object (to come), 
and with the multiplicity in which it happens. Rotman thus proposes that 
what is at stake concerning a mathematical abstraction is “what it functions 
with” (Deleuze and Guattari [1980] 1987, 5) thus instead of opposing an 
abstraction’s (or a book’s) subject and object, the question is how “[i]t forms 
a rhizome with the world” (ibid., 11).2
Would this necessarily take us “beyond” language? In fact, Kirby in 
“Enumerating Language: ‘The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics’” 
from 2003, has a strong argument for approaching mathematics as a 
language. This does not automatically lead Kirby to a linguisticism and away 
from the ontological prior. Defining mathematics as a “system of relational 
configurations that refers to itself,” Kirby (2003, 418) alludes to her attempt 
at rewriting the deflated, representationalist concept of “language” as it 
features in much of cultural theory, while rewriting “mathematics [as] the 
language of Nature […] divine[ly] author[ed]” (ibid., 419) along the way. 
Kirby thus also critiques Rotman in a manner similar to her and other 
new materialists’ critique of Butler (see Chapter 5 of the present book). 
Nevertheless, it is possible not to go along with Kirby’s negative reading of 
Rotman’s anthropocentrism, based on a simple reversal of a mathematics 
reated by Nature/God (ibid., 426–427).
It is possible not to go along with Kirby’s negative reading of Rotman’s 
anthropocentrism, based on a simple reversal of a mathematics created by 
Nature/God (ibid., 426–7). That is, we can read the ontological prior into 
both Kirby and Rotman.
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Famously, and counterintuitively via a Derridean detour, Kirby (2006, 
84) states that “[f]or if ‘there is no outside of text,’ as Derrida suggests, then 
it is in ‘the nature of Nature’ to write, to read and to model.” “[M]atter” 
thus “appears within the horizon of our inquiry as a much more curious 
subject. And importantly, its appearance need not be veiled in substitute 
form as a cultural artefact” (ibid., 85; original emphasis). Echoing her 
rewriting of Ferdinand de Saussure in Telling Flesh: The Substance of the 
Corporeal (1997), Kirby states that Derrida’s “there is no outside of text” 
should be rewritten into “there is no outside of Nature” (Kirby 2008b, 229). 
Thus, in turn echoing Spinoza, Kirby proclaims a univocity (Colebrook 
2004).3 In this way Rotman’s gestural, ontologically prior stance is to be 
found in Kirby’s work when she, via Derrida, states that
[…] any “unit” is not so much a separate part of a larger whole 
to which it remains indebted, but rather a unique instantiation 
of the system’s own reinvention (or rewriting) of itself. Thus, 
every “instance” is “the whole,” and this imploded, holographic 
sense of identity confounds linearity as an unfolding 
sequence of separate, successive moments (Kirby 2003, 425; 
original emphasis).
We have encountered such theorizations many times in this book, 
starting with DeLanda’s work in the interview with him and in Chapter 5. 
According to Rotman’s “gesture,” “the exuberant bodily connectivities” 
are “mathematical practice” (ibid., 428). Kirby’s project of showing how 
“it is […] in the nature of corporeality to mathematize, represent, or 
intelligently take measure of itself” (ibid., 434), of “think[ing] of biology as 
a “unified field” of operational differentiations, a mathesis naturalis” (ibid., 
438) does exactly the same thing. In both cases, the bodily force is what is 
ontologically prior.
Then in keeping with how Kirby rewrites the notion of language warding 
off linguisticism, we should (with Rotman and Deleuze and Guattari, 
among others) rewrite mathematics warding off a “mathematicism.” A 
necessary breakdown of any mathematical anthropocentrism in favor of 
any sort of materialism would probably mean, first of all, a move away from 
set theory, so dominant in mathematics these days (as Fernando Zalamea 
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[forthcoming] also suggests). At least, this is a common move by those 
scholars interested in what we term a new materialism. Stengers (2000, 157) 
proposes two routes:
[…] René Thom pleads for a form of ‘nomadic’ mathematics, 
whose vocation would not be to reduce the multiplicity of 
sensible phenomena to the unity of a mathematical description 
that would subject them to the order of resemblance, but to 
construct the mathematical intelligibility of their qualitative 
difference. The fall of a leaf, then, would no longer be a very 
complicated case of a Galilean register, but would have to 
provoke its own mathematics. One could also cite Benoit 
Mandelbrot’s fractal mathematics. Here as well, to ‘understand’ 
means to create a language that opens up the possibility of 
‘encountering’ different sensible forms, of reproducing them, 
without for all that subjugating them to a general law that would 
give them ‘reasons’ and allow them to be manipulated.
The first option Stengers proposes is interesting, because of its call 
to develop a “new materialist” mathematics, focusing on differing (see 
Chapter 7 of this book), as a worthy alternative to set theory. The second 
is interesting, because this route is actually the most commonly followed, 
including by Rotman, DeLanda, and Massumi. Following Mandelbrot’s 
non-Euclidean geometry, it is especially topology that is considered as 
a fruitful ground for a materialist mathematical metaphysics. Topology 
might even be considered the very opposite of set theory, practicing a 
radical “difference in degree” as opposed to set-theory’s “difference in 
kind.” Bearing this in mind, DeLanda (2002, 24; original emphasis) 
defines topology as: “[…] the least differentiated geometry, the one with 
the least number of distinct equivalence classes, the one in which many 
discontinuous forms have blended into one continuous one.” Massumi, in 
his 2002 Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation explains very 
well how topology should be seen as the smoothest of the sciences, or as 
Elie Ayache (2010, 147) beautifully puts it: “Mathematics is a thought 
(and not just a calculus), and it is thought that asserts existence through 
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the orientation of its discourse.” Massumi (2002, 135), recalling Kirby, 
adds to this:
Topology is not a qualitative science. It is not empirical, if 
empirical investigation is meant as progressing from description 
to prediction. It has no predictive value. Incapable of directly 
referencing anything other than its own variations, it is more 
analogical than descriptive. It is not, however, an analog of 
anything in particular. It is not an analog in the everyday 
sense of a variation on a model. Here, there is no model. Only 
infolding and outfolding: self-referential transformation. The 
analog is process, self-referenced to its own variations.
Although Meillassoux, in After Finitude, seems to be most interested in 
physics, and sometimes seems to be seduced by set theoretical problems 
(following the way his teacher Badiou has always been keen on such 
mathematical models) such as Cantor’s theorem, his speculative materialism 
seems to be in need of a mathematics that actually comes very close to the 
speculative pragmatism that Massumi has been working on in past years, 
and notably to the role topology plays in this type of thinking. And vice 
versa, Meillassoux’s interest in the absolute, in searching for the transfinite, 
or the “unclosed pluralization of the infinite qualities” (Meillassoux [2006] 
2008, 142) might be just what Massumi needs when exploring what 
topology can do. The notion of the virtual (as Massumi takes this from 
Bergson and Deleuze) especially seems to him of the greatest importance, as 
affirmed in Meillassoux’s “Potentiality and Virtuality” (2011). As Massumi 
(2002, 135) puts it:
A topological image center literally makes the virtual appear, in 
felt thought. It is more apparitional than empirical. Sensation, 
always on arrival a transformative feeling of the outside, a 
feeling of thought, is the being of the analog. It is matter in 
analog mode.
The smoothness of topology is nowadays mostly developed (in maths) 
in so-called “pointless topology,” continuing the traits of Peter T. Johnstone 
(1977), and mereotopology as it follows Whitehead ([1929/1978] 1985). 
Here we see most convincingly why Deleuze and Guattari considered 
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mathematics (together with music) capable of producing the smoothest of 
smooth spaces, and thus as most suitable for a rewriting of the dualisms that 
haunt us. Johnstone’s concept of the “locales” for instance, as he opposes 
them to “frames,” allow us to rethink morphology in terms of “continuous 
maps” (Johnstone 1982, 39) as he calls them. No longer related to objects, 
“locales” allow us to do pure morphology that always already includes 
a multiplicity of bodies equaling physical nature. Mathematics (pointless 
topology) is then our route (among many unforeseen routes) that allows us 
to get rid of our vectorial (homomorphic) status “in favor of a spreading out 
on the surface,” as Cache (1995, 75) puts it. Our upright position, as the 
latter continues, would then only be a consequence of the morphologies at 
work on the continuous abstract map (or plane) that is realized.
To close with an example, we could think of how Massumi (2002, 75) 
re-reads Michel Serres’ analysis of a soccer game, which concludes as 
follows: “The player’s subjectivity is disconnected as he enters the field of 
potential in and as its sensation. For the play, the player is that sensation. 
The sensation is a channeling of field potential into local action, from 
which it is again transduced into a global reconfiguration of the field 
of potential. Sensation is the mode in which potential is present in the 
perceiving body.” The manner in which Massumi does not take man as the 
starting point of analysis—or even of bodies—but rather the forces and 
surfaces that are being realized throughout the material practice, opens the 
way for a pointless topology similar to how Johnstone and contemporary 
Whiteheadians would have it. Massumi’s case proves Johnstone right in 
introducing a concept like “continuous mapping” when emphasizing the 
morphogeneses taking place with the creation of surfaces. Freeing us from 
the point, the line and even from movement (which in the end makes up a 
correlationist argument, as Meillassoux would put it), the virtual absolute 
is actualized. Pointless topology is then one of the “infinity mechanisms” 
in which Henri Michaux ([1972] 2002, 70) finds himself: the one infinite 
mechanism that is all. It liberates a new materialism.
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Notes
1. Here it should be mentioned once again that French feminist theories, in contradis-
tinction to the works reviewed and synthesized by Harding, have dealt with Lloyd’s 
monist question, and that this minor tradition in feminist theory has been our main 
source of inspiration. When Braidotti (2011a) writes that “Colebrook (2000a) sug-
gests that a younger feminist wave is looking at the question of sexual difference as 
not only or primarily a question that concerns the subject or the subject’s body,” she 
is referring precisely to the way in which a monism actually shifts anthropocentrism. 
Colebrook provocatively calls this new feminist materialism “a materialism with-
out bodies.” Colebrook used this term at the conference “What is the Matter with 
Materialism?,” Utrecht University, October 25, 2010.
2. Rather than implicitly accepting a humanism or anthropocentrism, Rotman (and 
Deleuze and Guattari)’s mathematics of gesture seem(s) to engage with what 
Stengers has called a “cosmopolitical network” or what Latour refers to as “the 
Parliament of Things” (see also Lischka 2007: 40). In line with Rotman, Latour 
([1991] 1993: 142) considers the sciences to be of interest (to politics) because of 
its intensities that are both human and non-human, both material and immaterial, 
indeed, that flow contingently:
[…] we continue to believe in the sciences, but instead of taking in their objectiv-
ity, their truth, their coldness, their extraterritoriality—qualities they never had, 
except after the arbitrary withdrawal of epistemology—we retain what has always 
been most interesting about them: their daring, their experimentation, their un-
certainty, their warmth, their incongruous blend of hybrids, their crazy ability to 
reconstitute the social bond.
3. This goes beyond the claim found in Telling Flesh, which reads: “[…] we think of 
the referent as neither preceding nor following language because it is an immanence 
within it” (Kirby 1997: 19). Where the earlier Kirby seems to prioritise language—
the referent being an immanence within language—the later Kirby comes to evoke 
a univocity that comes close to Deleuze and Guattari when they state in A Thousand 
Plateaus: “There are variables of expression that establish a relation between language 
and the outside, but precisely because they are immanent to language” (Deleuze and 
Guattari [1980] 1987: 82; original emphasis). Here, we do not look at language, 
but at immediate circumstantial expression and implied collective assemblages. 
Mathematics’ “reference to itself” should be read in the latter manner.
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